diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 8781a49..c730975 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,3 +1,22 @@ +v1.1.5 +- Various spelling and grammar fixes +- Fixed several numbering errors in references +- Updated and fixed many broken URLs and saved them in the Wayback Machine +- Noted that https://mastodon.social/@anonypla is gone? added strike-through +- Adapted Qubes OS hardware requirements that were too low for a decent experience (RAM) according to their recommendation +- Put more incentive to use Tor Browser Safest mode as long as it does not break anything and switch to Safer if necessary and with precautions linked in an appendix +- Precision that Anti-Evil Maid on Qubes OS is only available on Intel CPUs +- Removed dead link of Centry Fork project +- Added Windows 11 support to the guide +- Partial additions of partial Qubes 4.1.X support but needs completion and testing (coming soon) +- Added link to official guide to upgrade from Qubes 4.0.X to 4.1.X (fresh or in-place) +- Fixed issue in Qubes OS Tor over VPN and VPN over Tor Networking cases that were just plain wrong +- Added guidance to run Windows 11 within Virtualbox + link to official guide from Oracle +- Added recommendation to install/use Safing PortMaster and added a link for some compatibility issues between Portmaster and some VPNs +- Removed Windows AME completely from the guide +- Replaced the "I would" by a "We would" since it is now a group effort and project +- Added a safest recommendation for more paranoid people in security level choices in Tor + v1.1.4-pre2 - Fixed some spelling/grammar - Update to contributing guidelines diff --git a/_layouts/default.html b/_layouts/default.html index 17b4556..b9ac633 100644 --- a/_layouts/default.html +++ b/_layouts/default.html @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ input:checked + .slider::before {
v1.1.5 - Various spelling and grammar fixes - Fixed several numbering errors in references - Updated and fixed many broken URLs and saved them in the Wayback Machine - Noted that https://mastodon.social/@anonypla is gone? added strike-through - Adapted Qubes OS hardware requirements that were too low for a decent experience (RAM) according to their recommendation - Put more incentive to use Tor Browser Safest mode as long as it does not break anything and switch to Safer if necessary and with precautions linked in an appendix - Precision that Anti-Evil Maid on Qubes OS is only available on Intel CPUs - Removed dead link of Centry Fork project - Added Windows 11 support to the guide - Partial additions of partial Qubes 4.1.X support but needs completion and testing (coming soon) - Added link to official guide to upgrade from Qubes 4.0.X to 4.1.X (fresh or in-place) - Fixed issue in Qubes OS Tor over VPN and VPN over Tor Networking cases that were just plain wrong - Added guidance to run Windows 11 within Virtualbox + link to official guide from Oracle - Added recommendation to install/use Safing PortMaster and added a link for some compatibility issues between Portmaster and some VPNs - Removed Windows AME completely from the guide - Replaced the “I would” by a “We would” since it is now a group effort and project - Added a safest recommendation for more paranoid people in security level choices in Tor
v1.1.4-pre2 - Fixed some spelling/grammar - Update to contributing guidelines - Update of modern-crypto room rules - Addition of chatroom-rules for the PSA community - Update of verification guide (removed outdated content, fixed links, updates) - Removal of CTemplar references since it was shutdown - Fixed links to Proton services, references, onion URL, and archives - Removal of BTC Wasabi recommedation in favor of Coinjoin alternative and wallet recommendations - Re-phrasing of some confusing sentences - LibRedirect extension is recommended again - Fixed many links formatting - Removal of removed content (dark pdf) - Fixed links to ODT file - Added recommendation to https://z0ccc.github.io/extension-fingerprints/# and https://www.deviceinfo.me/ - Removed links to non-existant mirrors - Updated some outdated references(old project)
v1.1.4-pre1 - Addition of a legacy resources page for the old archives - Changes in the about page to reflect the current situation - Changes in the donation page to reflect the current situation - Fix link to video “How to Hack a Turned-Off Computer, [..]” - Misspelling and grammar mistakes fixed - Fix formatting - Garbage removal - Inline linking fixes - Privacyguides changed their URL scheme - Almost all archive.org links fixed - Annotated some links to make them more descriptive - Got rid of dupes and empty refs - Renew links for researchgate articles that were removed - Removed mobile wikipedia links - Fix a couple patent links & Rubber-hose cryptanalysis wiki - Update PDF archivals so they are direct links but not downloaded - Some scientific articles were removed or replaced - IEEExplore, Spread-spectrum watermarking of audio signals - ScienceDirect, Robust audio watermarking using perceptual masking - SSRN, The Cryptocurrency Tumblers: Risks, Legality and Oversight - Property of the People, Lawful Access to Secure Messaging Apps Data - Arxiv url fixes - s/grayshirt/grayshift/gi - Trailing parentheses and commas removed - Fixed all broken links - Removed uMatrix from the guide (use uBlock Origin) - Removal of https://xchange.me/ (abandoned) - Removal of https://swap.lightning-network.ro/ (abandoned) - Removal of https://privacyguides.org/providers/hosting/ (category removed from website) - Added a warning about the privacy redirect extension stating it might be abandoned/unmaintained - Added Anonymouth for linguistic antiforensics & related links
v1.1.3 - Added dedicated section about gait recognition and other long-range biometric techniques - Updated PDF toolchain to allow embedding images in the PDF guide
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comment: timestamp:1656409520 file:CODE_OF_CONDUCT.pdf hashed -cOjDmEPyXVfVTtQe55s4vKZsAbKBN7HmWO7Snh9Hy33XTc+3FuRNU8W0KrvO+0DRlz0mQiHj0slZs+bG6YoqBw== +RUSn9xivowlq/r1xd2/39+XfSTNVpibbcnkE5BVnm1u0VICA4ZKN0l8GqDkIgh/xuFjMwuJaWB/FY39Ngt8gKqv3qmIJrEbd/wE= +trusted comment: timestamp:1657508104 file:CODE_OF_CONDUCT.pdf hashed +t/c38k1ZTY76zJA2xx/Ma6lGLwg0zx6ig1DbyrkffJnwT1I5PLK2TANG+y+UnWUT555cBwGcEo9NXXbhzE9OCA== diff --git a/export/CONTRIBUTING.html b/export/CONTRIBUTING.html index 770c117..8d86649 100644 --- a/export/CONTRIBUTING.html +++ b/export/CONTRIBUTING.html @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@When reporting guide issues:
Donations to support this project are welcome as the funding of this project is limited. Those donations are mainly used to pay for Tor onion hosting (VPS), mail hosting, domain name registration, and to maintain/run Tor exit nodes. No profit is ever being made. All donations and spendings are being logged here below for transparency.
Current project donation goals:
Additional goals:
-Donate anonymously using Monero (XMR):
Here is the address for the main project:
@@ -44,10 +32,6 @@ Set-up more Tor Exit nodes if funding allows it.46crzj54eL493BA68pPT4A1MZyKQxrpZu9tVNsfsoa5nT85QqCt8cDTfy1fcTH1oyjdtUbhmpZ4QcVtfEXB337Ng6PS21MLHere is the address for additional goals:
-coming soonDonate using Bitcoin (BTC):
Here are the addresses for the main project:
1BBgBSVe6w4DWq2BewUQhDEjsNovhfPswD____________________
Here are the addresses for additional goals:
-coming sooncoming soonThank you for any contribution. All donations will be mentioned within this file.
Donations log (UTC date/time):
(Or “How I learned to start worrying and love privacy anonymity”)
Version 1.1.4-pre2, June 2022 by Anonymous Planet
+Version 1.1.5, June 2022 by Anonymous Planet
Forever in memory of Lena, 1999-2022
This is a message for the people of Ukraine.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@Ви можете знайти його тут: https://briarproject.org/ і тут: https://briarproject.org/quick-start/uk/.
За допомогою цієї програми ви можете спілкуватися, навіть коли немає Інтернету.
This guide is a work in progress. While I am doing the best I can to correct issues, inaccuracies, and improve the content, general structure, and readability; it will probably never be “finished”.
+This guide is a work in progress. While we are doing the best we can to correct issues, inaccuracies, and improve the content, general structure, and readability; it will probably never be “finished”.
There might be some wrong or outdated information in this guide because no human is omniscient, and humans do make mistakes. Please do not take this guide as a definitive gospel or truth because it is not. Mistakes have been written in the guide in earlier versions and fixed later when discovered. There are likely still some mistakes in this guide at this moment (hopefully few). Those are fixed as soon as possible when discovered.
This guide has been moved, due to recent unfortunate events. The old guide was at anonymousplanet.org, but has since been moved to https://anonymousplanet-ng.org
Your experience may vary. Remember to check regularly for an updated version of this guide.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@Precautions while reading this guide and accessing the various links:
Documents/Files have a [Archive.org] link next to them for accessing content through Archive.org for increased privacy and in case the content goes missing. Some links are not yet archived or outdated on archive.org in which case I encourage you to ask for a new save if possible.
Documents/Files have a [Archive.org] link next to them for accessing content through Archive.org for increased privacy and in case the content goes missing. Some links are not yet archived or outdated on archive.org in which case we encourage you to ask for a new save if possible.
YouTube Videos have a [Invidious] link next to them for accessing content through an Invidious Instance (in this case yewtu.be hosted in the Netherlands) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See https://github.com/iv-org/invidious [Archive.org] for more information.
Twitter links have a [Nitter] link next to them for accessing content through a Nitter Instance (in this case nitter.net) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See https://github.com/zedeus/nitter [Archive.org] for more information.
Wikipedia links have a [Wikiless] link next to them for accessing content through a Wikiless Instance (in this case Wikiless.org) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See https://codeberg.org/orenom/wikiless [Archive.org] for more information.
You must consider your threat model12 before going further.
(Illustration by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.5)
-Will this guide help you protect your privacy from OSINT researchers like Bellingcat13, Doxing14 trolls on 4chan15, and others that have no access to the NSA toolbox? More likely. Tho I would not be so sure about 4chan.
+Will this guide help you protect your privacy from OSINT researchers like Bellingcat13, Doxing14 trolls on 4chan15, and others that have no access to the NSA toolbox? More likely. Tho we would not be so sure about 4chan.
Here is a basic simplified threat model for this guide:
(Note that the “magical amulets/submarine/fake your own death” jokes are quoted from the excellent article “This World of Ours” by James Mickens, 2014above16)
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@…
This guide is written with hope for those good-intended individuals who might not be knowledgeable enough to consider the big picture of online anonymity and privacy.
-Lastly, use it at your own risk. Anything in here is not legal advice and you should verify compliance with your local law before use (IANAL25). “Trust but verify”26 all the information yourself (or even better, “Never Trust, always verify”27). I strongly encourage you to inform yourself and do not hesitate to check any information in this guide with outside sources in case of doubt. Please do report any mistake you spot to me as I welcome criticism. Even harsh but sound criticism is welcome and will result in having the necessary corrections made as quickly as possible.
+Lastly, use it at your own risk. Anything in here is not legal advice and you should verify compliance with your local law before use (IANAL25). “Trust but verify”26 all the information yourself (or even better, “Never Trust, always verify”27). We strongly encourage you to inform yourself and do not hesitate to check any information in this guide with outside sources in case of doubt. Please do report any mistake you spot to us as we welcome criticism. Even harsh but sound criticism is welcome and will result in having the necessary corrections made as quickly as possible.
There are many ways you can be tracked besides browser cookies and ads, your e-mail, and your phone number. And if you think only the Mossad or the NSA/FSB can find you, you would be wrong.
First, you could also consider these more general resources on privacy and security to learn more basics:
@@ -543,8 +543,8 @@Techlore videos*: https://www.youtube.com/c/Techlore [Invidious]
Privacy Guides: https://privacyguides.org/ [Archive.org]
Privacy Tools*: https://privacytools.io [Archive.org]
Note that these websites could contain affiliate/sponsored content and/or merchandising. This guide does not endorse and is not sponsored by any commercial entity in any way.
Note that these websites could contain affiliate/sponsored content and/or merchandising. This guide does not endorse and is not sponsored by any commercial entity in any way.
If you skipped those, you should really still consider viewing this YouTube playlist from the Techlore Go Incognito project (https://github.com/techlore-official/go-incognito [Archive.org]) as an introduction before going further: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3KeV6Ui_4CayDGHw64OFXEPHgXLkrtJO [Invidious]. This guide will cover many of the topics in the videos of this playlist with more details and references as well as some added topics not covered within that series. This will just take you 2 or 3 hours to watch it all.
Now, here is a non-exhaustive list of some of the many ways you could be tracked and de-anonymized:
For those reasons, we will need to obfuscate and hide that origin IP (the one tied to your identification) or hide it as much as we can through a combination of various means:
+For those reasons, you will need to obfuscate and hide that origin IP (the one tied to your identification) or hide it as much as we can through a combination of various means:
Using a public Wi-Fi service (free).
Using the Tor Anonymity Network30 (free).
Small in-between Disclaimer: This guide does not necessarily endorse or recommends Cloudflare services even if it is mentioned several times in this section for technical understanding.
Unfortunately, the TLS protocol used in most HTTPS connections in most Browsers (Chrome/Brave among them) will leak the Domain Name again through SNI42 handshakes (this can be checked here at Cloudflare: https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl/encrypted-sni/ [Archive.org] ). As of the writing of this guide, only Firefox-based browsers supports ECH (Encrypted Client Hello43 previously known as eSNI44) on some websites which will encrypt everything end to end (in addition to using a secure private DNS over TLS/HTTPS) and will allow you to hide your DNS requests from a third party45. And this option is not enabled by default either so you will have to enable it yourself.
In addition to limited browser support, only Web Services and CDNs46 behind Cloudflare CDN support ECH/eSNI at this stage47. This means that ECH and eSNI are not supported (as of the writing of this guide) by most mainstream platforms such as:
+In addition to limited browser support, only web Services and CDNs46 behind Cloudflare CDN support ECH/eSNI at this stage47. This means that ECH and eSNI are not supported (as of the writing of this guide) by most mainstream platforms such as:
Amazon (including AWS, Twitch…)
Microsoft (including Azure, OneDrive, Outlook, Office 365…)
Here is an illustration of the issue you could encounter on Firefox-based browsers:
Finally, even if you use a custom encrypted DNS server (DoH or DoT) with ECH/eSNI support and OCSP stapling, it might still not be enough as traffic analysis studies55 have shown it is still possible to reliably fingerprint and block unwanted requests. Only DNS over Tor was able to show efficient DNS Privacy in recent studies but even that can still be defeated by other means (see Your Anonymized Tor/VPN traffic).
-One could also decide to use a Tor Hidden DNS Service or ODoH (Oblivious DNS over HTTPS56) to further increase privacy/anonymity but unfortunately, as far as I know, these methods are only provided by Cloudflare as of this writing (https://blog.cloudflare.com/welcome-hidden-resolver/ [Archive.org], https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/ [Archive.org]). These are workable and reasonably secure technical options but there is also a moral choice if you want to use Cloudflare or not (despite the risk posed by some researchers57).
+One could also decide to use a Tor Hidden DNS Service or ODoH (Oblivious DNS over HTTPS56) to further increase privacy/anonymity but unfortunately, as far as we know, these methods are only provided by Cloudflare as of this writing (https://blog.cloudflare.com/welcome-hidden-resolver/ [Archive.org], https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/ [Archive.org]). These are workable and reasonably secure technical options but there is also a moral choice if you want to use Cloudflare or not (despite the risk posed by some researchers57).
Lastly, there is also this new possibility called DoHoT which stands for DNS over HTTPS over Tor which could also further increase your privacy/anonymity and which you could consider if you are more skilled with Linux. See https://github.com/alecmuffett/dohot [Archive.org]. This guide will not help you with this one at this stage, but it might be coming soon.
Here is an illustration showing the current state of DNS and HTTPS privacy based on my current knowledge.
As for your normal daily use (non-sensitive), remember that only Firefox-based browsers support ECH (formerly eSNI) so far and that it is only useful with websites hosted behind Cloudflare CDN at this stage. If you prefer a Chrome-based version (which is understandable for some due to some better-integrated features like on-the-fly Translation), then I would recommend the use of Brave instead which supports all Chrome extensions and offers much better privacy than Chrome.
+As for your normal daily use (non-sensitive), remember that only Firefox-based browsers support ECH (formerly eSNI) so far and that it is only useful with websites hosted behind Cloudflare CDN at this stage. If you prefer a Chrome-based version (which is understandable for some due to some better-integrated features like on-the-fly Translation), then we would recommend the use of Brave instead which supports all Chrome extensions and offers much better privacy than Chrome.
But the story does not stop there right. Now because after all this, even if you encrypt your DNS and use all possible mitigations. Simple IP requests to any server will probably allow an adversary to still detect which site you are visiting. And this is simply because the majority of websites have unique IPs tied to them as explained here: https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an-ip-address/ [Archive.org]. This means that an adversary can create a dataset of known websites for instance including their IPs and then match this dataset against the IP you ask for. In most cases, this will result in a correct guess of the website you are visiting. This means that despite OCSP stapling, despite ECH/eSNI, despite using Encrypted DNS … An adversary can still guess the website you are visiting anyway.
Therefore, to mitigate all these issues (as much as possible and as best as we can), this guide will later recommend two solutions: Using Tor and a virtualized (See Appendix W: Virtualization) multi-layered solution of VPN over Tor solution (DNS over VPN over Tor or DNS over TOR). Other options will also be explained (Tor over VPN, VPN only, No Tor/VPN) but are less recommended.
…
While all these cannot be used to de-anonymize you from a remote online adversary, they can be used to narrow down a search if your approximate location at a certain time is known. For instance, you cannot rule out that some stores will effectively scan (and log) all RFID chips passing through the door. They might be looking for their loyalty cards but are also logging others along the way. Such RFID tags could be traced to your identity and allow for de-anonymization.
-More information over at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification#Security_concerns [Wikiless] [Archive.org] and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification#Privacy [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
+More information over at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification#Security_concerns [Wikiless] [Archive.org] and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification#Privacy [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
The only way to mitigate this problem is to have no RFID tags on you or to shield them again using a type of Faraday cage. You could also use specialized wallets/pouches that specifically block RFID communications. Many of those are now made by well-known brands such as Samsonite60. You should just not carry such RFID devices while conducting sensitive activities.
See Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
Here is also a good YouTube video on this topic: DEFCON Safe Mode - Cooper Quintin - Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real-Time https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=siCk4pGGcqA [Invidious]
For these reasons, it is crucial to get dedicated an anonymous phone number and/or an anonymous burner phone with an anonymous pre-paid sim card that is not tied to you in any way (past or present) for conducting sensitive activities (See more practical guidance in Getting an anonymous Phone number section).
-While there are some smartphones manufacturers like Purism with their Librem series101 who claim to have your privacy in mind, they still do not allow IMEI randomization which I believe is a key anti-tracking feature that should be provided by such manufacturers. While this measure will not prevent IMSI tracking within the SIM card, it would at least allow you to keep the same “burner phone” and only switch SIM cards instead of having to switch both for privacy.
+While there are some smartphones manufacturers like Purism with their Librem series101 who claim to have your privacy in mind, they still do not allow IMEI randomization which we believe is a key anti-tracking feature that should be provided by such manufacturers. While this measure will not prevent IMSI tracking within the SIM card, it would at least allow you to keep the same “burner phone” and only switch SIM cards instead of having to switch both for privacy.
See Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
The MAC address102 is a unique identifier tied to your physical Network Interface (Wired Ethernet or Wi-Fi) and could of course be used to track you if it is not randomized. As it was the case with the IMEI, manufacturers of computers and network cards usually keep logs of their sales (usually including things like serial number, IMEI, Mac Addresses, …) and it is possible again for them to track where and when the computer with the MAC address in question was sold and to whom. Even if you bought it with cash in a supermarket, the supermarket might still have CCTV (or a CCTV just outside that shop) and again the time/date of sale could be used to find out who was there using the Mobile Provider antenna logs at that time (IMEI/IMSI).
Operating Systems makers (Google/Microsoft/Apple) will also keep logs of devices and their MAC addresses in their logs for device identification (Find my device type services for example). Apple can tell that the MacBook with this specific MAC address was tied to a specific Apple Account before. Maybe yours before you decided to use the MacBook for sensitive activities. Maybe to a different user who sold it to you but remembers your e-mail/number from when the sale happened.
Your home router/Wi-Fi access point keeps logs of devices that are registered on the Wi-Fi, and these can be accessed too to find out who has been using your Wi-Fi. Sometimes this can be done remotely (and silently) by the ISP depending on if that router/Wi-Fi access point is being “managed” remotely by the ISP (which is often the case when they provide the router to their customers).
Some commercial devices will keep a record of MAC addresses roaming around for various purposes such as road congestion103.
