From ed90c0237d5219f364a0b7ddad97e30135117dee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Batcherdink <105207317+Batcherdink@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 21:54:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Replaced the "I would" by "We would" and Replaced the "I would" by "We would" because it's now a group work --- guide.md | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/guide.md b/guide.md index 157145a..dac7860 100644 --- a/guide.md +++ b/guide.md @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ You must consider your threat model[^12] before going further. (Illustration by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.5) -Will this guide help you protect your privacy from OSINT researchers like Bellingcat[^13], Doxing[^14] trolls on 4chan[^15], and others that have no access to the NSA toolbox? More likely. Tho I would not be so sure about 4chan. +Will this guide help you protect your privacy from OSINT researchers like Bellingcat[^13], Doxing[^14] trolls on 4chan[^15], and others that have no access to the NSA toolbox? More likely. Tho we would not be so sure about 4chan. Here is a basic simplified threat model for this guide: @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ Here is an illustration showing the current state of DNS and HTTPS privacy based ![][56] -As for your normal daily use (non-sensitive), remember that only Firefox-based browsers support ECH (formerly eSNI) so far and that it is only useful with websites hosted behind Cloudflare CDN at this stage. If you prefer a Chrome-based version (which is understandable for some due to some better-integrated features like on-the-fly Translation), then I would recommend the use of Brave instead which supports all Chrome extensions and offers much better privacy than Chrome. +As for your normal daily use (non-sensitive), remember that only Firefox-based browsers support ECH (formerly eSNI) so far and that it is only useful with websites hosted behind Cloudflare CDN at this stage. If you prefer a Chrome-based version (which is understandable for some due to some better-integrated features like on-the-fly Translation), then we would recommend the use of Brave instead which supports all Chrome extensions and offers much better privacy than Chrome. But the story does not stop there right. Now because after all this, even if you encrypt your DNS and use all possible mitigations. Simple IP requests to any server will probably allow an adversary to still detect which site you are visiting. And this is simply because the majority of websites have unique IPs tied to them as explained here: [[Archive.org]][57]. This means that an adversary can create a dataset of known websites for instance including their IPs and then match this dataset against the IP you ask for. In most cases, this will result in a correct guess of the website you are visiting. This means that despite OCSP stapling, despite ECH/eSNI, despite using Encrypted DNS ... An adversary can still guess the website you are visiting anyway. @@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ There is a frequent adage among the infosec community: "Don't roll your own cryp And there are reasons[^255]'[^256]'[^257]'[^258] for that: -I would not want people discouraged from studying and innovating in the crypto field because of that adage. So instead, I would recommend people to be cautious with "Roll your own crypto" because it is not necessarily good crypto: +We would not want people discouraged from studying and innovating in the crypto field because of that adage. So instead, we would recommend people to be cautious with "Roll your own crypto" because it is not necessarily good crypto: - Good cryptography is not easy and usually takes years of research to develop and fine-tune. @@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ First, here is a small basic UML diagram showing your available options accordin - It is new and it has great specs (more than 16GB or for a perfect experience 32GB of RAM, >250GB of disk space, recent fast CPU): - - **You could go for any route, but I would recommend Qubes OS if your threat model allows it.** + - **You could go for any route, but we would recommend Qubes OS if your threat model allows it.** - If it is an ARM-based M1 Mac: @@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ First, here is a small basic UML diagram showing your available options accordin - **Qubes OS is not supported on ARM architecture yet.** -**Your only option on M1 Macs is probably to stick with Tor Browses for now. But I would guess that if you can afford an M1 Mac you should probably get a dedicated x86 laptop for more sensitive activities.** +**Your only option on M1 Macs is probably to stick with Tor Browses for now. But we would guess that if you can afford an M1 Mac you should probably get a dedicated x86 laptop for more sensitive activities.** ### Skills: @@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ This is rather easy. Leave your smartphone on and at home. Have some cash and go *A note regarding your current phone:* The point of leaving your smartphone on is to create avoid leaking the fact that you're not using the device. If a smartphone is turned off, this creates a metadata trail that can be used to correlate the time your smartphone was turned off with the activation of your burner. If possible, leave your phone doing something (for example, watching YouTube on auto-play) to obscure the metadata trail further. This will not make it impossible to correlate your inactivity, but may make it more difficult if your phone's usage patterns can look convincing while you buy your burner. -I would recommend getting an old "dumbphone" with a removable battery (old Nokia if your mobile networks still allow those to connect as some countries phased out 1G-2G completely). This is to avoid the automatic sending/gathering of any telemetry/diagnostic data on the phone itself. You should never connect that phone to any Wi-Fi. +We would recommend getting an old "dumbphone" with a removable battery (old Nokia if your mobile networks still allow those to connect as some countries phased out 1G-2G completely). This is to avoid the automatic sending/gathering of any telemetry/diagnostic data on the phone itself. You should never connect that phone to any Wi-Fi. **Site Note: Be careful of some sellers as shown here ** [[Archive.org]][226] @@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ See [Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices] Double-check that the mobile operators selling the pre-paid SIM cards will accept the SIM activation and top-up without any ID registration of any kind before going there. Ideally, they should accept SIM activation and top-up from the country you live in. -I would recommend GiffGaff in the UK as they are "affordable", do not require identification for activation and top-up, and will even allow you to change your number up to two times from their website. One GiffGaff prepaid SIM card will therefore grant you three numbers to use for your needs. +We would recommend GiffGaff in the UK as they are "affordable", do not require identification for activation and top-up, and will even allow you to change your number up to two times from their website. One GiffGaff prepaid SIM card will therefore grant you three numbers to use for your needs. Power off the phone after activation/top-up and before going home. Do not ever power it on again unless you are not at a place that can be used to reveal your identity and ideally leave your real phone on but at home before going to the safe place with only your burner phone. @@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ Therefore IMHO, it is just more convenient, cheaper, and less risky to just get **Skip this step if you have no intention of creating anonymous accounts on most mainstream platforms but just want anonymous browsing or if the platforms you will use allow registration without a phone number.** -Get at least one or two decent size generic USB keys (at least 16GB but I would recommend 32GB). +Get at least one or two decent size generic USB keys (at least 16GB but we would recommend 32GB). Please do not buy or use gimmicky self-encrypting devices such as these: [[Archive.org]][235] @@ -2085,7 +2085,9 @@ You will find details about each level here: