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export/guide.html

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 </header>
 <h1 id="the-hitchhikers-guide-to-online-anonymity">The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Online Anonymity</h1>
 <p>(Or “How I learned to start worrying and love <del>privacy</del> anonymity”)</p>
-<p>Version 1.1.4-pre1, June 2022 by Anonymous Planet</p>
+<p>Version 1.1.4-pre2, June 2022 by Anonymous Planet</p>
 <p><strong>Forever in memory of Lena, 1999-2022</strong></p>
 <h4 id="important-recommendation-for-ukrainians.-важлива-рекомендація-для-українців"><strong>IMPORTANT RECOMMENDATION FOR UKRAINIANS. ВАЖЛИВА РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЯ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ</strong></h4>
 <p>This is a message for the people of Ukraine.</p>
@@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@
 </ul>
 <h4 id="hardening-macos">Hardening macOS:</h4>
 <p>As a light introduction for new macOS users, consider <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFx5icuE6Io" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFx5icuE6Io</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=lFx5icuE6Io">[Invidious]</a></sup></p>
-<p>Now to go more in-depth in securing and hardening your macOS, I recommend reading this GitHub guide which should cover many of the issues: <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
+<p>Now to go more in-depth in securing and hardening your macOS, I recommend reading this guide which covers many of the issues: <a href="https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/" class="uri">https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p>Here are the basic steps you should take after your offline installation:</p>
 <h5 id="enable-firmware-password-with-disable-reset-capability-option">Enable Firmware password with “disable-reset-capability” option:</h5>
 <p>First, you should set up a firmware password following this guide from Apple: <a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455" class="uri">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
@@ -2076,7 +2076,7 @@
 <p>But you should document yourself on the actual issue before acting. This page is a good place to start: <a href="https://blog.jacopo.io/en/post/apple-ocsp/" class="uri">https://blog.jacopo.io/en/post/apple-ocsp/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://blog.jacopo.io/en/post/apple-ocsp/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p>Up to you really. I would block it because I do not want any telemetry at all from my OS to the mothership without my specific consent. None.</p>
 <h5 id="enable-full-disk-encryption-filevault">Enable Full Disk encryption (Filevault):</h5>
-<p>You should enable full disk encryption on your Mac using Filevault according to this part of the guide: <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#full-disk-encryption" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#full-disk-encryption</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
+<p>You should enable full disk encryption on your Mac using Filevault according to this part of the guide: <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#full-disk-encryption" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#full-disk-encryption</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p><strong>Be careful when enabling. Do not store the recovery key at Apple if prompted (should not be an issue since you should be offline at this stage). You do not want a third party to have your recovery key.</strong></p>
 <h5 id="mac-address-randomization">MAC Address Randomization:</h5>
 <p>Unfortunately, macOS does not offer a native convenient way of randomizing your MAC Address and so you will have to do this manually. This will be reset at each reboot, and you will have to re-do it each time to ensure you do not use your actual MAC Address when connecting to various Wi-Fis</p>
@@ -6015,9 +6015,58 @@ Privacy and Security Track Record ***
 <th>
 De-centralized
 </th>
+<th>
+Additional notes
+</th>
 </tr>
 </thead>
 <tbody>
+<tr class="even">
+<td>
+<p>
+Berty
+</p>
+<p>
+(avoid)
+</p>
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+No
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes <a href="#fn13" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref13" role="doc-noteref"><sup>13</sup></a>
+</td>
+<td>
+Good
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes
+</td>
+<td>
+Good
+</td>
+<td>
+Yes (peer to peer)
+</td>
+<td>
+Not sufficiently reviewed by this project, cannot recommend
+</td>
+</tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
 Briar (preferred)
@@ -6055,6 +6104,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 Yes (peer to peer)
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6098,6 +6149,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 Yes (peer to peer)
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6141,6 +6194,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6179,6 +6234,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 Partial (federated servers)
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6217,6 +6274,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6255,6 +6314,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 Yes (peer to peer)
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6293,6 +6354,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6331,6 +6394,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6374,6 +6439,9 @@ Good
 <td>
 Partial
 </td>
+<td>
+Tor breaks some features
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6412,6 +6480,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6448,6 +6518,8 @@ E-Mail Required
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6486,6 +6558,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6524,6 +6598,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6562,10 +6638,12 @@ Bad<a href="#fn6" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref6" role="doc-noteref"><sup>6</su
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
-qTox
+Tox (avoid)
 </td>
 <td>
 Yes
@@ -6600,6 +6678,9 @@ Medium<a href="#fn7" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref7" role="doc-noteref"><sup>7<
 <td>
 Yes
 </td>
+<td>
+Known cryptographic weaknesses<a href="#fn14" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref14" role="doc-noteref"><sup>14</sup></a>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6643,6 +6724,9 @@ Good
 <td>
 Yes
 </td>
+<td>
+Lacks PFS, deniability
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6681,6 +6765,9 @@ Good
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+Requires burner or anonymous VOIP number for anonymous usage
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6719,6 +6806,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6757,6 +6846,9 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+Deleted/expired messages are easily recoverable<a href="#fn15" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref15" role="doc-noteref"><sup>15</sup></a>,<a href="#fn16" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref16" role="doc-noteref"><sup>16</sup></a>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6795,6 +6887,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6833,6 +6927,8 @@ Medium<a href="#fn9" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref9" role="doc-noteref"><sup>9<
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6871,6 +6967,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6909,6 +7007,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -6947,6 +7047,8 @@ Bad
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -6985,6 +7087,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="even">
 <td>
@@ -7023,6 +7127,8 @@ Good
 <td>
 Partial
 </td>
+<td>
+</td>
 </tr>
 <tr class="odd">
 <td>
@@ -7061,6 +7167,9 @@ Bad<a href="#fn12" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref12" role="doc-noteref"><sup>12<
 <td>
 No
 </td>
+<td>
+Malware risk<a href="#fn17" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref17" role="doc-noteref"><sup>17</sup></a>
+</td>
 </tr>
 </tbody>
 </table>
@@ -7127,6 +7236,31 @@ The Incercept, Zoom Meetings Aren’t End-to-End Encrypted, Despite Misleading M
 Serpentsec, Secure Messaging: Choosing a chat app <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://serpentsec.1337.cx/secure-messaging-choosing-a-chat-app">https://web.archive.org/web/https://serpentsec.1337.cx/secure-messaging-choosing-a-chat-app</a><a href="#fnref12" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
 </p>
 </li>
+<li id="fn13" role="doc-endnote">
+<p>
+Berty, Development, <a href="https://berty.tech">https://berty.tech</a><a href="#fn13" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
+</p>
+</li>
+<li id="fn14" role="doc-endnote">
+<p>
+Tox Handshake Vulnerable to KCI, <a href="https://github.com/TokTok/c-toxcore/issues/426">https://github.com/TokTok/c-toxcore/issues/426</a><a href="#fn13" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
+</p>
+</li>
+<li id="fn15" role="doc-endnote">
+<p>
+The Guardian, Deleted Snapchat photos recovered ‘within days’ by forensics company, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/may/09/snapchat-photos-not-deleted">https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/may/09/snapchat-photos-not-deleted</a><a href="#fn13" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
+</p>
+</li>
+<li id="fn16" role="doc-endnote">
+<p>
+The Guardian, Snapchat’s expired snaps are not deleted, just hidden, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131115224243/https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/partner-zone-infosecurity/snapchat-photos-not-deleted-hidden">https://web.archive.org/web/20131115224243/https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/partner-zone-infosecurity/snapchat-photos-not-deleted-hidden</a><a href="#fn13" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
+</p>
+</li>
+<li id="fn17" role="doc-endnote">
+<p>
+The Guardian, ‘Zoom is malware’: why experts worry about the video conferencing platform, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/zoom-technology-security-coronavirus-video-conferencing">https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/zoom-technology-security-coronavirus-video-conferencing</a><a href="#fn13" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a>
+</p>
+</li>
 </ol>
 </section>
 <p><strong>Legend:</strong></p>
@@ -7692,12 +7826,41 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <ul>
 <li><p>Easy options for less experienced users:</p>
 <ul>
-<li><p>If available, just use the Secure Erase option available from your BIOS/UEFI (ATA/NVME Secure Erase or Sanitize).</p></li>
+<li><p>If available, just use the Secure Erase option available from your BIOS/UEFI (ATA/NVME Secure Erase or Sanitize).</p>
+<ul>
+<li>It’s worth noting that this relies on your drive’s firmware. Some drive manufacturers have messed up the implementation, causing data to still be recoverable.</li>
+</ul></li>
 <li><p>Just re-install a fresh operating system (delete/quick format the drive) and re-encrypt it. The full disk encryption process should erase all previous data from the disk.</p></li>
 <li><p>Buy PartedMagic<a href="#fn456" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref456" role="doc-noteref"><sup>456</sup></a> for 11$ and use it to erase any disk.</p></li>
 </ul></li>
 <li><p>Technical options for more advanced users:</p>
 <ul>
+<li><p>Overwrite the entire drive’s contents</p>
+<ul>
+<li>HDDs:
+<ul>
+<li>Overwrite the drive’s contents using a tool like <a href="https://www.howtogeek.com/425232/how-to-securely-delete-files-on-linux/">srm</a>, <a href="https://linux.die.net/man/1/wipe">wipe</a>, <a href="https://recoverit.wondershare.com/harddrive-tips/format-and-wipe-linux-disk.html">shred, etc.</a>. Ideally you want to use the Gutmann method, which was created for most effective data erasure on all drives. This method also works on SSDs, although it is overkill.</li>
+<li>Simply overwriting the drive’s contents is not always enough. Dedicated secure deletion tools are designed to perform multiple passes to more effectively wipe data. This is expecially important on older drives. I recommend using either <code>wipe</code> or <code>srm</code>.
+<ul>
+<li>If using <code>wipe</code>, just use its default options (<code>wipe /dev/sdX</code>), as the defaults are tuned to most effectively wipe data on HDDs.</li>
+<li>If using <code>srm</code>, make sure to manually specify that it should perform a Gutmann wipe (<code>srm -G /dev/sdX</code>).</li>
+</ul></li>
+</ul></li>
+<li>SSDs:
+<ul>
+<li>Overwrite the drive’s contents. Tools like wipe or shred are often overkill, as they perform up to 35 passes. While they work, most SSDs require no more than a couple passes.</li>
+<li>Use <code>wipe</code> with only a couple passes: <code>wipe -qQ2 /dev/sdX</code>.
+<ul>
+<li><code>-qQ2</code> means 2 passes. Replace <code>2</code> with the desired number of passes.</li>
+</ul></li>
+<li>Use <code>srm</code> with a 3-pass overwrite: <code>srm -P /dev/sdX</code>.</li>
+<li>Use <code>dd</code>: <code>dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sdX bs=8M status=progress conv=fsync</code>. This command will overwrite the drive with random data. To perform multiple passes (I recommend at least 2), simply run the command again until you’re satisfied.
+<ul>
+<li>The reason you run it twice is because SSDs have hidden (“overprovisioned”) storage which can contain remnants of deleted data. Wiping twice forces the drive to wipe its overprovisioned storage. This is only guaranteed to work if each pass writes different data (which is why we wipe with random data on each pass).</li>
+<li><code>bs=8M</code> writes 8MiB blocks at a time. This doesn’t affect the quality of the data deletion, but adjusting it could affect how long it takes to wipe the drive.</li>
+</ul></li>
+</ul></li>
+</ul></li>
 <li><p>ATA/NVMe Secure Erase: This method will remove the mapping table that keeps track of allocated data on the storage Blocks but does not destroy the actual data.</p></li>
 <li><p>ATA/NVMe Sanitize Crypto Scramble (aka Instant Secure Erase, Crypto Erase), which applies to self-encrypting SSD drives: This method will change the encryption key of the self-encrypting SSD drive and render all the data stored in it unreadable.</p></li>
 <li><p>ATA/NVMe Sanitize Block Erase: This method performs an actual block erase on every storage block and will destroy the data and change the encryption key if present.</p></li>
@@ -7711,11 +7874,14 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <li><p>Remove platters (with a screwdriver, usually Torx T6)</p></li>
 <li><p>Rub the platters with a rare earth magnet</p></li>
 <li><p>Break/Deform/Crush the platters</p></li>
-<li><p>Burn them</p></li>
+<li><p>Burn the platters or cook them in an oven (<strong>do not</strong> skip this step)</p></li>
 <li><p>Separate the debris</p></li>
 <li><p>Throw away in separate places</p></li>
 </ol></li>
 <li><p>SSDs:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>Ideally you should wipe the drive through other means first, as this method alone is not known to be secure against all attackers</li>
+</ul>
 <ol type="1">
 <li><p>Open the drive</p></li>
 <li><p>Break/Crush the board and memory cells</p></li>
@@ -8090,7 +8256,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <h4 id="guest-os">Guest OS:</h4>
 <p>Revert to an earlier snapshot on Virtualbox (or any other VM software you are using) and perform a Trim command on your Mac using Disk Utility by executing a first-aid on the Host OS again as explained at the end of the next section.</p>
 <h4 id="host-os">Host OS:</h4>
-<p>Most of the info from this section can also be found at this nice guide <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
+<p>Most of the info from this section can also be found at this nice guide <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <h5 id="quarantine-database-used-by-gatekeeper-and-xprotect">Quarantine Database (used by Gatekeeper and XProtect):</h5>
 <p>macOS (up to and including Big Sur) keeps a Quarantine SQL Database of all the files you ever downloaded from a Browser. This database is located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2</code>.</p>
 <p>You can query it yourself by running the following command from terminal: <code>sqlite3 ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2 &quot;select * from LSQuarantineEvent&quot;</code></p>
@@ -8103,7 +8269,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <ul>
 <li><code>sudo spctl --master-disable</code></li>
 </ul>
-<p>Refer to this section of this guide for further information <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#gatekeeper-and-xprotect" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#gatekeeper-and-xprotect</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
+<p>Refer to this section of this guide for further information <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#gatekeeper-and-xprotect" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#gatekeeper-and-xprotect</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p>In addition to this convenient database, each saved file will also carry detailed file system HFS+/APFS attributes showing for instance when it was downloaded, with what, and from where.</p>
 <p>You can view these just by opening a terminal and typing <code>mdls filename</code> and <code>xattr -l filename</code> on any downloaded file from any browser.</p>
 <p>To remove such attributes, you will have to do it manually from the terminal:</p>
@@ -8197,7 +8363,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p>Clearing the QuarantineEventsV2 is easy as explained above. Removing the attributes takes some work. <strong>Brave is the only tested browser that will not store those attributes by default in normal operations.</strong></p>
 <h5 id="various-artifacts">Various Artifacts:</h5>
 <p>In addition, macOS keeps various logs of mounted devices, connected devices, known networks, analytics, documents revisions…</p>
-<p>See this section of this guide for guidance on where to find and how to delete such artifacts: <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#metadata-and-artifacts" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#metadata-and-artifacts</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
+<p>See this section of this guide for guidance on where to find and how to delete such artifacts: <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#metadata-and-artifacts" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#metadata-and-artifacts</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p>Many of those can be deleted using various commercial third-party tools but I would personally recommend using the free and well-known Onyx which you can find here: <a href="https://www.titanium-software.fr/en/onyx.html" class="uri">https://www.titanium-software.fr/en/onyx.html</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.titanium-software.fr/en/onyx.html">[Archive.org]</a></sup>. Unfortunately, it is closed-source, but it is notarized, signed, and has been trusted for many years.</p>
 <h5 id="force-a-trim-operation-after-cleaning">Force a Trim operation after cleaning:</h5>
 <ul>
@@ -11020,7 +11186,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <li id="fn520" role="doc-endnote"><p>Wikipedia, macOS Malware <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/macOS_malware" class="uri">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/macOS_malware</a> <sup><a href="https://wikiless.org/wiki/MacOS_malware">[Wikiless]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacOS_malware">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref520" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn521" role="doc-endnote"><p>MacWorld, List of Mac viruses, malware and security flaws <a href="https://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/mac-viruses-list-3668354/" class="uri">https://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/mac-viruses-list-3668354/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/mac-viruses-list-3668354/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref521" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn522" role="doc-endnote"><p>JAMF, The Mac Malware of 2020 <a href="https://resources.jamf.com/documents/macmalware-2020.pdf" class="uri">https://resources.jamf.com/documents/macmalware-2020.pdf</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://resources.jamf.com/documents/macmalware-2020.pdf">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref522" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn523" role="doc-endnote"><p>macOS Security and Privacy Guide, <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#viruses-and-malware" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#viruses-and-malware</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref523" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn523" role="doc-endnote"><p>macOS Security and Privacy Guide, <a href="https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#viruses-and-malware" class="uri">https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#viruses-and-malware</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref523" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn524" role="doc-endnote"><p>ImageTragick.com, <a href="https://imagetragick.com/" class="uri">https://imagetragick.com/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://imagetragick.com/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref524" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn525" role="doc-endnote"><p>Oracle Virtualbox Documentation, <a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html" class="uri">https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref525" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn526" role="doc-endnote"><p>Oracle Virtualbox Documentation, <a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html" class="uri">https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/admin/hyperv-support.html">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref526" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>