-So, it is important again not to bring your phone along when/where you conduct sensitive activities. If you use your own laptop, then it is crucial to hide that MAC address (and Bluetooth address) anywhere you use it and be extra careful not to leak any information. Thankfully many recent OSes now feature or allow the possibility to randomize MAC addresses (Android, IOS, Linux, and Windows 10) with the notable exception of macOS which does not support this feature even in its latest Big Sur version.
+So, it is important again not to bring your phone along when/where you conduct sensitive activities. If you use your own laptop, then it is crucial to hide that MAC address (and Bluetooth address) anywhere you use it and be extra careful not to leak any information. Thankfully many recent OSes now feature or allow the possibility to randomize MAC addresses (Android, IOS, Linux, and Windows 10/11) with the notable exception of macOS which does not support this feature even in its latest Big Sur version.
See Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
Your Bluetooth MAC is like the earlier MAC address except it is for Bluetooth. Again, it can be used to track you as manufacturers and operating system makers keep logs of such information. It could be tied to a sale place/time/date or accounts and then could be used to track you with such information, the shop billing information, the CCTV, or the mobile antenna logs in correlation.
@@ -770,8 +770,8 @@If you are using Windows, you can check the vulnerability status of your CPU using inSpectre https://www.grc.com/inspectre.htm [Archive.org]
Some of these can be avoided using Virtualization Software settings that can mitigate such exploits. See this guide for more information https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Spectre_Meltdown [Archive.org] (warning: these can severely impact the performance of your VMs).
-I will therefore mitigate some of these issues in this guide by recommending the use of virtual machines on a dedicated anonymous laptop for your sensitive activities that will only be used from an anonymous public network.
-In addition, I will recommend the use of AMD CPUs vs Intel CPUs.
+We will therefore mitigate some of these issues in this guide by recommending the use of virtual machines on a dedicated anonymous laptop for your sensitive activities that will only be used from an anonymous public network.
+In addition, we recommend the use of AMD CPUs instead of Intel CPUs.
Whether it is Android, iOS, Windows, macOS, or even Ubuntu. Most popular Operating Systems now collect telemetry information by default even if you never opt-in or opted-out112 from the start. Some like Windows will not even allow disabling telemetry completely without some technical tweaks. This information collection can be extensive and include a staggering number of details (metadata and data) on your devices and their usage.
Here are good overviews of what is being collected by those five popular OSes in their last versions:
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@Here are some other resources on the topic if you cannot see this documentary:
2017, Behavior Analysis in Social Networks, https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4614-7163-9_110198-1 [Archive.org]
2017, Social Networks and Positive and Negative Affect https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042811013747/pdf?md5=253d8f1bb615d5dee195d353dc077d46&pid=1-s2.0-S1877042811013747-main.pdf [Archive.org]
2017, Social Networks and Positive and Negative Affect https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042811013747/pdf?md5=253d8f1bb615d5dee195d353dc077d46&pid=1-s2.0-S1877042811013747-main.pdf [Archive.today]
2015, Using Social Networks Data for Behavior and Sentiment Analysis https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300562034_Using_Social_Networks_Data_for_Behavior_and_Sentiment_Analysis [Archive.org]
2016, A Survey on User Behavior Analysis in Social Networks https://www.academia.edu/30936118/A_Survey_on_User_Behaviour_Analysis_in_Social_Networks [Archive.org]
2019, Influence and Behavior Analysis in Social Networks and Social Media https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2 [Archive.org]
You should never share real individual experiences/details using your anonymous identities that could later lead to finding your real identity. You will see more details about this in the Creating new identities section.
“Hell is other people”, even if you evade every method listed above, you are not out of the woods yet thanks to the widespread use of advanced Face recognition by everyone.
-Companies like Facebook have used advanced face recognition for years160’161 and have been using other means (Satellite imagery) to create maps of “people” around the world162. This evolution has been going on for years to the point we can now say “We lost control of our faces”163.
+Companies like Facebook have used advanced face recognition for years160’161 and have been using other means (Satellite imagery) to create maps of “people” around the world162. This evolution has been going on for years to the point we can now say “we lost control of our faces”163.
If you are walking in a touristy place, you will most likely appear in someone’s selfie within minutes without knowing it. That person could then go ahead and upload that selfie to various platforms (Twitter, Google Photos, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat …). Those platforms will then apply face recognition algorithms to those pictures under the pretext of allowing better/easier tagging or to better organize your photo library. In addition to this, the same picture will provide a precise timestamp and in most cases geolocation of where it was taken. Even if the person does not provide a timestamp and geolocation, it can still be guessed with other means164’165.
Here are a few resources for even trying this yourself:
There are specialized commercial forensics solutions available (Magnet Axiom254, Cellebrite Cloud255) that will help an adversary analyze your cloud data with ease.
Notable Examples:
Apple iCloud: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 [Archive.org] : “Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices.”.
Apple iCloud: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 [Archive.org] : “Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices.”.
Google Drive and WhatsApp: https://faq.whatsapp.com/android/chats/about-google-drive-backups/ [Archive.org]: “Media and messages you back up aren’t protected by WhatsApp end-to-end encryption while in Google Drive.”. Do however note that Facebook/Whatsapp have announced the rollout of encrypted backups on October 14th 2021 (https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/end-to-end-encrypted-backups-on-whatsapp/ [Archive.org]) which should solve this issue.
Dropbox: https://www.dropbox.com/privacy#terms [Archive.org] “To provide these and other features, Dropbox accesses, stores, and scans Your Stuff. You give us permission to do those things, and this permission extends to our affiliates and trusted third parties we work with”.
Microsoft OneDrive: https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement [Archive.org]: Productivity and communications products, “When you use OneDrive, we collect data about your usage of the service, as well as the content you store, to provide, improve, and protect the services. Examples include indexing the contents of your OneDrive documents so that you can search for them later and using location information to enable you to search for photos based on where the photo was taken”.
There is a frequent adage among the infosec community: “Don’t roll your own crypto!”.
And there are reasons262‘263’264’265 for that:
-I would not want people discouraged from studying and innovating in the crypto field because of that adage. So instead, I would recommend people to be cautious with “Roll your own crypto” because it is not necessarily good crypto:
+We would not want people discouraged from studying and innovating in the crypto field because of that adage. So instead, we would recommend people to be cautious with “Roll your own crypto” because it is not necessarily good crypto:
Good cryptography is not easy and usually takes years of research to develop and fine-tune.
Good cryptography is transparent and not proprietary/closed source so it can be reviewed by peers.
There is no such thing as “military-grade crypto”269‘270’271.
Cryptography is a complex topic and bad cryptography could easily lead to your de-anonymization.
-In the context of this guide, I recommend sticking to Apps/Services using well-established, published, and peer-reviewed methods.
+In the context of this guide,we recommend sticking to Apps/Services using well-established, published, and peer-reviewed methods.
So, what to prefer and what to avoid as of 2021? You will have to look up for yourself to get the technical details of each app and see if they are using “bad crypto” or “good crypto”. Once you get the technical details, you could check this page for seeing what it is worth: https://latacora.micro.blog/2018/04/03/cryptographic-right-answers.html [Archive.org]
Here are some examples:
Many people have the idea that privacy-oriented services such as VPN or E-Mail providers are safe due to their no-logging policies or their encryption schemes. Unfortunately, many of those same people forget that all those providers are legal commercial entities subject to the laws of the countries in which they operate.
Any of those providers can be forced to silently (without your knowing (using for example a court order with a gag order279 or a national security letter280) log your activity to de-anonymize you. There have been several recent examples of those:
2021, Proton, Proton logged IP address of French activist after an order by Swiss authorities281.
2021, WindScribe, Servers were not encrypted as they should have been allowing MITM attacks by authorities282.
2021, DoubleVPN servers, logs, and account info seized by law enforcement283.
2021, The Germany-based mail provider Tutanota was forced to monitor specific accounts for 3 months284.
2020, The Germany-based mail provider Tutanota was forced to implement a backdoor to intercept and save copies of the unencrypted e-mails of one user285 (they did not decrypt the stored e-mail).
2017, PureVPN was forced to disclose information of one user to the FBI286.
2014, an EarthVPN user was arrested based on logs provider to the Dutch Police287.
2013, Secure E-Mail provider Lavabit shuts down after fighting a secret gag order288.
2011, HideMyAss user was de-anonymized, and logs were provided to the FBI289.
2021, Proton, Proton logged IP address of French activist after an order by Swiss authorities (source link unavailable).
2021, WindScribe, Servers were not encrypted as they should have been allowing MITM attacks by authorities281.
2021, DoubleVPN servers, logs, and account info seized by law enforcement282.
2021, The Germany-based mail provider Tutanota was forced to monitor specific accounts for 3 months283.
2020, The Germany-based mail provider Tutanota was forced to implement a backdoor to intercept and save copies of the unencrypted e-mails of one user284 (they did not decrypt the stored e-mail).
2017, PureVPN was forced to disclose information of one user to the FBI285.
2014, an EarthVPN user was arrested based on logs provider to the Dutch Police286.
2013, Secure E-Mail provider Lavabit shuts down after fighting a secret gag order287.
2011, HideMyAss user was de-anonymized, and logs were provided to the FBI288.
Some providers have implemented the use of a Warrant Canary290 that would allow their users to find out if they have been compromised by such orders, but this has not been tested yet as far as I know.
-Finally, it is now well known that some companies might be sponsored front ends for some state adversaries (see the Crypto AG story291 and Omnisec story292).
+Some providers have implemented the use of a Warrant Canary289 that would allow their users to find out if they have been compromised by such orders, but this has not been tested yet as far as we know.
+Finally, it is now well known that some companies might be sponsored front ends for some state adversaries (see the Crypto AG story290 and Omnisec story291).
For these reasons, you mustn’t trust such providers for your privacy despite all their claims. In most cases, you will be the last person to know if any of your accounts were targeted by such orders and you might never know at all.
-To mitigate this, in cases where you want to use a VPN, I will recommend the use of a cash/Monero-paid VPN provider over Tor to prevent the VPN service from knowing any identifiable information about you.
+To mitigate this, in cases where you want to use a VPN, we will recommend the use of a cash/Monero-paid VPN provider over Tor to prevent the VPN service from knowing any identifiable information about you.
If the VPN provider knows nothing about you, it should mitigate any issue due to them not logging but logging anyway.
(Illustration: an excellent movie I highly recommend: Das Leben der Anderen293)
-Many advanced techniques can be used by skilled adversaries294 to bypass your security measures provided they already know where your devices are. Many of those techniques are detailed here https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap [Archive.org] (Air-Gap Research Page, Cyber-Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) but also in this report https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/eset_jumping_the_air_gap_wp.pdf [Archive.org] (ESET, JUMPING
+(Illustration: an excellent movie we highly recommend: Das Leben der Anderen292)
+Many advanced techniques can be used by skilled adversaries293 to bypass your security measures provided they already know where your devices are. Many of those techniques are detailed here https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap [Archive.org] (Air-Gap Research Page, Cyber-Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) but also in this report https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/eset_jumping_the_air_gap_wp.pdf [Archive.org] (ESET, JUMPING
THE AIR GAP: 15 years of nation-state effort) and include:
Attacks requiring malware implants:
@@ -1227,14 +1227,14 @@Attacks not requiring malware:
Observing a blank wall in a room from a distance to figure how many people are in a room and what they are doing295. Publication with demonstration: http://wallcamera.csail.mit.edu/ [Archive.org]
Observing a reflective bag of snacks in a room from a distance to reconstruct the entire room296. Publication with photographic examples: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.04642.pdf [Archive.org]
Measuring floor vibrations to identify individuals and determine their health condition and mood297. Publication with demonstration: https://engineering.cmu.edu/news-events/news/2020/02/17-mauraders-map.html [Archive.org]
Observing a light bulb from a distance to listen to the sound in the room298 without any malware: Demonstration: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t32QvpfOHqw [Invidious]. It should be noted that this type of attack is not new at all and there have been articles about such techniques as far back as 2013299 and that you can even buy devices to perform this yourself such as here: http://www.gcomtech.com/ccp0-prodshow/laser-surveillance-laser-listening.html [Archive.org]
Observing a blank wall in a room from a distance to figure how many people are in a room and what they are doing294. Publication with demonstration: http://wallcamera.csail.mit.edu/ [Archive.org]
Observing a reflective bag of snacks in a room from a distance to reconstruct the entire room295. Publication with photographic examples: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.04642.pdf [Archive.org]
Measuring floor vibrations to identify individuals and determine their health condition and mood296. Publication with demonstration: https://engineering.cmu.edu/news-events/news/2020/02/17-mauraders-map.html [Archive.org]
Observing a light bulb from a distance to listen to the sound in the room297 without any malware: Demonstration: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t32QvpfOHqw [Invidious]. It should be noted that this type of attack is not new at all and there have been articles about such techniques as far back as 2013298 and that you can even buy devices to perform this yourself such as here: http://www.gcomtech.com/ccp0-prodshow/laser-surveillance-laser-listening.html [Archive.org]
Here is also a good video from the same authors to explain those topics: Black Hat, The Air-Gap Jumpers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKRtFgunyj4 [Invidious]
-Realistically, this guide will be of little help against such adversaries as such malware could be implanted on the devices by a manufacturer, anyone in the middle300, or by anyone with physical access to the air-gapped computer but there are still some ways to mitigate such techniques:
+Realistically, this guide will be of little help against such adversaries as such malware could be implanted on the devices by a manufacturer, anyone in the middle299, or by anyone with physical access to the air-gapped computer but there are still some ways to mitigate such techniques:
Do not conduct sensitive activity while connected to an untrusted/unsecured power line to prevent power line leaks.
Do not use your devices in front of a camera that could be compromised.
Twitter Transparency Report https://transparency.twitter.com/ [Archive.org]
Personally, in the context of this guide, it is also interesting to have a look at your security model. And in this context, I only have one to recommend:
-Zero-Trust Security301 (“Never trust, always verify”).
+Personally, in the context of this guide, it is also interesting to have a look at your security model. And in this context,we only have one to recommend:
+Zero-Trust Security300 (“Never trust, always verify”).
Here are some various resources about what Zero-Trust Security is:
DEFCON, Zero Trust a Vision for Securing Cloud, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euSsqXO53GY [Invidious]
It is not that old, and it has decent specs (at least 6GB of RAM, 250GB of disk space or more, decent CPU):
+It is not that old, and it has decent specs (at least 8GB of RAM, 250GB of disk space or more, decent CPU):
It is new and it has great specs (more than 8GB of RAM, >250GB of disk space, recent fast CPU):
+It is new and it has great specs (more than 16GB or ideally 32GB of RAM, >250GB of disk space, recent fast CPU):
If it is an ARM-based M1 Mac:
Your only option on M1 Macs is probably to stick with Tor Browses for now. But I would guess that if you can afford an M1 Mac you should probably get a dedicated x86 laptop for more sensitive activities.
+Your only option on M1 Macs is probably to stick with Tor Browses for now. But we would guess that if you can afford an M1 Mac you should probably get a dedicated x86 laptop for more sensitive activities.
Do you have no IT skills at all the content of this guide look like an alien language to you? Consider:
@@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@The Whonix route.
The Qubes OS route (best but requires budget/time and some skills).
If you want system-wide plausible deniability302‘303 despite the risks304’305, consider:
+If you want system-wide plausible deniability301‘302 despite the risks303’304, consider:
The Tails Route including the persistent plausible deniability section (see Persistent Plausible Deniability using Whonix within Tails).
The Whonix Route (This is possible on both Windows and Linux but will require more skills to achieve on Linux).
You might be asking yourself: “How do I know if I’m in a hostile online environment where activities are actively monitored and blocked?”
First read more about it at the EFF here: https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/understanding-and-circumventing-network-censorship [Archive.org]
Check some data yourself here on the Tor Project OONI306 (Open Observatory of Network Interference) website: https://explorer.ooni.org/
Check some data yourself here on the Tor Project OONI305 (Open Observatory of Network Interference) website: https://explorer.ooni.org/
Have a look at https://censoredplanet.org/ and see if they have data about your country.
Specific to China, look at https://gfwatch.org/ and https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-hoang.pdf [Archive.org]
Test for yourself using OONI (this can be risky in a hostile environment).
This is rather easy. Leave your smartphone on and at home. Have some cash and go to some random flea market or small shop (ideally one without CCTV inside or outside and while avoiding being photographed/filmed) and just buy the cheapest phone you can find with cash and without providing any personal information. It only needs to be in working order.
A note regarding your current phone: The point of leaving your smartphone on is to create avoid leaking the fact that you’re not using the device. If a smartphone is turned off, this creates a metadata trail that can be used to correlate the time your smartphone was turned off with the activation of your burner. If possible, leave your phone doing something (for example, watching YouTube on auto-play) to obscure the metadata trail further. This will not make it impossible to correlate your inactivity, but may make it more difficult if your phone’s usage patterns can look convincing while you buy your burner.
-I would recommend getting an old “dumbphone” with a removable battery (old Nokia if your mobile networks still allow those to connect as some countries phased out 1G-2G completely). This is to avoid the automatic sending/gathering of any telemetry/diagnostic data on the phone itself. You should never connect that phone to any Wi-Fi.
+We would recommend getting an old “dumbphone” with a removable battery (old Nokia if your mobile networks still allow those to connect as some countries phased out 1G-2G completely). This is to avoid the automatic sending/gathering of any telemetry/diagnostic data on the phone itself. You should never connect that phone to any Wi-Fi.
Site Note: Be careful of some sellers as shown here https://therecord.media/malware-found-preinstalled-in-classic-push-button-phones-sold-in-russia/ [Archive.org]
It will also be crucial not to power on that burner phone ever (not even without the SIM card) in any geographical location that could lead to you (at your home/work for instance) and never at the same location as your other known smartphone (because that one has an IMEI/IMSI that will easily lead to you). This might seem like a big burden, but it is not as these phones are only being used during the setup/sign-up process and for verification from time to time.
See Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
-You should test that the phone is in working order before going to the next step. But I will repeat myself and state that it is important to leave your smartphone at home when going (or turn it off before leaving if you must keep it) and that you test the phone at a random location that cannot be tracked back to you (and again, do not do that in front of a CCTV, avoid cameras, be aware of your surroundings). No need for Wi-Fi at this place either.
+You should test that the phone is in working order before going to the next step. But we will repeat ourselves and state that it is important to leave your smartphone at home when going (or turn it off before leaving if you must keep it) and that you test the phone at a random location that cannot be tracked back to you (and again, do not do that in front of a CCTV, avoid cameras, be aware of your surroundings). No need for Wi-Fi at this place either.
When you are certain the phone is in working order, disable Bluetooth then power it off (remove the battery if you can) and go back home and resume your normal activities. Go to the next step.
This is the hardest part of the whole guide. It is a SPOF (Single Point of Failure). The places where you can still buy prepaid SIM cards without ID registration are getting increasingly limited due to various KYC type regulations307.
+This is the hardest part of the whole guide. It is a SPOF (Single Point of Failure). The places where you can still buy prepaid SIM cards without ID registration are getting increasingly limited due to various KYC type regulations306.
So here is a list of places where you can still get them now: https://prepaid-data-sim-card.fandom.com/wiki/Registration_Policies_Per_Country [Archive.org]
You should be able to find a place that is “not too far” and just go there physically to buy some pre-paid cards and top-up vouchers with cash. Do verify that no law was passed before going that would make registration mandatory (in case the above wiki was not updated). Try to avoid CCTV and cameras and do not forget to buy a Top-Up voucher with the SIM card (if it is not a package) as most pre-paid cards will require a top-up before use.
See Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
Double-check that the mobile operators selling the pre-paid SIM cards will accept the SIM activation and top-up without any ID registration of any kind before going there. Ideally, they should accept SIM activation and top-up from the country you live in.
-I would recommend GiffGaff in the UK as they are “affordable”, do not require identification for activation and top-up, and will even allow you to change your number up to two times from their website. One GiffGaff prepaid SIM card will therefore grant you three numbers to use for your needs.
+We would recommend GiffGaff in the UK as they are “affordable”, do not require identification for activation and top-up, and will even allow you to change your number up to two times from their website. One GiffGaff prepaid SIM card will therefore grant you three numbers to use for your needs.
Power off the phone after activation/top-up and before going home. Do not ever power it on again unless you are not at a place that can be used to reveal your identity and ideally leave your real phone on but at home before going to the safe place with only your burner phone.
DISCLAIMER: Do not attempt this until you are done setting up a secure environment according to one of the selected routes. This step will require online access and should only be done from an anonymous network. Do not do this from any known/unsecured environment. Skip this until you have finished one of the routes.
There are many commercial services offering numbers to receive SMS messages online but most of those have no anonymity/privacy and can be of no help as most Social Media platforms place a limit on how many times a phone number can be used for registration.
There are some forums and subreddits (like r/phoneverification/) where users will offer the service of receiving such SMS messages for you for a small fee (using PayPal or some crypto payment). Unfortunately, these are full of scammers and very risky in terms of anonymity. You should not use those under any circumstance.
-To this date, I do not know any reputable service that would offer this service and accept cash payments (by post for instance) like some VPN providers. But a few services are providing online phone numbers and do accept Monero which could be reasonably anonymous (yet less recommended than that physical way in the earlier chapter) that you could consider:
+To this date, we do not know any reputable service that would offer this service and accept cash payments (by post for instance) like some VPN providers. But a few services are providing online phone numbers and do accept Monero which could be reasonably anonymous (yet less recommended than that physical way in the earlier chapter) that you could consider:
Recommended: Do not require any identification (even e-mail):
DISCLAIMER: I cannot vouch for any of these providers and therefore I will still recommend doing it yourself physically. In this case, you will have to rely on the anonymity of Monero and you should not use any service that requires any kind of identification using your real identity. Please do read Appendix B2: Monero Disclaimer.
+DISCLAIMER:We cannot vouch for any of these providers and therefore we will still recommend doing it yourself physically. In this case, you will have to rely on the anonymity of Monero and you should not use any service that requires any kind of identification using your real identity. Please do read Appendix B2: Monero Disclaimer.
Therefore IMHO, it is just more convenient, cheaper, and less risky to just get a pre-paid SIM card from one of the physical places that still sell them for cash without requiring ID registration. But at least there is an alternative if you have no other choice.
Skip this step if you have no intention of creating anonymous accounts on most mainstream platforms but just want anonymous browsing or if the platforms you will use allow registration without a phone number.
-Get at least one or two decent size generic USB keys (at least 16GB but I would recommend 32GB).
+Get at least one or two decent size generic USB keys (at least 16GB but we would recommend 32GB).
Please do not buy or use gimmicky self-encrypting devices such as these: https://syscall.eu/blog/2018/03/12/aigo_part1/ [Archive.org]
-Some might be very efficient308 but many are gimmicky gadgets that offer no real protection309.
+Some might be very efficient307 but many are gimmicky gadgets that offer no real protection308.
You need to find safe places where you will be able to do your sensitive activities using some publicly accessible Wi-Fi (without any account/ID registration, avoid CCTVs).
This can be anywhere that will not be tied to you directly (your home/work) and where you can use the Wi-Fi for a while without being bothered. But also, a place where you can do this without being “noticed” by anyone.
@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@This part of the guide will help you in setting up the simplest and easiest way to browse the web anonymously. It is not necessarily the best method and there are more advanced methods below with (much) better security and (much) better mitigations against various adversaries. Yet, this is a straightforward way of accessing resources anonymously and quickly with no budget, no time, no skills, and limited usage.
So, what is Tor Browser? Tor Browser (https://www.torproject.org/ [Archive.org]) is a web browser like Safari/Firefox/Chrome/Edge/Brave designed with privacy and anonymity in mind.
-This browser is different from other browsers as it will connect to the internet through the Tor Network using Onion Routing. I first recommend that you watch this very nice introduction video by the Tor Project themselves: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWII85UlzKw [Invidious]. After that, you should probably head over to their page to read their quick overview here: https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [Archive.org]. Without going into too many technical details, Tor Browser is an easy and simple “fire and forget” solution to browse the web anonymously from pretty much any device. It is probably sufficient for most people and can be used from any computer or smartphone.
+This browser is different from other browsers as it will connect to the internet through the Tor Network using Onion Routing. We first recommend that you watch this very nice introduction video by the Tor Project themselves: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWII85UlzKw [Invidious]. After that, you should probably head over to their page to read their quick overview here: https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [Archive.org]. Without going into too many technical details, Tor Browser is an easy and simple “fire and forget” solution to browse the web anonymously from pretty much any device. It is probably sufficient for most people and can be used from any computer or smartphone.
Here are several ways to set it up for all main OSes.
Please see Appendix Y: Installing and using desktop Tor Browser.
@@ -1574,11 +1574,12 @@Any media playback is “click to play” (disabled by default)
I would recommend the “Safer” level for most cases. The Safest level should only be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid.
+We would recommend the “Safer” level for most cases. The Safest level should be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites and/or if you are extra paranoid.
+If you are extra paranoid, use the “Safest” level by default and consider downgrading to Safer is the website is unusable because of Javascript blocking.
However, the Safer level should be used with some extra precautions while using some websites: see Appendix A5: Additional browser precautions with JavaScript enabled.
Now, you are really done, and you can now surf the web anonymously from your Android device.
While the official Tor Browser is not yet available for iOS, there is an alternative called Onion Browser endorsed by the Tor Project310.
+While the official Tor Browser is not yet available for iOS, there is an alternative called Onion Browser endorsed by the Tor Project309.
Head over to https://apps.apple.com/us/app/onion-browser/id519296448
Install
I would recommend the “Silver” level for most cases. The Gold level should only be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid. The Gold mode will also most likely break many websites that rely actively on JavaScript.
+We would recommend the “Silver” level for most cases. The Gold level should only be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid. The Gold mode will also most likely break many websites that rely actively on JavaScript.
As JavaScript is enabled in the Silver mode, please see Appendix A5: Additional browser precautions with JavaScript enabled.
Now, you are really done, and you can now surf the web anonymously from your iOS device.
This route is the easiest but is not designed to resist highly skilled adversaries. It is however usable on any device regardless of the configuration. This route is also vulnerable to correlation attacks (See Your Anonymized Tor/VPN traffic) and is blind to anything that might be on your device (this could be any malware, exploit, virus, remote administration software, parental controls…). Yet, if your threat model is quite low, it is probably sufficient for most people.
-If you have time and want to learn, I recommend going for other routes instead as they offer far better security and mitigate far more risks while lowering your attack surface considerably.
+If you have time and want to learn, we recommend going for other routes instead as they offer far better security and mitigate far more risks while lowering your attack surface considerably.
This part of the guide will help you in setting up Tails if one of the following is true:
You have very low IT skills
You decide to go with Tails anyway
Tails311 stands for The Amnesic Incognito Live System. It is a bootable Live Operating System running from a USB key that is designed for leaving no traces and forcing all connections through the Tor network.
+Tails310 stands for The Amnesic Incognito Live System. It is a bootable Live Operating System running from a USB key that is designed for leaving no traces and forcing all connections through the Tor network.
You insert the Tails USB key into your laptop, boot from it and you have a full operating system running with privacy and anonymity in mind. As soon as you shut down the computer, everything will be gone unless you saved it somewhere.
Tails is an amazingly straightforward way to get going in no time with what you have and without much learning. It has extensive documentation and tutorials.
-WARNING: Tails is not always up to date with their bundled software. And not always up to date with the Tor Browser updates either. You should always make sure you are using the latest version of Tails and you should use extreme caution when using bundled apps within Tails that might be vulnerable to exploits and reveal your location312.
+WARNING: Tails is not always up to date with their bundled software. And not always up to date with the Tor Browser updates either. You should always make sure you are using the latest version of Tails and you should use extreme caution when using bundled apps within Tails that might be vulnerable to exploits and reveal your location311.
It does however have some drawbacks:
Tails uses Tor and therefore you will be using Tor to access any resource on the internet. This alone will make you suspicious to most platforms where you want to create anonymous accounts (this will be explained in more detail later).
Your ISP (whether it is yours or some public Wi-Fi) will also see that you are using Tor, and this could make you suspicious in itself.
Tails does not include (natively) some of the software you might want to use later which will complicate things quite a bit if you want to run some specific things (Android Emulators for instance).
Tails uses Tor Browser which while it is very secure will be detected as well by most platforms and will hinder you in creating anonymous identities on many platforms.
Tails will not protect you more from the 5$ wrench313.
Tails will not protect you more from the 5$ wrench312.
Tor in itself might not be enough to protect you from an adversary with enough resources as explained earlier.
Important Note: If your laptop is monitored/supervised and some local restrictions are in place, please read Appendix U: How to bypass (some) local restrictions on supervised computers.
You should also read Tails Documentation, Warnings, and limitations, before going further https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html [Archive.org]
-Taking all this into account and the fact that their documentation is great, I will just redirect you towards their well-made and well-maintained tutorial:
+Taking all this into account and the fact that their documentation is great, we will just redirect you towards their well-made and well-maintained tutorial:
https://tails.boum.org/install/index.en.html [Archive.org], pick your flavor and proceed.
If you’re having an issue accessing Tor due to censorship or other issues, you can try using Tor Bridges by following this Tails tutorial: https://tails.boum.org/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html [Archive.org] and find more information about these on Tor Documentation https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/bridges [Archive.org]
If you think using Tor alone is dangerous/suspicious, see Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor/VPN is not an option
@@ -1692,12 +1693,13 @@Any media playback is “click to play” (disabled by default)
I would recommend the “Safer” level for most cases. The Safest level should only be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid. The Safest mode will also most likely break many websites that rely actively on JavaScript.
+We would recommend the “Safer” level for most cases. The Safest level should be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid. The Safest mode will also most likely break many websites that rely actively on JavaScript.
+If you are extra paranoid, use the “Safest” level by default and consider downgrading to Safer is the website is unusable because of Javascript blocking.
Lastly, while using Tor Browser on Tails on the “Safer” level, please consider Appendix A5: Additional browser precautions with JavaScript enabled
When you are done and have a working Tails on your laptop, go to the Creating your anonymous online identities step much further in this guide or if you want persistence and plausible deniability, continue with the next section.
Consider checking the https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM [Archive.org] project for Tails.
-This project is a clever idea of a one-click self-contained VM solution that you could store on an encrypted disk using plausible deniability314 (see The Whonix route: first chapters and also for some explanations about Plausible deniability, as well as the How to securely delete specific files/folders/data on your HDD/SSD and Thumb drives: section at the end of this guide for more understanding).
+This project is a clever idea of a one-click self-contained VM solution that you could store on an encrypted disk using plausible deniability313 (see The Whonix route: first chapters and also for some explanations about Plausible deniability, as well as the How to securely delete specific files/folders/data on your HDD/SSD and Thumb drives: section at the end of this guide for more understanding).
This would allow the creation of a hybrid system mixing Tails with the Virtualization options of the Whonix route in this guide.
Note: See Pick your connectivity method in the Whonix Route for more explanations about Stream Isolation
@@ -1716,7 +1718,7 @@See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
CAUTION: Please see Appendix K: Considerations for using external SSD drives and Understanding HDD vs SSD sections if you consider storing such hidden VMs on an external SSD drive:
Do not use hidden volumes on SSD drives as this is not supported/recommended by Veracrypt315.
Do not use hidden volumes on SSD drives as this is not supported/recommended by Veracrypt314.
Use instead file containers instead of encrypted volumes.
Make sure you do know how to clean data from an external SSD drive properly.
Download the latest Whonix XFCE release from https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VirtualBox/XFCE [Archive.org]
Prepare a USB Key/Drive with Veracrypt
Create a Hidden Volume on the USB/Key Drive (I would recommend at least 16GB for the hidden volume)
Create a Hidden Volume on the USB/Key Drive (We would recommend at least 16GB for the hidden volume)
In the Outer Volume, place some decoy files
In the Hidden Volume, place the HiddenVM appimage file
In the Hidden Volume, place the Whonix XFCE ova file
This laptop could have an HDD (7200rpm) or an SSD/NVMe drive. Both possibilities have their benefits and issues that will be detailed later.
All future online steps performed with this laptop should ideally be done from a safe network such as Public Wi-Fi in a safe place (see Find some safe places with decent public Wi-Fi). But several steps will have to be taken offline first.
I would strongly recommend getting a “business grade” laptop (meaning not consumer/gaming-grade laptop) if you can. For instance, some ThinkPad from Lenovo (my personal favorite).
+We would strongly recommend getting a “business grade” laptop (meaning not consumer/gaming-grade laptop) if you can. For instance, some ThinkPad from Lenovo (my personal favorite).
This is because those business laptops usually offer better and more customizable security features (especially in the BIOS/UEFI settings) with longer support than most consumer laptops (Asus, MSI, Gigabyte, Acer…). The interesting features to look for are IMHO:
Better custom Secure Boot settings (where you can selectively manage all the keys and not just use the Standard ones)
HDD/SSD passwords in addition to just BIOS/UEFI passwords.
AMD laptops could be more interesting as some provide the ability to disable AMD PSP (the AMD equivalent of Intel IME) from the BIOS/UEFI settings by default. And, because AFAIK, AMD PSP was audited and contrary to IME was not found to have any “evil” functionalities316. However, if you are going for the Qubes OS Route consider Intel CPUs as Qubes OS does not support AMD with their anti-evil-maid system317.
AMD laptops could be more interesting as some provide the ability to disable AMD PSP (the AMD equivalent of Intel IME) from the BIOS/UEFI settings by default. And, because AFAIK, AMD PSP was audited and contrary to IME was not found to have any “evil” functionalities315. However, if you are going for the Qubes OS Route consider Intel CPUs as Qubes OS does not support AMD with their anti-evil-maid system316.
Secure Wipe tools from the BIOS (especially useful for SSD/NVMe drives, see Appendix M: BIOS/UEFI options to wipe disks in various Brands).
Better control over the disabling/enabling of select peripherals (USB ports, Wi-Fis, Bluetooth, Camera, Microphone …).
Better security features with Virtualization.
Disable USB/HDMI or any other port (Ethernet, Firewire, SD card …) if you can.
Disable Intel ME if you can (odds are very high you can’t).
Disable AMD PSP if you can (AMD’s equivalent to IME, see Your CPU)
Disable Secure Boot if you intend to use Qubes OS as they do not support it out of the box318. Keep it on if you intend to use Linux/Windows.
Disable Secure Boot if you intend to use Qubes OS as they do not support it out of the box317. Keep it on if you intend to use Linux/Windows.
Check if your laptop BIOS has a secure erase option for your HDD/SSD that could be convenient in case of need.
Only enable those on a “need to use” basis and disable them again after use. This can help mitigate some attacks in case your laptop is seized while locked but still on OR if you had to shut it down rather quickly and someone took possession of it (this topic will be explained later in this guide).
So, what is Secure Boot319? In short, it is a UEFI security feature designed to prevent your computer from booting an operating system from which the bootloader was not signed by specific keys stored in the UEFI firmware of your laptop.
-When the operating system (or the Bootloader320) supports it, you can store the keys of your bootloader in your UEFI firmware, and this will prevent booting up any unauthorized Operating System (such as a live OS USB or anything similar).
+So, what is Secure Boot318? In short, it is a UEFI security feature designed to prevent your computer from booting an operating system from which the bootloader was not signed by specific keys stored in the UEFI firmware of your laptop.
+When the operating system (or the Bootloader319) supports it, you can store the keys of your bootloader in your UEFI firmware, and this will prevent booting up any unauthorized Operating System (such as a live OS USB or anything similar).
Secure Boot settings are protected by the password you set up to access the BIOS/UEFI settings. If you have that password, you can disable Secure Boot and allow unsigned OSes to boot on your system. This can help mitigate some Evil-Maid attacks (explained later in this guide).
In most cases, Secure Boot is disabled by default or is enabled but in “setup” mode which will allow any system to boot. For Secure Boot to work, your Operating System will have to support it and then sign its bootloader and push those signing keys to your UEFI firmware. After that, you will have to go to your BIOS/UEFI settings and save those pushed keys from your OS and change the Secure Boot from setup to user mode (or custom mode in some cases).
After doing that step, only the Operating Systems from which your UEFI firmware can verify the integrity of the bootloader will be able to boot.
@@ -1827,32 +1829,29 @@You should also enable firmware password reset protection (available from Catalina) according to the documentation here: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec28382c9ca/web [Archive.org]
This feature will mitigate the possibility for some adversaries to use hardware hacks to disable/bypass your firmware password. Note that this will also prevent Apple themselves from accessing the firmware in case of repair.
At some point, you will inevitably leave this laptop alone somewhere. You will not sleep with it and take it everywhere every single day. You should make it as hard as possible for anyone to tamper with it without you noticing it. This is mostly useful against some limited adversaries that will not use a 5$ wrench against you321.
+At some point, you will inevitably leave this laptop alone somewhere. You will not sleep with it and take it everywhere every single day. You should make it as hard as possible for anyone to tamper with it without you noticing it. This is mostly useful against some limited adversaries that will not use a 5$ wrench against you320.
It is important to know that it is trivially easy for some specialists to install a key logger in your laptop, or to just make a clone copy of your hard drive that could later allow them to detect the presence of encrypted data in it using forensic techniques (more on that later).
-Here is a good cheap method to make your laptop tamper-proof using Nail Polish (with glitter) https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-tamper-protect-laptop/ [Archive.org] 322 (with pictures).
+Here is a good cheap method to make your laptop tamper-proof using Nail Polish (with glitter) https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-tamper-protect-laptop/ [Archive.org] 321 (with pictures).
While this is a good cheap method, it could also raise suspicions as it is quite “noticeable” and might just reveal that you “have something to hide”. So, there are more subtle ways of achieving the same result. You could also for instance make a close-up macro photography of the back screws of your laptop or just use a small amount of candle wax within one of the screws that could just look like usual dirt. You could then check for tampering by comparing the photographs of the screws with new ones. Their orientation might have changed a bit if your adversary was not careful enough (Tightening them exactly the same way they were before). Or the wax within the bottom of a screw head might have been damaged compared to before.
The same techniques can be used with USB ports where you could just put a tiny amount of candle wax within the plug that would be damaged by inserting a USB key in it.
In riskier environments, check your laptop for tampering before using it regularly.
This route will make extensive use of Virtual Machines323, they will require a host OS to run the Virtualization software. You have three recommended choices in this part of the guide:
+This route will make extensive use of Virtual Machines322, they will require a host OS to run the Virtualization software. You have three recommended choices in this part of the guide:
Your Linux distribution of choice (excluding Qubes OS)
Windows 10 (preferably Home edition due to the absence of Bitlocker)
-Windows 10/11 (preferably Home edition due to the absence of Bitlocker)
macOS (Catalina or higher up to Monterey)
In addition, chances are high that your Mac is or has been tied to an Apple account (at the time of purchase or after signing-in) and therefore its unique hardware identifiers could lead back to you in case of hardware identifiers leak.
-Linux is also not necessarily the best choice for anonymity depending on your threat model. This is because using Windows will allow us to conveniently use Plausible Deniability324 (aka Deniable Encryption325) easily at the OS level. Windows is also unfortunately at the same time a privacy nightmare326 but is the only easy to set up option for using OS-wide plausible deniability. Windows telemetry and telemetry blocking are also widely documented which should mitigate many issues.
-So, what is Plausible Deniability? You can cooperate with an adversary requesting access to your device/data without revealing your true secret. All this using Deniable Encryption327.
-A soft lawful adversary could ask for your encrypted laptop password. At first, you could refuse to give out any password (using your “right to remain silent”, “right not to incriminate yourself”) but some countries are implementing laws328’329 to exempt this from such rights (because terrorists and “think of the children”). In that case, you might have to reveal the password or face jail time in contempt of court. This is where plausible deniability will come into play.
+Linux is also not necessarily the best choice for anonymity depending on your threat model. This is because using Windows will allow us to conveniently use Plausible Deniability323 (aka Deniable Encryption324) easily at the OS level. Windows is also unfortunately at the same time a privacy nightmare325 but is the only easy to set up option for using OS-wide plausible deniability. Windows telemetry and telemetry blocking are also widely documented which should mitigate many issues.
+So, what is Plausible Deniability? You can cooperate with an adversary requesting access to your device/data without revealing your true secret. All this using Deniable Encryption326.
+A soft lawful adversary could ask for your encrypted laptop password. At first, you could refuse to give out any password (using your “right to remain silent”, “right not to incriminate yourself”) but some countries are implementing laws327’328 to exempt this from such rights (because terrorists and “think of the children”). In that case, you might have to reveal the password or face jail time in contempt of court. This is where plausible deniability will come into play.
You could then reveal a password, but that password will only give access to “plausible data” (a decoy OS). The forensics will be well aware that it is possible for you to have hidden data but should not be able to prove this (if you do this right). You will have cooperated, and the investigators will have access to something but not what you actually want to hide. Since the burden of proof should lie on their side, they will have no options but to believe you unless they have proof that you have hidden data.
This feature can be used at the OS level (a plausible OS and a hidden OS) or at the files level where you will have an encrypted file container (similar to a zip file) where different files will be shown depending on the encryption password you use.
This also means you could set up your own advanced “plausible deniability” setup using any Host OS by storing for instance Virtual Machines on a Veracrypt hidden volume container (be careful of traces in the Host OS tho that would need to be cleaned if the host OS is persistent, see Some additional measures against forensics section later). There is a project for achieving this within Tails (https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM [Archive.org]) which would make your Host OS non-persistent and use plausible deniability within Tails.
-In the case of Windows, plausible deniability is also the reason you should ideally have Windows 10 Home (and not Pro). This is because Windows 10 Pro natively offers a full-disk encryption system (Bitlocker330) where Windows 10 Home offers no full-disk encryption at all. We will later use third-party open-source software for encryption that will allow full-disk encryption on Windows 10 Home. This will give you a good (plausible) excuse to use this software. While using this software on Windows 10 Pro would be suspicious.
+In the case of Windows, plausible deniability is also the reason you should ideally have Windows 10/11 Home (and not Pro). This is because Windows 10/11 Pro natively offers a full-disk encryption system (Bitlocker329) where Windows 10/11 Home offers no full-disk encryption at all. You will later use third-party open-source software for encryption that will allow full-disk encryption on Windows 10/11 Home. This will give you a good (plausible) excuse to use this software. While using this software on Windows 10/11 Pro would be suspicious.
Note about Linux: So, what about Linux and plausible deniability? Yes, it is possible to achieve plausible deniability with Linux too. More information within the Linux Host OS section later.
Unfortunately, encryption is not magic and there are some risks involved:
Plausible deniability is only effective against soft lawful adversaries that will not resort to physical means. Avoid, if possible, the use of plausible deniability-capable software (such as Veracrypt) if your threat model includes hard adversaries. So, Windows users should in that case install Windows Pro as a Host OS and use Bitlocker instead.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
Evil Maid Attacks331 are conducted when someone tampers with your laptop while you are away. To install to clone your hard drive, install malware or a key logger. If they can clone your hard drive, they can compare one image of your hard drive at the time they took it while you were away with the hard drive when they seize it from you. If you used the laptop again in between, forensics examiners might be able to prove the existence of the hidden data by looking at the variations between the two images in what should be an empty/unused space. This could lead to compelling evidence of the existence of hidden data. If they install a key logger or malware within your laptop (software or hardware), they will be able to simply get the password from you for later use when they seize it. Such attacks can be done at your home, your hotel, a border crossing, or anywhere you leave your devices unattended.
+Evil Maid Attacks330 are conducted when someone tampers with your laptop while you are away. To install to clone your hard drive, install malware or a key logger. If they can clone your hard drive, they can compare one image of your hard drive at the time they took it while you were away with the hard drive when they seize it from you. If you used the laptop again in between, forensics examiners might be able to prove the existence of the hidden data by looking at the variations between the two images in what should be an empty/unused space. This could lead to compelling evidence of the existence of hidden data. If they install a key logger or malware within your laptop (software or hardware), they will be able to simply get the password from you for later use when they seize it. Such attacks can be done at your home, your hotel, a border crossing, or anywhere you leave your devices unattended.
You can mitigate this attack by doing the following (as recommended earlier):
Have basic tamper protection (as explained previously) to prevent physical access to the internals of the laptop without your knowing. This will prevent them from cloning your disks and installing a physical key logger without your knowledge.
Disable all the USB ports (as explained previously) within a password-protected BIOS/UEFI. Again, they will not be able to turn them on (without physically accessing the motherboard to reset the BIOS) to boot a USB device that could clone your hard drive or install a software-based malware that could act as a key logger.
Set up BIOS/UEFI/Firmware passwords to prevent any unauthorized boot of an unauthorized device.
Some OSes and Encryption software have anti-EvilMaid protection that can be enabled. This is the case with Windows/Veracrypt and QubeOS.
Some OSes and Encryption software have anti-EvilMaid protection that can be enabled. This is the case with Windows/Veracrypt and QubeOS (only on Intel CPUs).
Cold Boot attacks332 are trickier than the Evil Maid Attack but can be part of an Evil Maid attack as it requires an adversary to come into possession of your laptop while you are actively using your device or shortly afterward.
-The idea is rather simple, as shown in this video333, an adversary could theoretically quickly boot your device on a special USB key that would copy the content of the RAM (the memory) of the device after you shut it down. If the USB ports are disabled or if they feel like they need more time, they could open it and “cool down” the memory using a spray or other chemicals (liquid nitrogen for instance) preventing the memory from decaying. They could then be able to copy its content for analysis. This memory dump could contain the key to decrypt your device. We will later apply a few principles to mitigate these.
-In the case of Plausible Deniability, there have been some forensics studies334 about technically proving the presence of the hidden data with a simple forensic examination (without a Cold Boot/Evil Maid Attack) but these have been contested by other studies335 and by the maintainer of Veracrypt336 so I would not worry too much about those yet.
+Cold Boot attacks331 are trickier than the Evil Maid Attack but can be part of an Evil Maid attack as it requires an adversary to come into possession of your laptop while you are actively using your device or shortly afterward.
+The idea is rather simple, as shown in this video332, an adversary could theoretically quickly boot your device on a special USB key that would copy the content of the RAM (the memory) of the device after you shut it down. If the USB ports are disabled or if they feel like they need more time, they could open it and “cool down” the memory using a spray or other chemicals (liquid nitrogen for instance) preventing the memory from decaying. They could then be able to copy its content for analysis. This memory dump could contain the key to decrypt your device. You will later apply a few principles to mitigate these.
+In the case of Plausible Deniability, there have been some forensics studies333 about technically proving the presence of the hidden data with a simple forensic examination (without a Cold Boot/Evil Maid Attack) but these have been contested by other studies334 and by the maintainer of Veracrypt335 so we would not worry too much about those yet.
The same measures used to mitigate Evil Maid attacks should be in place for Cold Boot attacks with some added ones:
If your OS or Encryption software allows it, you should consider encrypting the keys within RAM too (this is possible with Windows/Veracrypt and will be explained later). Again see https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/technical/thread/3961542951/ [Archive.org]
Do enable the option to Wipe keys from memory if a device is inserted in Veracrypt.
You should limit the use of Sleep stand-by and instead use Shutdown or Hibernate to prevent the encryption keys from staying in RAM when your computer goes to sleep. This is because sleep will maintain power in your memory for resuming your activity faster. Only hibernation and shutdown will actually clear the key from the memory337.
You should limit the use of Sleep stand-by and instead use Shutdown or Hibernate to prevent the encryption keys from staying in RAM when your computer goes to sleep. This is because sleep will maintain power in your memory for resuming your activity faster. Only hibernation and shutdown will actually clear the key from the memory336.
See also https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Cold_Boot_Attack_Defense [Archive.org] and https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protection_Against_Physical_Attacks [Archive.org]
Here are also some interesting tools to consider for Linux users to defend against these:
https://github.com/0xPoly/Centry [Archive.org] (unfortunately unmaintained it seems so I made a fork and pull request updating for Veracrypt https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry [Archive.org] which should still work)
https://github.com/0xPoly/Centry [Archive.org] (unfortunately unmaintained it seems)
https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill [Archive.org] (unfortunately unmaintained as well it seems)
https://askubuntu.com/questions/153245/how-to-wipe-ram-on-shutdown-prevent-cold-boot-attacks [Archive.org]
Here are some examples of such leaks:
Windows ShellBags that are stored within the Windows Registry silently storing various histories of accessed volumes/files/folders338.
Windows Indexing keeping traces of the files present in your user folder by default339.
Recent lists (aka Jump Lists) in Windows and various apps keeping traces of recently accessed documents340.
Windows ShellBags that are stored within the Windows Registry silently storing various histories of accessed volumes/files/folders337.
Windows Indexing keeping traces of the files present in your user folder by default338.
Recent lists (aka Jump Lists) in Windows and various apps keeping traces of recently accessed documents339.
Many more traces in various logs, please see this convenient interesting poster for more insight: https://www.sans.org/security-resources/posters/windows-forensic-analysis/170/download [Archive.org]
Gatekeeper341 and XProtect keeping track of your download history in a local database and file attributes.
Gatekeeper340 and XProtect keeping track of your download history in a local database and file attributes.
Spotlight Indexing
Recent lists in various apps keeping traces of recently accessed documents.
Temporary folders keeping various traces of App usage and Document usage.
In the case of Windows, this data could for instance be used to prove the existence of a hidden OS / Volume on a computer and would be readily available at Microsoft. Therefore, it is critically important that you disable and block telemetry with all the means at your disposal. No matter what OS you are using.
You should never conduct sensitive activities from a non-encrypted system. And even if it is encrypted, you should never conduct sensitive activities from the Host OS itself. Instead, you should use a VM to be able to efficiently isolate and compartmentalize your activities and prevent local data leaks.
-If you have little to no knowledge of Linux or if you want to use OS-wide plausible deniability, I recommend going for Windows (or back to the Tails route) for convenience. This guide will help you hardening it as much as possible to prevent leaks. This guide will also help you hardening macOS and Linux as much as possible to prevent similar leaks.
-If you have no interest in OS-wide plausible deniability and want to learn to use Linux, I will strongly recommend going for Linux or the Qubes OS route if your hardware allows it.
+If you have little to no knowledge of Linux or if you want to use OS-wide plausible deniability, we recommend going for Windows (or back to the Tails route) for convenience. This guide will help you hardening it as much as possible to prevent leaks. This guide will also help you hardening macOS and Linux as much as possible to prevent similar leaks.
+If you have no interest in OS-wide plausible deniability and want to learn to use Linux, we will strongly recommend going for Linux or the Qubes OS route if your hardware allows it.
In all cases, the host OS should never be used to conduct sensitive activities directly. The host OS will only be used to connect to a public Wi-Fi Access Point. It will be left unused while you conduct sensitive activities and should ideally not be used for any of your day-to-day activities.
Consider also reading https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Full_Disk_Encryption#Encrypting_Whonix_VMs [Archive.org]
As mentioned earlier, I do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at least I do not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
+As mentioned earlier, we do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at least we do not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
I also recommend that you do the initial installation completely offline to avoid any data leak.
You should always remember that despite the reputation, Linux mainstream distributions (Ubuntu for instance) are not necessarily better at security than other systems such as macOS and Windows. See this reference to understand why https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html [Archive.org].
For other distros, you will have to document yourself, but it will likely be similar. Encryption during install is just much easier in the context of this guide.
There are several ways to achieve plausible deniability on Linux342 and it is possible to achieve. Here are some more details about some of the ways I would recommend. All these options require some higher level of skills at using Linux.
+There are several ways to achieve plausible deniability on Linux341 and it is possible to achieve. Here are some more details about some of the ways we would recommend. All these options require some higher level of skills at using Linux.
While not supported yet by this guide, it is possible to achieve a form of deniability on Linux using LUKS by using detached LUKS headers. For now, I will redirect you toward this page for more information: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Specialties#Encrypted_system_using_a_detached_LUKS_header [Archive.org]
+While not supported yet by this guide, it is possible to achieve a form of deniability on Linux using LUKS by using detached LUKS headers. For now, we will redirect you toward this page for more information: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Specialties#Encrypted_system_using_a_detached_LUKS_header [Archive.org]
It is technically possible to not only use Veracrypt but also to achieve plausible deniability on a Linux Host OS by using Veracrypt for system full-disk encryption (instead of LUKS). This is not supported by Veracrypt (System encryption is only supported on Windows) and requires some tinkering with various commands. This is not recommended at all for unskilled users and should only be used at your own risk.
The steps to achieve this are not yet integrated into this guide but can be found here: http://dreadytofatroptsdj6io7l3xptbet6onoyno2yv7jicoxknyazubrad.onion/post/5779e55aae7fc06e4758 (this is a .onion address and requires Tor Browser).
@@ -2026,7 +2025,7 @@See Appendix G: Safe Browser on the Host OS
Note: At this time, this guide will not support ARM M1 MacBooks (yet). Due to Virtualbox not supporting this architecture yet. It could however be possible if you use commercial tools like VMWare or Parallels but those are not covered in this guide.
-As mentioned earlier, I do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at least I do not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
+As mentioned earlier, we do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at leastWedo not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
I also recommend that you do the initial installation completely offline to avoid any data leak.
Do not ever sign in with your Apple account using that Mac.
As a light introduction for new macOS users, consider https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFx5icuE6Io [Invidious]
-Now to go more in-depth in securing and hardening your macOS, I recommend reading this guide which covers many of the issues: https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/ [Archive.org]
+Now to go more in-depth in securing and hardening your macOS, we recommend reading this guide which covers many of the issues: https://www.bejarano.io/hardening-macos/ [Archive.org]
Here are the basic steps you should take after your offline installation:
First, you should set up a firmware password following this guide from Apple: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204455 [Archive.org]
@@ -2074,7 +2073,7 @@sudo sh -c 'echo "127.0.0.1 ocsp.apple.com" >> /etc/hosts'But you should document yourself on the actual issue before acting. This page is a good place to start: https://blog.jacopo.io/en/post/apple-ocsp/ [Archive.org]
-Up to you really. I would block it because I do not want any telemetry at all from my OS to the mothership without my specific consent. None.
+Up to you really. We would block it because we do not want any telemetry at all from my OS to the mothership without my specific consent. None.
You should enable full disk encryption on your Mac using Filevault according to this part of the guide: https://github.com/drduh/macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide#full-disk-encryption [Archive.org]
Be careful when enabling. Do not store the recovery key at Apple if prompted (should not be an issue since you should be offline at this stage). You do not want a third party to have your recovery key.
@@ -2089,7 +2088,7 @@See Appendix G: Safe Browser on the Host OS
As mentioned earlier, I do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at least I do not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
+As mentioned earlier, we do not recommend using your daily laptop for sensitive activities. Or at leastWedo not recommend using your in-place OS for these. Doing that might result in unwanted data leaks that could be used to de-anonymize you. If you have a dedicated laptop for this, you should reinstall a fresh clean OS. If you do not want to wipe your laptop and start over, you should consider the Tails route or proceed at your own risk.
I also recommend that you do the initial installation completely offline to avoid any data leak.
You should follow Appendix A: Windows Installation
@@ -2104,26 +2103,26 @@See Appendix B: Windows Additional Privacy Settings
Veracrypt343 is the software I will recommend for full-disk encryption, file encryption, and plausible deniability. It is a fork of the well-known but deprecated and unmaintained TrueCrypt. It can be used for:
+Veracrypt342 is the software we will recommend for full-disk encryption, file encryption, and plausible deniability. It is a fork of the well-known but deprecated and unmaintained TrueCrypt. It can be used for:
Full Disk simple encryption (your hard drive is encrypted with one passphrase).
Full Disk encryption with plausible deniability (this means that depending on the passphrase entered at boot, you will either boot a decoy OS or a hidden OS).
File container simple encryption (it is a large file that you will be able to mount within Veracrypt as if it were an external drive to store encrypted files within).
File container with plausible deniability (it is the same large file but depending on the passphrase you use when mounting it, you will either mount a “hidden volume” or the “decoy volume”).
It is to my knowledge the only (convenient and usable by anyone) free, open-source, and openly audited344 encryption software that also provides plausible deniability for widespread use and it works with Windows Home Edition.
+It is to my knowledge the only (convenient and usable by anyone) free, open-source, and openly audited343 encryption software that also provides plausible deniability for widespread use and it works with Windows Home Edition.
Go ahead and download and install Veracrypt from: https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html [Archive.org]
After installation, please take a moment to review the following options that will help mitigate some attacks:
Encrypt the memory with a Veracrypt option345 (settings > performance/driver options > encrypt RAM) at a cost of 5-15% performance. This setting will also disable hibernation (which does not actively clear the key when hibernating) and instead encrypt the memory altogether to mitigate some cold-boot attacks. More details about this feature here: https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/technical/thread/3961542951/ [Archive.org]
Encrypt the memory with a Veracrypt option344 (settings > performance/driver options > encrypt RAM) at a cost of 5-15% performance. This setting will also disable hibernation (which does not actively clear the key when hibernating) and instead encrypt the memory altogether to mitigate some cold-boot attacks. More details about this feature here: https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/technical/thread/3961542951/ [Archive.org]
Enable the Veracrypt option to wipe the keys from memory if a new device is inserted (system > settings > security > clear keys from memory if a new device is inserted). This could help in case your system is seized while still on (but locked).
Enable the Veracrypt option to mount volumes as removable volumes (Settings > Preferences > Mount volume as removable media). This will prevent Windows from writing some logs about your mounts in the Event logs346 and prevent some local data leaks.
Enable the Veracrypt option to mount volumes as removable volumes (Settings > Preferences > Mount volume as removable media). This will prevent Windows from writing some logs about your mounts in the Event logs345 and prevent some local data leaks.
Be careful and have a good situational awareness if you sense something weird. Shut your laptop down as fast as possible.
If you do not want to use encrypted memory (because performance might be an issue), you should at least enable hibernation instead of sleep. This will not clear the keys from memory (you are still vulnerable to cold boot attacks) but at least should mitigate them if your memory has enough time to decay.
More details later in Route A and B: Simple Encryption using Veracrypt (Windows tutorial).
For this case, I will recommend the use of BitLocker instead of Veracrypt for the full disk encryption. The reasoning is that BitLocker does not offer a plausible deniability possibility contrary to Veracrypt. A hard adversary has then no incentive in pursuing his “enhanced” interrogation if you reveal the passphrase.
+For this case, we will recommend the use of BitLocker instead of Veracrypt for the full disk encryption. The reasoning is that BitLocker does not offer a plausible deniability possibility contrary to Veracrypt. A hard adversary has then no incentive in pursuing his “enhanced” interrogation if you reveal the passphrase.
Normally, you should have installed Windows Pro in this case and the BitLocker setup is quite straightforward.
Basically, you can follow the instructions here: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838 [Archive.org]
But here are the steps:
@@ -2143,8 +2142,8 @@Encryption should now be started in the background (you can check by clicking the Bitlocker icon on the lower right side of the taskbar).
Unfortunately, this is not enough. With this setup, your Bitlocker key can just be stored as-is in the TPM chip of your computer. This is rather problematic as the key can be extracted in some cases with ease347‘348’349’350.
-To mitigate this, we will have to enable a few more options as per the recommendations of Microsoft351:
+Unfortunately, this is not enough. With this setup, your Bitlocker key can just be stored as-is in the TPM chip of your computer. This is rather problematic as the key can be extracted in some cases with ease346‘347’348’349.
+To mitigate this, you will have to enable a few more options as per the recommendations of Microsoft350:
Click the Windows icon
Type Run
Click the Windows icon
Type Command to display the “Command Prompt”
Right Click on it and click “Run as Administrator”
Run manage-bde -protectors -delete c: (this will delete current protection: the recovery key we will not need)
Run manage-bde -protectors -delete c: (this will delete current protection: the recovery key you will not need)
Run manage-bde -protectors -add c: -TPMAndPIN (this will prompt you for a pre-boot password)
Again, as explained earlier. You should never use the sleep/stand-by feature to mitigate some cold-boot and evil-maid attacks. Instead, you should Shut down or hibernate. You should therefore switch your laptop from sleeping to hibernating when closing the lid or when your laptop goes to sleep.
(Note that you cannot enable hibernation if you previously enabled RAM encryption within Veracrypt)
The reason is that Hibernation will actually shut down your laptop completely and clean the memory. Sleep on the other hand will leave the memory powered on (including your decryption key) and could leave your laptop vulnerable to cold-boot attacks.
-By default, Windows 10 might not offer you this possibility so you should enable it by following this Microsoft tutorial: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/disable-and-re-enable-hibernation [Archive.org]
+By default, Windows 10/11 might not offer you this possibility so you should enable it by following this Microsoft tutorial: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/disable-and-re-enable-hibernation [Archive.org]
Open an administrator command prompt (right-click on Command Prompt and “Run as Administrator”)
Run: powercfg.exe /hibernate on
Requires Windows (this feature is not “easily” supported on Linux).
The danger of online Data leaks
Requires full wipe of your laptop
No use with an SSD drive due to the requirement of disabling Trim352 Operations353. This will severely degrade the performance/health of your SSD drive over time.
No use with an SSD drive due to the requirement of disabling Trim351 Operations352. This will severely degrade the performance/health of your SSD drive over time.
Enter a strong passphrase (longer the better, remember Appendix A2: Guidelines for passwords and passphrases)
Collect some entropy by randomly moving your cursor around until the bar is full
Click Next as the Generated Keys screen
To rescue disk354 or not rescue disk, well that is up to you. I recommend making one (just in case), just make sure to store it outside your encrypted drive (USB key for instance or wait and see the end of this guide for guidance on safe backups). This rescue disk will not store your passphrase and you will still need it to use it.
To rescue disk353 or not rescue disk, well that is up to you. We recommend making one (just in case), just make sure to store it outside your encrypted drive (USB key for instance or wait and see the end of this guide for guidance on safe backups). This rescue disk will not store your passphrase and you will still need it to use it.
Wipe mode:
If you have no sensitive data yet on this laptop, select None
If you have sensitive data on an SSD, Trim alone should take care of it355 but I would recommend one pass (random data) just to be sure.
If you have sensitive data on an HDD, there is no Trim, and I would recommend at least 1-pass.
If you have sensitive data on an SSD, Trim alone should take care of it354 but we would recommend one pass (random data) just to be sure.
If you have sensitive data on an HDD, there is no Trim, and we Swould recommend at least 1-pass.
Test your setup. Veracrypt will now reboot your system to test the bootloader before encryption. This test must pass for encryption to go forward.
After your computer rebooted and the test is passed. You will be prompted by Veracrypt to start the encryption process.
Create a hidden volume within the outer volume of that second partition. This is where the hidden OS will reside.
Clone your currently running Windows 10 installation onto the hidden volume.
Wipe your currently running Windows 10.
This means that your current Windows 10 will become the hidden Windows 10 and that you will need to reinstall a fresh decoy Windows 10 OS.
Clone your currently running Windows 10/11 installation onto the hidden volume.
Wipe your currently running Windows 10/11.
This means that your current Windows 10/11 will become the hidden Windows 10/11 and that you will need to reinstall a fresh decoy Windows 10/11 OS.
Mandatory if you have an SSD drive and you still want to do this against the recommendation: Disable SSD Trim in Windows356 (again this is NOT recommended at all as disabling Trim in itself is highly suspicious). Also as mentioned earlier, disabling Trim will reduce the lifetime of your SSD drive and will significantly impact its performance over time (your laptop will become slower and slower over several months of use until it becomes almost unusable, you will then have to clean the drive and re-install everything). But you must do it to prevent data leaks357 that could allow forensics to defeat your plausible deniability358359. The only way around this at the moment is to have a laptop with a classic HDD drive instead.
-Mandatory if you have an SSD drive and you still want to do this against the recommendation: Disable SSD Trim in Windows355 (again this is NOT recommended at all as disabling Trim in itself is highly suspicious). Also as mentioned earlier, disabling Trim will reduce the lifetime of your SSD drive and will significantly impact its performance over time (your laptop will become slower and slower over several months of use until it becomes almost unusable, you will then have to clean the drive and re-install everything). But you must do it to prevent data leaks356 that could allow forensics to defeat your plausible deniability357358. The only way around this at the moment is to have a laptop with a classic HDD drive instead.
+See Appendix C: Windows Installation Media Creation and go with the USB key route.
-Insert the USB key into your laptop
See Appendix A: Windows Installation and proceed with installing Windows 10 Home.
See Appendix A: Windows Installation and proceed with installing Windows 10/11 Home.
See Appendix B: Windows Additional Privacy Settings
@@ -2348,12 +2347,12 @@Use all the space available on the second partition for the Outer Volume
Use a strong passphrase (remember Appendix A2: Guidelines for passwords and passphrases)
Select yes to Large Files
Create some Entropy by moving the mouse around until the bar is full and select NTFS (do not select exFAT as we want this outer volume to look “normal” and NTFS is normal).
Create some Entropy by moving the mouse around until the bar is full and select NTFS (do not select exFAT as you want this outer volume to look “normal” and NTFS is normal).
Format the Outer Volume
Open Outer Volume:
At this stage, you should copy decoy data onto the outer volume. So, you should have some sensitive but not so sensitive files/folders to copy there. In case you need to reveal a password to this Volume. This is a good place for your Anime/Mp3/Movies/Porn collection.
I recommend you do not fill the outer volume too much or too little (about 40%). Remember you must leave enough space for the Hidden OS (which will be the same size as the first partition you created during installation).
We recommend you do not fill the outer volume too much or too little (about 40%). Remember you must leave enough space for the Hidden OS (which will be the same size as the first partition you created during installation).
Use a strong passphrase for the Hidden Volume (obviously a different one than the one for the Outer Volume).
Now you will create the Hidden Volume, select AES and SHA-512
Use 1-Pass Wipe and proceed.
Now your Hidden OS will be installed, proceed to the next step
Now that the Hidden OS is fully installed, you will need to install a Decoy OS:
Insert the USB key into your laptop
See Appendix A: Windows Installation and proceed with installing Windows 10 Home again (do not install a different version and stick with Home).
See Appendix A: Windows Installation and proceed with installing Windows 10/11 Home again (do not install a different version and stick with Home).
See Appendix B: Windows Additional Privacy Settings
Now we will encrypt the Decoy OS:
+Now you will encrypt the Decoy OS:
Install Veracrypt
Launch VeraCrypt
Enter a short weak password (yes this is serious, do it, it will be explained later).
Collect some entropy by randomly moving your cursor around until the bar is full
Click Next as the Generated Keys screen
To rescue disk360 or not rescue disk, well that is up to you. I recommend making one (just in case), just make sure to store it outside your encrypted drive (USB key for instance or wait and see the end of this guide for guidance on safe backups). This rescue disk will not store your passphrase and you will still need it to use it.
To rescue disk359 or not rescue disk, well that is up to you. We recommend making one (just in case), just make sure to store it outside your encrypted drive (USB key for instance or wait and see the end of this guide for guidance on safe backups). This rescue disk will not store your passphrase and you will still need it to use it.
Wipe mode: Select 1-Pass just to be safe
Pre-Test your setup. Veracrypt will now reboot your system to test the bootloader before encryption. This test must pass for encryption to go forward.
After your computer rebooted and the test is passed. You will be prompted by Veracrypt to start the encryption process.
Remember that you will need valid excuses for this plausible deniability scenario to work:
You are using Veracrypt because you are using Windows 10 Home which does not feature Bitlocker but still wanted Privacy.
You are using Veracrypt because you are using Windows 10/11 Home which does not feature Bitlocker but still wanted Privacy.
You have two Partitions because you wanted to separate the System and the Data for easy organization and because some Geek friend told you this was better for performance.
You have used a weak password for easy convenient booting on the System and a Strong long passphrase on the Outer Volume because you were too lazy to type a strong passphrase at each boot.
You encrypted the second Partition with a different password than the System because you do not want anyone in your entourage to see your stuff. And so, you did not want that data available to anyone.
Remember Appendix W: Virtualization.
This step and the following steps should be done from within the Host OS. This can either be your Host OS with simple encryption (Windows/Linux/macOS) or your Hidden OS with plausible deniability (Windows only).
-In this route, we will make extensive use of the free Oracle Virtualbox361 software. This is a virtualization software in which you can create Virtual Machines that emulate a computer running a specific OS (if you want to use something else like Xen, Qemu, KVM, or VMWARE, feel free to do so but this part of the guide covers Virtualbox only for convenience).
-So, you should be aware that Virtualbox is not the virtualization software with the best track record in terms of security and some of the reported issues362 have not been completely fixed to this date363 and if you are using Linux with a bit more technical skills, you should consider using KVM instead by following the guide available at Whonix here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/KVM [Archive.org] and here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/KVM#Why_Use_KVM_Over_VirtualBox.3F [Archive.org]
+In this route, you will make extensive use of the free Oracle Virtualbox360 software. This is a virtualization software in which you can create Virtual Machines that emulate a computer running a specific OS (if you want to use something else like Xen, Qemu, KVM, or VMWARE, feel free to do so but this part of the guide covers Virtualbox only for convenience).
+So, you should be aware that Virtualbox is not the virtualization software with the best track record in terms of security and some of the reported issues361 have not been completely fixed to this date362 and if you are using Linux with a bit more technical skills, you should consider using KVM instead by following the guide available at Whonix here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/KVM [Archive.org] and here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/KVM#Why_Use_KVM_Over_VirtualBox.3F [Archive.org]
Some steps should be taken in all cases:
-All your sensitive activities will be done from within a guest Virtual Machine running Windows 10 Pro (not Home this time), Linux, or macOS.
+All your sensitive activities will be done from within a guest Virtual Machine running Windows 10/11 Pro (not Home this time), Linux, or macOS.
This has a few advantages that will help you remain anonymous:
It should prevent the guest VM OS (Windows/Linux/macOS), Apps, and any telemetry within the VMs from accessing your hardware directly. Even if your VM is compromised by malware, this malware should not be able to the VM and compromise your actual laptop.
If an adversary somehow manages to compromise the Tor network too, they will only reveal the IP of a random public Wi-Fi that is not tied to your identity.
If an adversary somehow compromises your VM OS (with malware or an exploit for instance), they will be trapped within the internal Network of Whonix and should be unable to reveal the IP of the public Wi-Fi.
-This solution however has one main drawback to consider: Interference with Tor Stream Isolation364.
+This solution however has one main drawback to consider: Interference with Tor Stream Isolation363.
Stream isolation is a mitigation technique used to prevent some correlation attacks by having different Tor Circuits for each application. Here is an illustration to show what stream isolation is:
(Illustration from Marcelo Martins, https://stakey.club/en/decred-via-tor-network/ [Archive.org])
-VPN/Proxy over Tor falls on the right-side365 meaning using a VPN/Proxy over Tor forces Tor to use one circuit for all activities instead of multiple circuits for each. This means that using a VPN/Proxy over Tor can reduce the effectiveness of Tor in some cases and should therefore be used only for some specific cases:
+VPN/Proxy over Tor falls on the right-side364 meaning using a VPN/Proxy over Tor forces Tor to use one circuit for all activities instead of multiple circuits for each. This means that using a VPN/Proxy over Tor can reduce the effectiveness of Tor in some cases and should therefore be used only for some specific cases:
When your destination service does not allow Tor Exit nodes.
When you do not mind using a shared Tor circuit for various services. For instance, when using various authenticated services.
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Introduction#Comparison_Table [Archive.org]
You might be wondering: Well, what about using Tor over VPN instead of VPN over Tor? Well, I would not necessarily it:
+You might be wondering: Well, what about using Tor over VPN instead of VPN over Tor? Well, we would not necessarily recommend it:
Disadvantages:
Your VPN provider is just another ISP that will then know your origin IP and will be able to de-anonymize you if required. We do not trust them. I prefer a situation where your VPN provider does not know who you are. It does not add much in terms of anonymity.
Your VPN provider is just another ISP that will then know your origin IP and will be able to de-anonymize you if required. We do not trust them. We prefer a situation where your VPN provider does not know who you are. It does not add much in terms of anonymity.
This would result in you connecting to various services using the IP of a Tor Exit Node which is banned/flagged in many places. It does not help in terms of convenience.
Advantages:
@@ -2677,12 +2676,12 @@Unfortunately, using Tor alone will raise the suspicion of many destinations’ platforms. You will face many hurdles (captchas, errors, difficulties signing up) if you only use Tor. In addition, using Tor where you are could put you in trouble just for that. But Tor is still the best solution for anonymity and must be somewhere for anonymity.
If you intend to create persistent shared and authenticated identities on various services where access from Tor is hard, I recommend the VPN over Tor and VPS VPN/Proxy over Tor options (or VPN over Tor over VPN if needed). It might be a bit less secure against correlation attacks due to breaking Tor Stream isolation but provides much better convenience in accessing online resources than just using Tor. It is an “acceptable” trade-off IMHP if you are careful enough with your identity.
+If you intend to create persistent shared and authenticated identities on various services where access from Tor is hard, we recommend the VPN over Tor and VPS VPN/Proxy over Tor options (or VPN over Tor over VPN if needed). It might be a bit less secure against correlation attacks due to breaking Tor Stream isolation but provides much better convenience in accessing online resources than just using Tor. It is an “acceptable” trade-off IMHP if you are careful enough with your identity.
If your intent however is just to browse random services anonymously without creating specific shared identities, using tor friendly services; or if you do not want to accept that trade-off in the earlier option. Then I recommend using the Tor Only route to keep the full benefits of Stream Isolation (or Tor over VPN if you need to).
If cost is an issue, I recommend the Tor Only option if possible.
If your intent however is just to browse random services anonymously without creating specific shared identities, using tor friendly services; or if you do not want to accept that trade-off in the earlier option. Then we recommend using the Tor Only route to keep the full benefits of Stream Isolation (or Tor over VPN if you need to).
If cost is an issue, we recommend the Tor Only option if possible.
If both Tor and VPN access are impossible or dangerous then you have no choice but to rely on Public wi-fi safely. See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
For more information, you can also see the discussions here that could help decide yourself:
@@ -2709,7 +2708,7 @@See Appendix O: Getting an anonymous VPN/Proxy
Skip this step if you cannot use Tor.
-This route will use Virtualization and Whonix366 as part of the anonymization process. Whonix is a Linux distribution composed of two Virtual Machines:
+This route will use Virtualization and Whonix365 as part of the anonymization process. Whonix is a Linux distribution composed of two Virtual Machines:
The Whonix Workstation (this is a VM where you can conduct sensitive activities)
The Whonix Gateway (this VM will establish a connection to the Tor network and route all the network traffic from the Workstation through the Tor network).
You will be able to decide which flavor to use based on my recommendations. I recommend the second one as explained before.
+You will be able to decide which flavor to use based on my recommendations. We recommend the second one as explained before.
Whonix is well maintained and has extensive and incredibly detailed documentation.
Later, you will create and run several Virtual Machines within Virtualbox for your sensitive activities. Virtualbox provides a feature called “Snapshots”367 that allow for saving the state of a VM at any point in time. If for any reason later you want to go back to that state, you can restore that snapshot at any moment.
+Later, you will create and run several Virtual Machines within Virtualbox for your sensitive activities. Virtualbox provides a feature called “Snapshots”366 that allow for saving the state of a VM at any point in time. If for any reason later you want to go back to that state, you can restore that snapshot at any moment.
I strongly recommend that you do make use of this feature by creating a snapshot after the initial installation/update of each VM. This snapshot should be done before its use for any sensitive/anonymous activity.
-This will allow you to turn your VMs into a kind of disposable “Live Operating Systems” (like Tails discussed earlier). Meaning that you will be able to erase all the traces of your activities within a VM by restoring a Snapshot to an earlier state. Of course, this will not be “as good” as Tails (where everything is stored in memory) as there might be traces of this activity left on your hard disk. Forensics studies have shown the ability to recover data from a reverted VM368. Fortunately, there will be ways to remove those traces after the deletion or reverting to an earlier snapshot. Such techniques will be discussed in the Some additional measures against forensics section of this guide.
+This will allow you to turn your VMs into a kind of disposable “Live Operating Systems” (like Tails discussed earlier). Meaning that you will be able to erase all the traces of your activities within a VM by restoring a Snapshot to an earlier state. Of course, this will not be “as good” as Tails (where everything is stored in memory) as there might be traces of this activity left on your hard disk. Forensics studies have shown the ability to recover data from a reverted VM367. Fortunately, there will be ways to remove those traces after the deletion or reverting to an earlier snapshot. Such techniques will be discussed in the Some additional measures against forensics section of this guide.
You should download a few things within the host OS:
VBoxManage modifyvm "Whonix-Workstation-XFCE" --biossystemtimeoffset -35017
VBoxManage modifyvm "Whonix-Workstation-XFCE" --biossystemtimeoffset +27931
Also, consider applying these mitigations from VirtualBox to mitigate Spectre369/Meltdown370 vulnerabilities by running this command from the VirtualBox Program Directory. All of these are described here: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Spectre_Meltdown [Archive.org] (be aware these can impact severely the performance of your VMs but should be done for best security).
+Also, consider applying these mitigations from VirtualBox to mitigate Spectre368/Meltdown369 vulnerabilities by running this command from the VirtualBox Program Directory. All of these are described here: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Spectre_Meltdown [Archive.org] (be aware these can impact severely the performance of your VMs but should be done for best security).
Finally, consider the security advice from Virtualbox themselves here https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch13.html [Archive.org]
Skip this step if you do not intend to use Tor over VPN and only intend to use Tor or cannot.
If you intend to use Tor over VPN for any reason. You first must configure a VPN service on your host OS.
-Remember that in this case, I recommend having two VPN accounts. Both paid with cash/Monero (see Appendix O: Getting an anonymous VPN/Proxy). One will be used in the Host OS for the first VPN connection. The other could be used in the VM to achieve VPN over Tor over VPN (User > VPN > Tor > VPN).
+Remember that in this case, we recommend having two VPN accounts. Both paid with cash/Monero (see Appendix O: Getting an anonymous VPN/Proxy). One will be used in the Host OS for the first VPN connection. The other could be used in the VM to achieve VPN over Tor over VPN (User > VPN > Tor > VPN).
If you intend to only use Tor over VPN, you only need one VPN account.
See Appendix R: Installing a VPN on your VM or Host OS for instructions.
Skip this step if you cannot use Tor.
Just use the provided Whonix Workstation VM. It is the safest and most secure way to go on this route.
-It is also the only VM that will provide Stream Isolation pre-configured for most apps by default371.
+It is also the only VM that will provide Stream Isolation pre-configured for most apps by default370.
If you want additional software on the Workstation (such as another Browser), follow their guide here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Install_Software [Archive.org]
Consider running Whonix in Live Mode if for extra malware protection, See https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anti-Forensics_Precautions [Archive.org]
Do not forget to apply the VM hardening recommendations here: Virtualbox Hardening recommendations.
@@ -2801,80 +2800,83 @@Be careful, any customization you make to the non-Whonix guest VMs (keyboard layout, language, time zone, screen resolution, or other) could be used to fingerprint your VMs later. See https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting [Archive.org]
Use the Linux Distro of your choice. I would recommend Ubuntu or Fedora for convenience but any other would work too. Be sure to not enable any telemetry.
+Use the Linux Distro of your choice. We would recommend Ubuntu or Fedora for convenience but any other would work too. Be sure to not enable any telemetry.
Refer to this tutorial https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Other_Operating_Systems [Archive.org] for detailed instructions.
Consider hardening the VM as recommended in Hardening Linux.
Use the Linux Distro of your choice. I would recommend Ubuntu or Fedora for convenience but any other would work too. Be sure to not enable any telemetry. You could go with the risky route: See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
+Use the Linux Distro of your choice. We would recommend Ubuntu or Fedora for convenience but any other would work too. Be sure to not enable any telemetry. You could go with the risky route: See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
This time, I will recommend Brave browser.
+This time, we will recommend Brave browser.
See why here: Appendix V: What browser to use in your Guest VM/Disposable VM
See Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers as well.
-Be careful, any customization you make to the non-Whonix guest VMs (keyboard layout, language, time zone, screen resolution, or other) could be used to fingerprint your VMs later. See https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting [Archive.org]
-Go with the Official Windows 10 Pro VM and harden it yourself: see Appendix C: Windows Installation Media Creation and go with the ISO route.
-There is also another option you might hear about which is Windows AME (Ameliorated) from the https://ameliorated.info/ [Archive.org] project which is a special Windows 10 build stripped from all telemetry/advertising and update components. I do not recommend this option due to the insecure nature of that release lacking the latest updates/patches and lacking the ability to update completely. I do believe the project general idea is good, but it is just too insecure/risky and contains unnecessary software picked by the dev.
+Go with the Official Windows 10/11 Pro VM and harden it yourself: see Appendix C: Windows Installation Media Creation and go with the ISO route.
Refer to this tutorial https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Other_Operating_Systems [Archive.org] for detailed instructions.
Shut down the Whonix Gateway VM (this will prevent Windows from sending out telemetry and allow you to create a local account).
Open Virtualbox
Select Machine > New > Select Windows 10 64bit
Allocate a minimum amount of 2048MB but ideally 4096MB if your Ram allows it
Select Machine > New > Select Windows 10 or Windows 11 64bit
Allocate a minimum amount of 2GB for Windows 10 and 4GB for Windows 11
Create a Virtual Disk using the VDI format and select Dynamically Allocated
Keep the disk size at 50GB (this is a maximum; it should not reach that much)
Keep the disk size at 50GB for Windows 10 and 80GB for Windows 11 (this is a maximum; it should not reach that much)
Make sure PAE/NX is enabled in System > Processor
Select the VM and click Settings, Go into the Network Tab
Select “Internal Network” in the “Attached to” Field and select Whonix.
Go into the Storage Tab, Select the Empty CD and click the icon next to SATA Port 1
Click on “Choose a disk file” and select the Windows ISO you previously downloaded
Click ok and start the VM
Virtualbox will prompt you to select a Starting disk (the ISO file), select it, and click Start
Virtualbox will prompt you to either push a button to boot the ISO or ask you what to boot, select the ISO or click.
Follow the steps in Appendix A: Windows Installation
Start the Whonix Gateway VM
Go back into Settings then Network & Internet
Click Properties (Below Ethernet)
Edit IP settings:
Enable IPv4 and set the following:
+Back to your Windows
Windows 10: Go back into Settings then Network & Internet. Windows 11: Go into settings, click the upper left menu and pick “Network and Internet”
Windows 10: Click Properties (Below Ethernet). Windows 11: Click Ethernet
Windows 10: Edit IP settings. Windows 11: Edit IP assignment.
Windows 10: Enable IPv4 and set the following, Windows 11: Switch from DHCP to Manual and set the following:
IP address 10.152.152.50 (increase this IP by one for any other VM)
Subnet prefix length 18 (255.255.192.0)
Gateway 10.152.152.10 (this is the Whonix Gateway)
DNS 10.152.152.10 (this is again the Whonix Gateway)
(Windows 10) DNS 10.152.152.10 (this is again the Whonix Gateway)
(Windows 11) exit the IP assignment and select DNS server assignment and set it to 10.152.152.10 (this is again the Whonix Gateway)
Save
Windows might prompt you if you want to be “discoverable” on this network. Click NO.
Windows might prompt you if you want to be “discoverable” on this network. Click NO. Always stay on a “public network” if prompted.
Every time you will power on this VM in the future, make sure you change its Ethernet Mac Address before each boot. You can do this in Virtualbox > Settings > Network > Advanced > Click the refresh button next to the MAC address. You can only do this while the VM is powered off.
+Every time you will power on this VM in the future, you should make sure to change its Ethernet Mac Address before each boot. You can do this in Virtualbox > Settings > Network > Advanced > Click the refresh button next to the MAC address. You can only do this while the VM is powered off.
See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
Open Virtualbox
Select Machine > New > Select Windows 10 64bit
Allocate a minimum amount of 2048MB but ideally 4096MB if your Ram allows it
Select Machine > New > Select Windows 10 or 11 64bit
Allocate a minimum amount of 4GB of RAM for 11 , 2GB of RAM for 10.
Create a Virtual Disk using the VDI format and select Dynamically Allocated
Keep the disk size at 50GB (this is a maximum; it should not reach that much)
In the System/Processor tab, make sure PAE/NX is enabled.
Keep the disk size at 80GB for 11, 50GB for 10 (this is a maximum; it should not reach that much)
Go into the Storage Tab, Select the Empty CD and click the icon next to SATA Port 1
Click on “Choose a disk file” and select the Windows ISO you previously downloaded
Click ok and start the VM
Virtualbox will prompt you to select a Starting disk (the ISO file), select it, and click Start
Virtualbox will prompt you to either push a button to boot the ISO or ask you what to boot, select the ISO or click.
Follow the steps in Appendix A: Windows Installation
Every time you will power on this VM in the future, make sure you change its Ethernet Mac Address before each boot. You can do this in Virtualbox > Settings > Network > Advanced > Click the refresh button next to the MAC address. You can only do this while the VM is powered off.
+Every time you will power on this VM in the future, you should make sure to change its Ethernet Mac Address before each boot. You can do this in Virtualbox > Settings > Network > Advanced > Click the refresh button next to the MAC address. You can only do this while the VM is powered off.
This time, I will recommend Brave browser.
+This time, we will recommend Brave browser.
See why here: Appendix V: What browser to use in your Guest VM/Disposable VM
See Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers as well.
-See Appendix B: Windows Additional Privacy Settings
Because sometimes you want to run mobile Apps anonymously too. You can also set up an Android VM for this purpose. As in other cases, ideally, this VM will also be sitting behind the Whonix Gateway for Tor network connectivity. But this can also be set up as VPN over Tor over VPN
@@ -2897,6 +2899,7 @@Just use the tutorials as is and see Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
Two possibilities: AnBox or Android-x86
+Personally, We would recommend AnBox over Android-x86 but it requires Linux
Basically follow the tutorial here for installing AnBox on the Whonix Workstation: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anbox [Archive.org] for running Android Applications within an AnBox VM.
Or follow the instructions here https://anbox.io/ to install on any other VM (Linux Only)
@@ -2960,7 +2963,7 @@There are some drawbacks to running macOS on Virtual Machines. The main one is that they do not have a serial number (0 by default) and you will be unable to log in to any Apple-provided service (iCloud, iMessage…) without a genuine ID. You can set such IDs using this script: https://github.com/myspaghetti/macos-virtualbox [Archive.org] but keep in mind that randomly generated IDs will not work and using the ID of someone else will break their Terms of Services and could count as impersonation (and therefore could be illegal).
-Note: I also ran in multiple issues with running these on AMD processors. This can be fixed so here is the configuration I used which worked fine with Catalina, Big Sur and Monterey which will tell Virtualbox to emulate an Intel Processor instead:
+Note: We also ran in multiple issues with running these on AMD processors. This can be fixed so here is the configurationWeused which worked fine with Catalina, Big Sur and Monterey which will tell Virtualbox to emulate an Intel Processor instead:
VBoxManage modifyvm "macOSCatalina" ---cpuidset 00000001 000106e5 00100800 0098e3fd bfebfbff
VBoxManage setextradata "macOSCatalina" "VBoxInternal/Devices/efi/0/Config/DmiSystemProduct" "MacBookPro15,1"
Refer to Hardening macOS.
This time, I will recommend Brave browser.
+This time, we will recommend Brave browser.
See why here: Appendix V: What browser to use in your Guest VM/Disposable VM
See Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers as well.
You will need something to store your data (logins/passwords, identities, and TOTP372 information).
-For this purpose, I strongly recommend KeePassXC because of its integrated TOTP feature. This is the ability to create entries for 2FA373 authentication with the authenticator feature.
+You will need something to store your data (logins/passwords, identities, and TOTP371 information).
+For this purpose, we strongly recommend KeePassXC because of its integrated TOTP feature. This is the ability to create entries for 2FA372 authentication with the authenticator feature.
Remember this should ideally be installed on your Guest VM and not on your Host OS. You should never do any sensitive activities from your Host OS.
Here are the tutorials:
This step will allow you to configure your Host OS so that only the Whonix Gateway VM will have access to the internet. This will therefore prevent any “leak” from your Host OS while letting the Whonix Gateway establish the tor connectivity. The other VMs (Whonix Workstation or any other VM you installed behind it will not be affected)
There are three ways to do this:
The Lazy Way (not really recommended): not supported by Whonix and might have some security implications as you will expose the Whonix Gateway VM to the Public Wi-Fi network. I would recommend against this unless you are in a hurry or very lazy.
+The Lazy Way (not really recommended): not supported by Whonix and might have some security implications as you will expose the Whonix Gateway VM to the Public Wi-Fi network. We would recommend against this unless you are in a hurry or very lazy.
The Best Way: Using an external USB Wi-Fi dongle and just disabling Wi-Fi on the Host OS/Computer.
This way is not supported by the Whonix project374 but I will go ahead and give this option anyway. IMHO this is helpful to prevent your Host OS from leaking any information while you are using the Whonix VMs.
+This way is not supported by the Whonix project373 but we will go ahead and give this option anyway. IMHO this is helpful to prevent your Host OS from leaking any information while you are using the Whonix VMs.
Note that this option as-is will only work on Wi-Fis without a captive portal (where you must enter some information to unlock access).
The illustration below shows the result of this step:
For this to work, we will need to change some configurations on the Whonix Gateway VM. We will need to add a DHCP client to the Whonix Gateway to receive IP addresses from the network. To do those changes the Host OS will still have to have internet access allowed for now.
+For this to work, we will need to change some configurations on the Whonix Gateway VM. we will need to add a DHCP client to the Whonix Gateway to receive IP addresses from the network. To do those changes the Host OS will still have to have internet access allowed for now.
So here is how:
Be sure to have your Host OS connected to a safe Wi-Fi.
Click OK and you are done with the VM configuration part
Now we must block internet access from your Host OS while still allowing the VM to connect. This will be done by connecting to Wi-Fi with the Host OS but without assigning itself an IP address. The VM will then use your Wi-fi association to get an IP address.
+Now you must block internet access from your Host OS while still allowing the VM to connect. This will be done by connecting to Wi-Fi with the Host OS but without assigning itself an IP address. The VM will then use your Wi-fi association to get an IP address.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open an administrative command prompt (right-click on Command Prompt and Run as Administrator)
And finally, after that, you can start the Whonix Workstation VM (or any other VM you configured to work behind the Whonix Gateway VM) and it should be connected to the internet through Tor.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open a Terminal
And finally, after that, you can start the Whonix Workstation VM (or any other VM you configured to work behind the Whonix Gateway VM) and it should be connected to the internet through Tor.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open a Terminal
This way will not go against Whonix recommendations (as it will not expose the Whonix Gateway to the Host OS) and will have the advantage of allowing connections not only to open Wi-Fis but also to the ones with a Captive Portal where you need to enter some information to access the internet.
Yet this will still not be supported by the Whonix project, but it is fine as the main concern for the earlier Lazy Way is to have the Whonix Gateway VM exposed to the Host Network, and it will not be the case here.
This option will require an additional VM between the Host OS and the Whonix Gateway to act as a Network Bridge.
-For this purpose, I will recommend the use of a lightweight Linux Distro. Any will do but the easiest IMHO will be an Ubuntu-based distro and I would recommend the lightweight XUbuntu as it will be extremely easy to configure this setup.
+For this purpose, we will recommend the use of a lightweight Linux Distro. Any will do but the easiest IMHO will be an Ubuntu-based distro and we would recommend the lightweight XUbuntu as it will be extremely easy to configure this setup.
Why XUbuntu and not Ubuntu or KUbuntu? Because XUbuntu uses an XFCE desktop environment which is lightweight and this VM will only serve as a proxy and nothing else.
Of course, you can also achieve this with any other Linux distro if you so decide you do not like XUbuntu.
This is how it will look at the end:
XUbuntu was picked due the performance of XFCE.
Make sure you are connected to a safe Wi-Fi for this operation.
First, you will need to download the latest XUbuntu Stable release ISO from https://xubuntu.org/download/
When you are done with the download, it is time to create a new VM:
@@ -3180,11 +3184,11 @@You are done configuring the Whonix Gateway VM
Now we must block internet access from your Host OS while still allowing the XUbuntu Bridge VM to connect. This will be done by connecting to Wi-Fi with the Host OS but without assigning itself a gateway address. The VM will then use your Wi-fi association to get an IP address.
+Now you must block internet access from your Host OS while still allowing the XUbuntu Bridge VM to connect. This will be done by connecting to Wi-Fi with the Host OS but without assigning itself a gateway address. The VM will then use your Wi-fi association to get an IP address.
If necessary, from the XUbuntu Bridge VM, you will be able to launch a Browser to enter information into any captive/registration portal on the Wi-Fi network.
Only the XUbuntu Bridge VM should be able to access the internet. The Host OS will be limited to local traffic only.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open an administrative command prompt (right-click on Command Prompt and Run as Administrator)
And finally, after that, you can start the Whonix Workstation VM (or any other VM you configured to work behind the Whonix Gateway VM) and it should be connected to the internet through Tor.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open a Terminal
And finally, after that, you can start the Whonix Workstation VM (or any other VM you configured to work behind the Whonix Gateway VM) and it should be connected to the internet through Tor.
The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. We will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
+The goal here is to associate with a Wi-Fi network without having an internet connection. You will achieve this by deleting the Gateway from the connection after you are connected:
First, connect to the safe Wi-Fi of your choice
Open a Terminal
This way will not go against Whonix recommendations (as it will not expose the Whonix Gateway to the Host OS) and will have the advantage of allowing connections not only to open Wi-Fis but also to the ones with a Captive Portal where you need to enter some information to access the internet. Yet this will still not be supported by the Whonix project, but it is fine as the main concern for the earlier Lazy Way is to have the Whonix Gateway VM exposed to the Host Network, and it will not be the case here. This option is the best because the network will be completely disabled on the Host OS from booting up.
This option will require an additional VM between the Host OS and the Whonix Gateway to act as a Network Bridge and to connect to the Wi-Fi network. This option requires a working USB Wi-Fi Dongle that will be passed through to a bridge VM.
-For this purpose, I will recommend the use of a lightweight Linux Distro. Any will do but the easiest IMHO will be an Ubuntu-based distro and I would recommend the lightweight XUbuntu as it will be extremely easy to configure this setup.
+For this purpose, we will recommend the use of a lightweight Linux Distro. Any will do but the easiest IMHO will be an Ubuntu-based distro and we would recommend the lightweight XUbuntu as it will be extremely easy to configure this setup.
Why XUbuntu and not Ubuntu or KUbuntu? Because XUbuntu uses an XFCE desktop environment which is lightweight and this VM will only serve as a proxy and nothing else.
Of course, you can also achieve this with any other Linux distro if you so decide you do not like XUbuntu.
This is how it will look at the end:
@@ -3239,7 +3243,7 @@Disable Networking on your Host OS completely (Turn off the on-board Wi-Fi completely)
Plug in and install your USB Wi-Fi Dongle. Connect it to a safe Public Wi-Fi. This should be easy and automatically installed by any recent OS (Windows 10, macOS, Linux).
Plug in and install your USB Wi-Fi Dongle. Connect it to a safe Public Wi-Fi. This should be easy and automatically installed by any recent OS (Windows 10/11, macOS, Linux).
By default, the Whonix Gateway has no DHCP client and will require one to get an IP from a shared network you will configure later, on a Bridge VM:
@@ -3309,7 +3313,7 @@At this stage, your Host OS should have no network at all and your XUbuntu VM should have a fully working Wi-Fi connection and this Wi-Fi connection will be shared to the Internal Network “XUbuntu Bridge”.
Now it is time to configure the Whonix Gateway VM to get access from the shared network from the bridge VM we just made on the earlier step:
+Now it is time to configure the Whonix Gateway VM to get access from the shared network from the bridge VM you just made on the earlier step:
Go into the VirtualBox Application and select the Whonix Gateway VM
Click Settings
Take a post-install VirtualBox snapshot of your VMs.
You are done and can now skip the rest to go to the Getting Online part.
Note that while this route is written for Qubes OS 4.0.x, it should also work with Qubes OS 4.1.x but it hasn’t been tested yet. The guide will be updated when Qubes OS 4.1 is released (now at the Release Candidate 3 stage as of this writing).
+Note that while this route is written for Qubes OS 4.0.x, it should also work with Qubes OS 4.1.x but it hasn’t been tested yet. The guide will be updated and tested for Qubes OS 4.1 soon. In the mean time, you can see the changelog here: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/4.1/release-notes/
As they say on their website, Qubes OS is a reasonably secure, free, open-source, and security-oriented operating system for single-user desktop computing. Qubes OS leverages and extensively uses Xen-based virtualization to allow for the creation and management of isolated compartments called Qubes.
-Qubes OS is not a Linux distribution375 but a Xen distribution. It is different from Linux distributions because it will make extensive use of Virtualization and Compartmentalization so that any app will run in a different VM (Qube). As a bonus, Qubes OS integrates Whonix by default and allows for increased privacy and anonymity. It is highly recommended that you document yourself over Qubes OS principles before going this route. Here are some recommended resources:
+Qubes OS is not a Linux distribution374 but a Xen distribution. It is different from Linux distributions because it will make extensive use of Virtualization and Compartmentalization so that any app will run in a different VM (Qube). As a bonus, Qubes OS integrates Whonix by default and allows for increased privacy and anonymity. It is highly recommended that you document yourself over Qubes OS principles before going this route. Here are some recommended resources:
Qubes OS Introduction, https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/ [Archive.org]
Qubes OS Video Tours, https://www.qubes-os.org/video-tours/ [Archive.org]
Qubes OS Getting Started, https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/getting-started/ [Archive.org]
YouTube, Life Behind the Tinfoil: A Look at Qubes and Copperhead - Konstantin Ryabitsev, The Linux Foundation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cU4hQg6GvU [Invidious]
YouTube, I used the reasonably-secure Qubes OS for 6 months and survived - Matty McFatty [@themattymcfatty] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbN5Bz3v-uA [Invidious]
YouTube, We used the reasonably-secure Qubes OS for 6 months and survived - Matty McFatty [@themattymcfatty] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbN5Bz3v-uA [Invidious]
YouTube, Qubes OS: How it works, and a demo of this VM-centric OS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPAvoFsvSbg [Invidious]
This OS is recommended by prominent figures such as Edward Snowden, PrivacyGuides.org.
-Qubes is the best option in this guide for people who are more comfortable with Linux and tech in general. But it has some downsides such as the lack of OS-wide plausible deniability, its hardware requirements, and its hardware compatibility. While you can run this on 4GB of RAM as per their requirements376, the recommended RAM is 16GB. I would recommend against using Qubes OS if you have less than 8GB of RAM. If you want a comfortable experience, you should have 16GB, if you want a particularly enjoyable experience, you should have 24GB or 32GB.
+Qubes is the best option in this guide for people who are more comfortable with Linux and tech in general. But it has some downsides such as the lack of OS-wide plausible deniability, its hardware requirements, and its hardware compatibility. While you can run this on 4GB of RAM as per their requirements [Archive.org], the recommended RAM is 16GB. We would recommend against using Qubes OS if you have less than 8GB of RAM. If you want a comfortable experience, you should have 16GB, if you want a particularly enjoyable experience, you should have 24GB or 32GB.
The reason for this RAM requirement is that each app will run in a different VM and each of those VM will require and allocate a certain amount of memory that will not be available for other apps. If you are running native Windows apps within Qubes OS Qubes, the ram overhead will be significant.
You should also check their hardware compatibility here https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/ [Archive.org] before proceeding. Your mileage might vary, and you might experience several issues about hardware compatibility that you will have to troubleshoot and solve yourself.
-I think that if you can afford it and are comfortable with the idea of using Linux, you should go with this route as it is probably the best one in terms of security and privacy. The only disadvantage of this route is that it does not provide a way to enable OS-wide plausible deniability377, unlike the Whonix route.
+I think that if you can afford it and are comfortable with the idea of using Linux, you should go with this route as it is probably the best one in terms of security and privacy. The only disadvantage of this route is that it does not provide a way to enable OS-wide plausible deniability [Archive.org], unlike the Whonix route.
There are seven possibilities within this route:
If an adversary somehow manages to compromise the Tor network too, they will only reveal the IP of a random public Wi-Fi that is not tied to your identity.
If an adversary somehow compromises your VM OS (with malware or an exploit for instance), they will be trapped within the internal Network of Whonix and should be unable to reveal the IP of the public Wi-Fi.
-This solution however has one main drawback to consider: Interference with Tor Stream Isolation378.
+This solution however has one main drawback to consider: Interference with Tor Stream Isolation375.
Stream isolation is a mitigation technique used to prevent some correlation attacks by having different Tor Circuits for each application. Here is an illustration to show what stream isolation is:
(Illustration from Marcelo Martins, https://stakey.club/en/decred-via-tor-network/ [Archive.org])
-VPN/Proxy over Tor falls on the right-side379 meaning using a VPN/Proxy over Tor forces Tor to use one circuit for all activities instead of multiple circuits for each. This means that using a VPN/Proxy over Tor can reduce the effectiveness of Tor in some cases and should therefore be used only for some specific cases:
+VPN/Proxy over Tor falls on the right-side376 meaning using a VPN/Proxy over Tor forces Tor to use one circuit for all activities instead of multiple circuits for each. This means that using a VPN/Proxy over Tor can reduce the effectiveness of Tor in some cases and should therefore be used only for some specific cases:
When your destination service does not allow Tor Exit nodes.
When you do not mind using a shared Tor circuit for various services. For instance for using various authenticated services.
Unfortunately, using Tor alone will raise the suspicion of many destinations’ platforms. You will face many hurdles (captchas, errors, difficulties signing up) if you only use Tor. In addition, using Tor where you are could put you in trouble just for that. But Tor remains the best solution for anonymity and must be somewhere for anonymity.
If you intend to create persistent shared and authenticated identities on various services where access from Tor is hard, I recommend the VPN over Tor and VPS VPN/Proxy over Tor options (or VPN over Tor over VPN if needed). It might be a bit less secure against correlation attacks due to breaking Tor Stream isolation but provides much better convenience in accessing online resources than just using Tor. It is an “acceptable” trade-off IMHP if you are careful enough with your identity.
+If you intend to create persistent shared and authenticated identities on various services where access from Tor is hard, we recommend the VPN over Tor and VPS VPN/Proxy over Tor options (or VPN over Tor over VPN if needed). It might be a bit less secure against correlation attacks due to breaking Tor Stream isolation but provides much better convenience in accessing online resources than just using Tor. It is an “acceptable” trade-off IMHP if you are careful enough with your identity.
If your intent however is just to browse random services anonymously without creating specific shared identities, using tor friendly services; or if you do not want to accept that trade-off in the earlier option. Then I recommend using the Tor Only route to keep the full benefits of Stream Isolation (or Tor over VPN if you need to).
If cost is an issue, I recommend the Tor Only option if possible.
If your intent however is just to browse random services anonymously without creating specific shared identities, using tor friendly services; or if you do not want to accept that trade-off in the earlier option. Then we recommend using the Tor Only route to keep the full benefits of Stream Isolation (or Tor over VPN if you need to).
If cost is an issue, we recommend the Tor Only option if possible.
If both Tor and VPN access are impossible or dangerous then you have no choice but to rely on Public wi-fi safely. See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option
For more information, you can also see the discussions here that could help decide yourself:
@@ -3579,7 +3583,7 @@Qubes OS uses LUKS for full disk encryption and it is technically possible to achieve a form of deniability by using detached LUKS headers. This is not yet integrated into this guide but you will find a tutorial on how to achieve this here: http://dreadytofatroptsdj6io7l3xptbet6onoyno2yv7jicoxknyazubrad.onion/post/af76301c21e1b4a33851 and some more background information within the Linux Host OS section (see Note about plausible deniability on Linux).
We will follow the instructions from their own guide https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/ [Archive.org]:
+You will follow the instructions from their own guide https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/installation-guide/ [Archive.org]:
(Secure Boot is not supported as per their FAQ: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#is-secure-boot-supported [Archive.org] so it should be disabled in the BIOS/UEFI settings.)
Download the latest Qubes OS 4.1.x installation ISO according to their hardware compatibility list.
If you want to use Tor or VPN over Tor: Check the "Enabling system and template updates over the Tor anonymity network using Whonix" during the last step. This will force all Qubes OS updates to go through Tor. While this will significantly reduce your update speed, it will increase your anonymity from the start. (If you are having issues connecting to Tor due to censorship or blocking, consider using Tor Bridges as recommended earlier. Just follow the tutorial provided here: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Bridges [Archive.org])
If you want to use Tor over VPN or cannot use any of those, leave it unchecked.
Be absolutely sure that you are verifying the signature of the ISO, which you can find on this page: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/ [Archive.org]. Check by obtaining the fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways as recommended. This is to ensure the image has not been tampered with. Do not skip this vital step even though we know we are getting the ISO from a trusted source, because it’s possible for the Qubes website to be compromised.
Be absolutely sure that you are verifying the signature of the ISO, which you can find on this page: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/ [Archive.org]. Check by obtaining the fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways as recommended. This is to ensure the image has not been tampered with. Do not skip this vital step even though you know you are getting the ISO from a trusted source, because it’s possible for the Qubes website to be compromised.
If you cannot use Tor at all, there is also no point in installing Whonix. So, you should disable Whonix installation within the Software Selection Menu.
The Qubes master signing key fingerprint should match 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494.
Remember to read the guide to verifying signatures on the Qubes website: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/ [Archive.org].
Unfortunately, Qubes OS does not support hibernation380 which is IMHO an issue regarding cold-boot attacks. To mitigate those, I highly recommend that you configure Qubes OS to shut down on any power action (power button, lid closure). You can do set this from the XFCE Power Manager. Do not use the sleep features.
+Unfortunately, Qubes OS does not support hibernation377 which is IMHO an issue regarding cold-boot attacks. To mitigate those, we highly recommend that you configure Qubes OS to shut down on any power action (power button, lid closure). You can do set this from the XFCE Power Manager. Do not use the sleep features.
Remember this should be done from a safe place (see Find some safe places with decent public Wi-Fi and Appendix Q: Using long-range Antenna to connect to Public Wi-Fis from a safe distance):
Open Firefox and register (anonymously) into the Wi-Fi
Personally, we wouldn’t do it in-place and do a fresh install.
+But if you really want to, it’s technically possible by following this guide: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade/4.1/ [Archive.org]
After you are connected to a Wi-Fi you need to update Qubes OS and Whonix. You must keep Qubes OS always updated before conducting any sensitive activities. Especially your Browser VMs. Normally, Qubes OS will warn you about updates in the upper right corner with a gear icon. As this might take a while in this case due to using Tor, you can force the process by doing the following:
Click Next and update
If you checked the Tor option during install, wait patiently as this might take a while over Tor
Follow the instructions on https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install [Archive.org]. If you’re running Qubes 4.1, this is already done for you.
+Again, you should really do this ASAP. We would use a fresh install but it’s technically possible to do it in-place, see https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Release_Upgrade_Whonix_15_to_Whonix_16 [Archive.org]
+Follow the instructions on https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install [Archive.org]. If you’re running Qubes 4.1.x, this is already done for you.
Disclaimer: This section is under construction and will be worked on heavily in the next releases. This section is for more advanced users.
While Qubes OS is already sandboxing everything by design, it is also useful to consider sandboxing apps themselves using AppArmor or SELinux.
“AppArmor is a Mandatory Access Control framework. When enabled, AppArmor confines programs according to a set of rules that specify what files a given program can access. This initiative-taking approach helps protect the system against both known and unknown vulnerabilities” (Debian.org).
-Basically, AppArmor381 is an application sandboxing system. By default, it is not enabled but supported by Qubes OS.
+Basically, AppArmor378 is an application sandboxing system. By default, it is not enabled but supported by Qubes OS.
About the Fedora VMs:
SELinux382 is similar to AppArmor. The differences between SELinux and AppArmor are technical details into which we will not get.
+SELinux379 is similar to AppArmor. The differences between SELinux and AppArmor are technical details into which we will not get.
Here is a good explanation of what it is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WOKRaM-HI4 [Invidious]
In this guide and the context of Qubes OS, it is important to mention it as it is the recommended method by Fedora which is one of the default systems on Qubes OS.
So, head out and read https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/getting-started-with-selinux/ [Archive.org]
@@ -3673,28 +3681,13 @@Skip this step if you do not want to use a VPN and just use Tor only or if VPN is not an option either.
This tutorial should also work with any OpenVPN provider (Mullvad, IVPN, Safing.io, or Proton VPN for instance).
-This is based on the tutorial provided by Qubes OS themselves (https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md [Archive.org]). If you are familiar with this process, you can follow their tutorial. Here is mine:
-Click the Applications icon (upper left corner)
Click Create Qubes VM
Name and label as you wish: I suggest “VPNGatewayVM”
Select Type: Standalone Qube copied from a template
Select Template: Debian-11 (the default)
Select Networking:
-Select sys-whonix if you want to do VPN over Tor / Tor only (recommended)
Select sys-firewall if you want to do Tor over VPN / No Tor or VPN / Just VPN
Advanced: Check provides network
Check “Start Qube automatically on boot”
Create the VM
Test your Connectivity:
-If you are going for VPN over Tor, Test the VM connectivity to Tor by launching a Browser within the ProxyVM and going to https://check.torproject.org [Archive.org] (It should say you are connected to Tor)
If you are going for Tor over VPN, Test the VM connectivity to the internet by launching a Browser within the ProxyVM and access any website.
This is based on the tutorial provided by Qubes OS themselves (https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md [Archive.org]). This part of the guide needs reworking and update, please follow their tutorial.
+- If you are going for VPN over Tor, you need to go into the settings of the ProxyVM you made and select "sys-vpn" for networking.
+ - An easier way to setup your ProxyVM is to simply run a VPN client on the ProxyVM.
+ - Usually when you connect to your VPN provider's website, it'll tell you whether your traffic is being properly routed through the VPN.
+
+- If you are going for Tor over VPN, the opposite should be done, the ProxyVM should have its networking set as "sys-tor" and the "sys-tor" VM should have "sys-vpn" for its networking.
+ - Test the VM connectivity to the internet by launching a Browser within the ProxyVM. Visit <https://check.torproject.org> <sup>[[Archive.org]][378]</sup> (It should say you are connected to Tor)
Using Tor Browser (be careful not to use any Clearnet Browser for this), download the necessary OpenVPN configuration files for Linux from your VPN provider.
@@ -3720,7 +3713,7 @@Change the port to a supported (by your VPN provider) TCP port (like 80 or 443)
Save and exit each file
Edit the OpenVPN config file (/etc/default/openvpn) by typing sudo nano /etc/default/openvpn (because I do not like vi editor)
Edit the OpenVPN config file (/etc/default/openvpn) by typing sudo nano /etc/default/openvpn
Change #AUTOSTART="all" to AUTOSTART="all" (in other words, remove the “#”)
Save and Exit
Within the Applications Menu (upper left corner), Select the Disposable Fedora VM
Go into Qube Settings
Click Clone Qube and name it (like “VPNoverTor”)
Click Clone Qube and name it like “sys-VPNoverTor” for example
Again, within the Application Menu, Select the Clone you just created
Go into Qube Settings
Change the Networking to your ProxyVPN created earlier
Within the Applications Menu (upper left corner), Select the Disposable Fedora VM
Go into Qube Settings
Click Clone Qube and name it (like “TorOverVPN”)
Click Clone Qube and name it like “sys-TorOverVPN” for example
Again, within the Application Menu, Select the Clone you just created
Go into Qube Settings
Change the Networking to your sys-whonix created earlier
Within the Applications Menu (upper left), Select the Fedora-34 template:
Go into Qube Settings
Clone the VM and name it “fedora-34-brave” (this VM template will have Brave)
Clone the VM and name it “fedora-3x-brave” (this VM template will have Brave)
Again, go into the Applications Menu and select the clone you just created
Go into Qube Settings
Change its network to the ProxyVPN and Apply
Launch a terminal from the VM
If you want to use Brave: apply the instructions from https://brave.com/linux/ [Archive.org] (Fedora 28+ section) and run the following commands:
+If you want to use Brave: apply the instructions from https://brave.com/linux/ [Archive.org] and run the following commands:
sudo dnf install dnf-plugins-core
sudo dnf config-manager --add-repo https://brave-browser-rpm-release.s3.brave.com/x86_64/
Because sometimes you want to run mobile Apps anonymously too. You can also set up an Android VM for this purpose. As in other cases, ideally, this VM will also be sitting behind the Whonix Gateway for Tor network connectivity. But this can also be set up as VPN over Tor over VPN.
-Since the Android-x86 does not work “well” with Qubes OS (my own experience). I will instead recommend using AnBox (https://anbox.io/ [Archive.org]) which works “well enough” with Qubes OS. More information can also be found at https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anbox [Archive.org]
+Since the Android-x86 does not work “well” with Qubes OS (my own experience). We will instead recommend using AnBox (https://anbox.io/ [Archive.org]) which works “well enough” with Qubes OS. More information can also be found at https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anbox [Archive.org]
Later in the Qubes settings during creation:
Select Networking
Change to sys-Whonix to put it behind the Whonix Gateway (over Tor).
Change to sys-whonix to put it behind the Whonix Gateway (over Tor).
Just use the tutorials as is. See Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option.
@@ -3875,7 +3868,7 @@Click the Applications icon (upper left corner)
Click Create Qubes VM
Name and label as you wish: I suggest “Android Box”
Name and label as you wish: we suggest “Android”
Select Type: Standalone Qube copied from a template
Select Template: Debian-11
Select Networking:
@@ -3900,7 +3893,7 @@sudo apt install snapdNow we will follow their other tutorial from here: https://github.com/anbox/anbox/blob/master/docs/install.md [Archive.org]:
+Now you will follow their other tutorial from here: https://github.com/anbox/anbox/blob/master/docs/install.md [Archive.org]:
Install AnBox by running:
That’s it, you should now have an Android Qube over Tor (or anything else) capable of running pretty much any App you can sideload with ADB. This is, for now, and IMHO, the easiest way to get Android emulation on Qubes OS.
You will need something to store your data (logins/passwords, identities, and TOTP383 information).
-For this purpose, I strongly recommend KeePassXC because of its integrated TOTP feature. This is the ability to create entries for 2FA384 authentication with the authenticator feature.
+You will need something to store your data (logins/passwords, identities, and TOTP380 information).
+For this purpose, we strongly recommend KeePassXC because of its integrated TOTP feature. This is the ability to create entries for 2FA381 authentication with the authenticator feature.
In the context of Qubes OS you should store your sensitive information within the Domain-vault Qube:
First, click the Applications icon (upper left) and select the Domain: Vault Qube.
(Illustrations by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.5)
-Captcha385 stands for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart” are Turing tests386 puzzles you need to complete before accessing a form/website. You will mostly encounter those provided by Google (reCAPTCHA service387) and Cloudflare (hCaptcha388). hCaptcha is used on 15% of the internet by their own metrics389.
+Captcha382 stands for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart” are Turing tests383 puzzles you need to complete before accessing a form/website. You will mostly encounter those provided by Google (reCAPTCHA service384) and Cloudflare (hCaptcha385). hCaptcha is used on 15% of the internet by their own metrics386.
They are designed to separate bots from humans but are also clearly used to deter anonymous and private users from accessing services.
-If you often use VPNs or Tor, you will quickly encounter many captchas everywhere390. Quite often when using Tor, even if you succeed in solving all the puzzles (sometimes dozens in a row), you will still be denied after solving the puzzles.
+If you often use VPNs or Tor, you will quickly encounter many captchas everywhere387. Quite often when using Tor, even if you succeed in solving all the puzzles (sometimes dozens in a row), you will still be denied after solving the puzzles.
See https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor [Archive.org]
-While most people think those puzzles are only about solving a little puzzle, it is important to understand that it is much more complex, and that modern Captchas uses advanced machine learning and risk analysis algorithms to check if you are human391:
+While most people think those puzzles are only about solving a little puzzle, it is important to understand that it is much more complex, and that modern Captchas uses advanced machine learning and risk analysis algorithms to check if you are human388:
They check your browser, cookies, and browsing history using Browser fingerprinting392.
They check your browser, cookies, and browsing history using Browser fingerprinting389.
They track your cursor movements (speed, accuracy) and use algorithms to decide if it is “human/organic”.
They track your behavior before/during/after the tests to ensure you are “human”393.
They track your behavior before/during/after the tests to ensure you are “human”390.
It is also highly likely that those platforms could already reliably identify you based on the unique way you interact with those puzzles. This could work despite obfuscation of your IP address / Browser and clearing all cookies.
You will often experience several in a row (sometimes endlessly) and sometimes exceedingly difficult ones involving reading undecipherable characters or identifying various objects on endless pictures sets. You will also have more captchas if you use an ad-blocking system (uBlock for example) or if your account was flagged for any reason for using VPNs or Tor previously.
You will also have (in my experience) more Captchas (Google’s reCAPTCHA) if you do not use a Chromium-based browser. But this can be mitigated by using a Chromium-based browsers such as Brave. There is also a Browser extension called Buster that could help you those https://github.com/dessant/buster [Archive.org].
-As for Cloudflare (hCaptcha), you could also use their Accessibility solution here (https://www.hcaptcha.com/accessibility [Archive.org]) which would allow you to sign-up (with your anonymous identity created later) and set a cookie within your Browser that would allow you to bypass their captchas. Another solution to mitigate hCaptcha would be to use their own solution called “Privacy Pass”394 https://privacypass.github.io/ [Archive.org] in the form of a Browser extension you could install in your VM Browser.
+As for Cloudflare (hCaptcha), you could also use their Accessibility solution here (https://www.hcaptcha.com/accessibility [Archive.org]) which would allow you to sign-up (with your anonymous identity created later) and set a cookie within your Browser that would allow you to bypass their captchas. Another solution to mitigate hCaptcha would be to use their own solution called “Privacy Pass”391 https://privacypass.github.io/ [Archive.org] in the form of a Browser extension you could install in your VM Browser.
You should therefore deal with those carefully and force yourself to alter the way you are solving them (speed/movement/accuracy/…) to prevent “Captcha Fingerprinting”.
-Fortunately, as far as I am aware, these are not yet officially/publicly used to de-anonymize users for third parties.
+Fortunately, as far as we are aware, these are not yet officially/publicly used to de-anonymize users for third parties.
To not have those issues, you should consider using a VPN over Tor. And the best option to avoid those is likely to use a self-hosted VPN/Proxy over Tor on a cash/Monero paid VPS server.
Phone verification is advertised by most platforms to verify you are human. But do not be fooled, the main reason for phone verification is not only to check if you are human but also to be able to de-anonymize you if needed.
-Most platforms (including the privacy-oriented ones such as Signal/Telegram/Proton will require a phone number to register, and most countries now make it mandatory to submit a proof of ID to register395.
+Most platforms (including the privacy-oriented ones such as Signal/Telegram/Proton will require a phone number to register, and most countries now make it mandatory to submit a proof of ID to register392.
Fortunately, this guide explained earlier how to get a number for these cases: Getting an anonymous Phone number.
E-Mail verification is what used to be enough but is not anymore in most cases. What is important to know is that open e-mail providers (disposable e-mail providers for instance) are flagged as much as open proxies (like Tor).
Most platforms will not allow you to register using an “anonymous” or disposable e-mail. As they will not allow you to register using an IP address from the Tor network.
The key thing to this is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to sign-up for a free e-mail account anywhere without providing (you guessed it) … a cell phone number. That same cell phone number can be used conveniently to track you down in most places.
-It is possible that those services (Proton for instance) might require you to provide an e-mail address for registration. In that case, I would recommend you create an e-mail address from these providers:
+It is possible that those services (Proton for instance) might require you to provide an e-mail address for registration. In that case, we would recommend you create an e-mail address from these providers:
MailFence: https://mailfence.com/
Disroot: https://disroot.org
Also see: https://forums.whonix.org/t/riseup-net-likely-compromised/3195
For the https://riseup.net [Tor Mirror] (It has come to my attention that the site now, unfortunately, requires an invitation from a current registered user)
If you want to avoid communicating your anonymous e-mail addresses to various parties. I would strongly suggest considering using e-mail aliasing services such as:
+If you want to avoid communicating your anonymous e-mail addresses to various parties. We would strongly suggest considering using e-mail aliasing services such as:
https://simplelogin.io/ (preferred first choice due to more options available to the free tier)
Name that does not match the correct ethnicity/language/country?
The deal-breaker in most cases. As far as I know, only Facebook and LinkedIn (outside of financial services) have requested such verifications which involve sending pictures of some form of identification (passport, national ID card, driver’s license …). The only way to do this would involve creating fake official documents (forgery) using some decent Photoshop skills and this might be illegal in most places.
-Therefore, this is a line I am not going to help you cross within this guide. Some services are offering such services online, but I think they are bad actors and are overstepping their boundaries.
-In many countries, only law enforcement, some specific processes (such as GDPR requests), and some well-regulated financial services may request proof of identification. So, the legality of asking for such documents is debatable and I think such platforms should not be allowed to require those.
+The deal-breaker in most cases. As far as we know, only Facebook and LinkedIn (outside of financial services) have requested such verifications which involve sending pictures of some form of identification (passport, national ID card, driver’s license …). The only way to do this would involve creating fake official documents (forgery) using some decent Photoshop skills and this might be illegal in most places.
+Therefore, this is a line we are not going to help you cross within this guide. Some services are offering such services online, but we think they are bad actors and are overstepping their boundaries.
+In many countries, only law enforcement, some specific processes (such as GDPR requests), and some well-regulated financial services may request proof of identification. So, the legality of asking for such documents is debatable and we beieve such platforms should not be allowed to require those.
In few countries (like Germany), this practice is illegal and online platforms such as Facebook or LinkedIn are legally bound to allow you to use a pseudonym and remain anonymous.
As stated previously in this guide, many platforms will apply filters on the IPs of the users. Tor exit nodes are publicly listed, and VPN exit servers are “well known”. There are many commercial and free services providing the ability to block those IPs with ease (hi Cloudflare).
@@ -4027,8 +4020,8 @@The tolerance is much higher with VPNs as they are not considered “open proxies” but that will not stop many platforms from making them hard to use by forcing increasingly difficult captchas on most VPN users.
For this reason, this guide does recommend the use of VPN over Tor (and not Tor over VPN) in certain use cases. Remember that the best option to avoid those is to use a self-hosted VPN/Proxy over Tor on a cash/Monero paid VPS server.
Browser and Device396 Fingerprinting are usually integrated into the Captcha services but also in other various services.
-Many platforms (like Google397) will check your browser for various capabilities and settings and block Browsers they do not like. This is one of the reasons I recommend using Chromium-based Browsers such as Brave Browser over Tor Browser within this VM.
+Browser and Device393 Fingerprinting are usually integrated into the Captcha services but also in other various services.
+Many platforms (like Google394) will check your browser for various capabilities and settings and block Browsers they do not like. This is one of the reasons we recommend using Chromium-based Browsers such as Brave Browser over Tor Browser within this VM.
Here are some of the things they check within recent browsers:
User-Agent: This is your Browser name and Version.
See Your Digital Fingerprint, Footprint, and Online Behavior.
Simple and efficient, some platforms will require you to perform a financial transaction to verify your account sometimes under the pretext of verifying your age. This could be a credit card verification or an exceedingly small amount bank wire. Some will accept a donation in a main cryptocurrency like Bitcoin or Ethereum.
-While this might seem innocent, this is obviously an ID verification and de-anonymization method. This is just indirectly relying on third-party financial KYC398 regulations.
-This is for instance now the case on YouTube for some European Users399 but also used by services like Amazon that requires a valid payment method for creating an account.
+While this might seem innocent, this is obviously an ID verification and de-anonymization method. This is just indirectly relying on third-party financial KYC395 regulations.
+This is for instance now the case on YouTube for some European Users396 but also used by services like Amazon that requires a valid payment method for creating an account.
Why do this user-verification ourselves when we can just ask others to deal with it?
+“Why do this user-verification ourselves when we can just ask others to deal with it?”
You will notice this, and you probably already encountered this. Some apps/platforms will ask/require you to sign in with a well-known and well-used reputable platform instead of their own system (Sign-in with Google/Facebook/Apple/Twitter).
-This option is often presented as the “default one”, hiding away the “Sign-in with e-mail and password” with clever Dark Patterns400 and unfortunately sometimes needed.
+This option is often presented as the “default one”, hiding away the “Sign-in with e-mail and password” with clever Dark Patterns397 and unfortunately sometimes needed.
This method will delegate the verification process on those platforms instead of assuming that you will not be able to create an anonymous Google/Facebook/Apple/Twitter account with ease.
Fortunately, it is still possible to this day to create those.
This is a common method used on some Crypto trading platforms and some dating Apps.
Some platforms/apps will require you to take a live picture of yourself either doing something (a wink, holding an arm up …) or showing a custom piece of information (a handwritten text, a passport, or ID) within the picture. Sometimes the platform/app will require several pictures to increase their certainty.
This guide will not cover this one (yet) as it is mainly used on financial platforms (that will be able to identify you with other means anyway) and some dating apps like Tinder401. Unfortunately, this method is now also sometimes being used on Facebook402 and Instagram as part of their verification methods (tho I did not face it yet so far).
+This guide will not cover this one (yet) as it is mainly used on financial platforms (that will be able to identify you with other means anyway) and some dating apps like Tinder398. Unfortunately, this method is now also sometimes being used on Facebook399 and Instagram as part of their verification methods (tho we did not face it yet so far).
In some cases, these verifications must be done from your Smartphone and with an “in-app” camera to prevent you from sending a previously saved (edited) image.
-Recently even platforms such as PornHub decided to implement similar measures in the future403.
+Recently even platforms such as PornHub decided to implement similar measures in the future400.
This verification is extremely hard to defeat but possible. A method to possibly defeat those would be to use “deep fake” technology software such as the open-source FaceSwap https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap [Archive.org] to generate the required verification pictures using a randomly computer-generated face that would be swapped over the picture of a complicit model (or a stock photo).
-Unfortunately, some apps require direct access to a smartphone camera to process the verification. In that case, we will need to find a way to do such “face swaps” on the fly using a filter and another way to feed this into the camera used by the app. A possible approach would be similar to this impressive project https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLive [Archive.org].
+Unfortunately, some apps require direct access to a smartphone camera to process the verification. In that case, you will need to find a way to do such “face swaps” on the fly using a filter and another way to feed this into the camera used by the app. A possible approach would be similar to this impressive project https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLive [Archive.org].
These can be triggered by any of the above and just means someone (usually specialized employees) will review your profile manually and decide whether it is real or not based on their subjective opinion.
-Some countries have even developed hotlines where you can report any subversive content404.
+Some countries have even developed hotlines where you can report any subversive content401.
Pros: Usually that verdict is “final”, and you will probably avoid further issues if you are good.
-Cons: Usually that verdict is “final”, and you will probably be banned without any appeal possibility if you are not good. Sometimes those reviews end up on the platform just ghosting you and cancel you without any reason whatsoever. Any appeal will be left unanswered, ignored, or will generate some random dark pattern bug when trying to appeal that specific identity (this happens on Instagram for instance where if your account gets “suspended” obviously by some manual review, trying to complete the appeal form will just throw an error and tell you to try again later (I have been trying this same appeal for that identity for the past 6 months at least).
+Cons: Usually that verdict is “final”, and you will probably be banned without any appeal possibility if you are not good. Sometimes those reviews end up on the platform just ghosting you and cancel you without any reason whatsoever. Any appeal will be left unanswered, ignored, or will generate some random dark pattern bug when trying to appeal that specific identity (this happens on Instagram for instance where if your account gets “suspended” obviously by some manual review, trying to complete the appeal form will just throw an error and tell you to try again later (We have been trying this same appeal for that identity for the past 6 months at least).
Now that you have a basic understanding of all the ways you can be de-anonymized, tracked, and verified. Let us get started at evading these while staying anonymous. Remember:
You cannot trust your Smart devices
Above all, you cannot trust people
So what? Well instead of not trusting anyone or anything, I would advise to “Trust but verify”405 (or “Never trust, always verify” if you are more hardcore about it and want to apply Zero-Trust Security406) instead.
+So what? Well instead of not trusting anyone or anything, we would advise to “Trust but verify”402 (or “Never trust, always verify” if you are more hardcore about it and want to apply Zero-Trust Security403) instead.
Do not start this process unless:
You consulted your local law for compliance and the legality of your actions.
Remember to see Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices
This is the fun part where you will now create your identities from thin air. These identities do not exist but should be plausible and look “organic”. They should ideally have a story, a “legend” (yes this is the real term for this407).
+This is the fun part where you will now create your identities from thin air. These identities do not exist but should be plausible and look “organic”. They should ideally have a story, a “legend” (yes this is the real term for this404).
What is a legend? Well, it is a full back-story for your character:
Age
Now is also the moment where you could finally consider getting an online phone number as explained in the Online Phone Number (less recommended) section.
-I will help you bit by listing a few tips I learned while researching over the years (disclaimer: this is based on my individual experiences alone):
+We will help you bit by listing a few tips we learned while researching over the years (disclaimer: this is based on my individual experiences alone):
“Some animals are more equal than others”.
Ethnicity is important and you will have fewer issues and attract less attention to verification algorithms if your identity is Caucasian/East-Asian than if it is Arabic/Black (yes, I tested this extensively and it is definitely an issue).
Ethnicity is important and you will have fewer issues and attract less attention to verification algorithms if your identity is Caucasian/East-Asian than if it is Arabic/Black (yes, we tested this extensively and it is definitely an issue).
Age is important and you will have fewer issues if you are young (18-22) than if you are middle-aged or older. Platforms seem to be more lenient in not imposing restrictions on new younger audiences.
Sex/Gender is important, and you will have fewer issues if you are a female than if you are a male.
Country of origin is important, and you will have fewer issues if your identity is Norwegian than if it is Ukrainian, Nigerian, or Mexican.
Identities that are “EU residents” with an “EU IP” (VPN/Tor Exit IP) will benefit from GDPR protections on many platforms. Others will not. GDPR is your friend in most cases, and you should take this into account.
Similarly, origin IP geolocation (your IP/location when you go to “whatsmyipaddress.com”) should match your identity location as much as possible (When using a VPN over Tor, you can pick this in the VPN client if you use the VPN over Tor approach or just create a new identity in Tor Browser or Brave Tor Tab until you get an appropriate Exit node, or configure Tor to restrict your Exit Nodes). Consider excluding any exit IP that is not located in Western Europe/US/Canada/Japan/South Korea/Australia/New Zealand as you will have fewer issues. Ideally, you should get a European Union IP to get additional GDPR protection and if possible, a German exit IP due to their legal stance on using anonymous accounts on online platforms.
Brave Browser (Chromium-based) with a Private Tor Tab has (IMHO) a better acceptance level than Tor Browser (Firefox based). You will experience fewer issues with captchas and online platforms408 if you use Brave than if you use Tor Browser (feel free to try this yourself).
For every identity, you should have a matching profile picture associated with it. For this purpose, I recommend you just go to https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/ [Archive.org] and generate a computer-generated profile picture (Do note that algorithms have been developed409’410 to detect these and it might not work 100% of the time). You can also generate such pictures yourself from your computer if you prefer by using the open-source StyleGan project here https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2 [Archive.org]. Just refresh the page until you find a picture that matches your identity in all aspects (age, sex, and ethnicity) and save that picture. It would be even better to have several pictures associated with that identity, but I do not have an “easy way” of doing that yet.
+Brave Browser (Chromium-based) with a Private Tor Tab has (IMHO) a better acceptance level than Tor Browser (Firefox based). You will experience fewer issues with captchas and online platforms405 if you use Brave than if you use Tor Browser (feel free to try this yourself).
For every identity, you should have a matching profile picture associated with it. For this purpose, we recommend you just go to https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/ [Archive.org] and generate a computer-generated profile picture (Do note that algorithms have been developed406’407 to detect these and it might not work 100% of the time). You can also generate such pictures yourself from your computer if you prefer by using the open-source StyleGan project here https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2 [Archive.org]. Just refresh the page until you find a picture that matches your identity in all aspects (age, sex, and ethnicity) and save that picture. It would be even better to have several pictures associated with that identity, butWedo not have an “easy way” of doing that yet.
Bonus, you could also make it more real by using this service (with an anonymous identity) https://www.myheritage.com/deep-nostalgia [Archive.org] to make a picture more lifelike. Here is an example:
Keep track (write down) of the background stories of your Identities. You should always use the same dates and answers everywhere. Everything should always match up. Even the stories you tell about your imaginary life should always match. If you say you work as an intern at the Department of Health one day and later on another platform, say you work as an intern at the Department of Transportation, people might question your identity. Be consistent.
Use a different phone number for each identity. Online platforms do keep track of phone number usage and if one identity/number gets flagged for violating Community Guidelines or Terms of Services, it might also get the other identities using the same number flagged/banned as well.
Adapt your language/writing to the identity to not raise suspicions and lower your chances of being fingerprinted by online platforms. Be especially careful with using pedantic words and figures of speech/quotes that could allow some people to guess your writing is very similar to that person with this Twitter handle or this Reddit user. See Appendix A4: Counteracting Forensic Linguistics.
Always use TOTP 2FA (not SMS to prevent Sim Swapping attacks411 and to keep your identity working when your pre-paid card expires) using KeePassXC when available to secure your logins to various platforms.
Always use TOTP 2FA (not SMS to prevent Sim Swapping attacks408 and to keep your identity working when your pre-paid card expires) using KeePassXC when available to secure your logins to various platforms.
Remember Appendix A2: Guidelines for passwords and passphrases.
Here is also a good guide on this specific topic: https://gendersec.tacticaltech.org/wiki/index.php/Complete_manual#.22Real.22_names [Archive.org]
Note: If you are having trouble finding an exit node in the country of your choice you can force using specific countries for Exit Nodes (and therefore exit countries) on Tor by editing the torrc file on the Whonix Gateway or even the Tor Browser:
Whonix/Tails: Create/Edit a file /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf412.
On Tor Browser: Edit the torrc file located at Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor413.
Whonix/Tails: Create/Edit a file /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf409.
On Tor Browser: Edit the torrc file located at Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor410.
Once you are in the file, you can do the following:
If the Exit Node is “clean” (in few lists), proceed to go back to the first tab and open the site you want to try a sign-up for.
Unfortunately, not using your real identity is against the ToS (Terms of Services) of many services (especially those owned by Microsoft and Facebook). But don’t despair, as explained in the Requirements, it’s still legal in Germany where the courts have upheld up the legality of not using real names on online platforms (§13 VI of the German Telemedia Act of 2007414’415). Fortunately, ToS cannot override laws (yet).
+Unfortunately, not using your real identity is against the ToS (Terms of Services) of many services (especially those owned by Microsoft and Facebook). But don’t despair, as explained in the Requirements, it’s still legal in Germany where the courts have upheld up the legality of not using real names on online platforms (§13 VI of the German Telemedia Act of 2007411’412). Fortunately, ToS cannot override laws (yet).
This does not mean that it is illegal in other places but that it might be a breach of their Terms of Services if you do not have the law on your side. Remember this guide only endorses this for German users residing in Germany.
-On my side, I strongly condemn this type of real-name policy. See for instance this Wikipedia article giving some examples: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_real-name_policy_controversy [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
+On my side, we strongly condemn this type of real-name policy. See for instance this Wikipedia article giving some examples: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_real-name_policy_controversy [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
Here are some more references about the German case for reference:
https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/why-some-americans-are-cheering-germany-for-taking-on-facebooks-real-name-policy.html [Archive.org]
https://www.pcmag.com/news/german-court-rules-facebooks-real-name-policy-is-illegal [Archive.org]
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-facebook/german-court-rules-facebook-use-of-personal-data-illegal-idUSKBN1FW1FI [Archive.org]
Alternatively, you could be an adult resident of any other country where you can confirm and verify the legality of this yourself. Again, this is not legal advice, and I am not a lawyer. Do this at your own risk.
+Alternatively, you could be an adult resident of any other country where you can confirm and verify the legality of this yourself. Again, this is not legal advice, and we are not lawyers. Do this at your own risk.
Other countries where this was ruled illegal:
South Korea (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-name_system#South_Korea [Wikiless] [Archive.org])
If you know any other, please let me know with references in the GitHub issues.
Some platforms are bypassing this requirement altogether by requiring a valid payment method instead (see Financial transactions:). While this does not directly require a real name through their ToS, this has the same results as they usually only accept mainstream (not Monero/Cash) payment methods (such as Visa/MasterCard/Maestro or PayPal) which do require a real-name legally as part of their KYC416 regulations. The result is the same and even better than a simple real-name policy you could ignore in some countries such as Germany.
+Some platforms are bypassing this requirement altogether by requiring a valid payment method instead (see Financial transactions:). While this does not directly require a real name through their ToS, this has the same results as they usually only accept mainstream (not Monero/Cash) payment methods (such as Visa/MasterCard/Maestro or PayPal) which do require a real-name legally as part of their KYC413 regulations. The result is the same and even better than a simple real-name policy you could ignore in some countries such as Germany.
If you intend to use paid services, privilege those accepting cash payments or Monero payments which you can do directly and safely while keeping your anonymity.
If the service you intend to buy does not accept those but accepts Bitcoin (BTC), consider the following appendix: Appendix Z: Paying anonymously online with BTC (or any other cryptocurrency).
@@ -5415,7 +5408,7 @@ Easy NoWill they require a phone number? Yes, but see below
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but see below
Because of this valid payment method requirement, I could not test this. While this is seemingly not against their ToS, it is not possible within the context of this guide unless you manage to obtain a valid KYC payment method anonymously which AFAIK is pretty much impossible or extremely difficult.
+Because of this valid payment method requirement, we could not test this. While this is seemingly not against their ToS, it is not possible within the context of this guide unless you manage to obtain a valid KYC payment method anonymously which AFAIK is pretty much impossible or extremely difficult.
So, AFAIK, it is not possible to create an anonymous Amazon account.
Will they require a phone number? No, they do require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? No
Is this against their ToS? No https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/ [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes
Is this against their ToS? No https://discord.com/terms [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, but they do require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? I had no issues with that so far using the Desktop Client
Can you create accounts through Tor? We had no issues with that so far using the Desktop Client
You might encounter more issues using the Web Client (Captchas). Especially with Tor Browser.
I suggest using the Discord Client app on a VM through Tor or ideally through VPN/Proxy over Tor to mitigate such issues.
@@ -5579,11 +5567,11 @@ HardUse the same name that you use in everyday life.
Provide accurate information about yourself.
Will they require a phone number? Yes, and probably more later
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but it is very difficult and their onion address417 will not help. In most cases, you’ll just have a random error at sign-up and your account suspended after sign-in."
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but it is very difficult and their onion address414 will not help. In most cases, you’ll just have a random error at sign-up and your account suspended after sign-in."
But this clause of their ToS is illegal in Germany (see Requirements).
Facebook is one of the most aggressive platforms with identity verification and is pushing hard their “real name policy”. It is why this guide is only advised to German residents.
-Over my tests tho I was able to pinpoint a few tips:
+Over our tests tho we were able to pinpoint a few tips:
It will be easier if you have an Instagram account first.
Signing up through Tor is almost impossible (even using their .onion address which is a joke) and will only succeed if you are " very lucky" (I assume if you are using an exit node that is not yet known by Facebook verification systems). In most cases, it will not allow registration at all and will just fail with “An error has occurred during registration”.
Restricting your profile privacy settings too soon after signing-up
If your account gets suspended, you will need to appeal the decision through a quite simple form that will require you to submit a “proof of ID”. However, that proof of ID verification system is more lenient than LinkedIn and will allow you to send various documents which require far less Photoshop skills.
-It is also possible that they ask you to take a selfie video or picture-making certain gestures to prove your identity. If that is the case, I am afraid it is a dead-end for now unless you use a deepfake face swapping technique.
+It is also possible that they ask you to take a selfie video or picture-making certain gestures to prove your identity. If that is the case, we are afraid it is a dead-end for now unless you use a deepfake face swapping technique.
If you do file an appeal, you will have to wait for Facebook to review it (I do not know whether this is automatic or human) and you will have to wait and hope for them to unsuspend your account.
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but expect some captchas and your phone number will be required
Proton is good … but to appear less suspicious, it is simply better to also have a mainstream Google Mail account.
-As Proton, Google will also most likely require a phone number during sign-up as part of their verification process. However contrary to Proton, Google will store that phone number during the sign-up process and will also limit the number of accounts that can be created during the sign-up418’419.
+As Proton, Google will also most likely require a phone number during sign-up as part of their verification process. However contrary to Proton, Google will store that phone number during the sign-up process and will also limit the number of accounts that can be created during the sign-up415’416.
From my experience during my research, this count is limited to three accounts/phone numbers. If you are unlucky with your number (if it was previously used by another mobile user), it might be less.
You should therefore use again your online phone number OR your burner phone and pre-paid SIM card to create the account. Do not forget to use the identity details you made up earlier (birthdate). When the account is created, please do take some time to do the following:
Keep in mind that there are different algorithms in place to check for weird activity. If you receive any mail (on Proton) prompting about a Google Security Warning. Click it and click the button to say, “Yes it was me”. It helps.
Do not use that account for “sign-up with Google” anywhere unless necessary.
Be extremely careful if you decide to use the account for Google activities (such as Google Maps reviews or YouTube Comments) as those can easily trigger some checks (Negative reviews, Comments breaking Community Guidelines on YouTube).
-If your account gets suspended 420 (this can happen on sign-up, after signing-up or after using it in some Google services), you can still get it unsuspended by submitting421 an appeal/verification (which will again require your Phone number and possibly an e-mail contact with Google support with the reason). Suspension of the account does not disable the e-mail forwarding, but the suspended account will be deleted after a while.
+If your account gets suspended 417 (this can happen on sign-up, after signing-up or after using it in some Google services), you can still get it unsuspended by submitting418 an appeal/verification (which will again require your Phone number and possibly an e-mail contact with Google support with the reason). Suspension of the account does not disable the e-mail forwarding, but the suspended account will be deleted after a while.
After suspension, if your Google account is restored, you should be fine.
If your account gets banned, you will have no appeal and the forwarding will be disabled. Your phone number will be flagged, and you will not be able to use it to sign-up on a different account. Be careful when using those to avoid losing them. They are precious.
-It is also possible that Google will require an ID check through indirect financial KYC or ID picture check if you try to access/publish mature content on their platform422.
-Is this against their ToS? No https://www.ycombinator.com/legal/#tou [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes
It is also possible that Google will require an ID check through indirect financial KYC or ID picture check if you try to access/publish mature content on their platform419.
"You can’t impersonate others or provide inaccurate information. You do not have to disclose your identity on Instagram, but you must provide us with accurate and up-to-date information (including registration information). Also, you may not impersonate someone you are not, and you can’t create an account for someone else unless you have their express permission".
-This one is a bit of an Oxymoron don’t you think? So, I am not sure whether it is allowed or not.
+This one is a bit of an Oxymoron don’t you think? So, we are not sure whether it is allowed or not.
Will they require a phone number? Maybe but less likely over VPN and very likely over Tor
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but expect some captchas and your phone number will be required
It is also possible that they ask you to take a selfie video or picture-making certain gestures to prove your identity (within the app or through an e-mail request). If that is the case, I am afraid it is a dead-end for now.
+It is also possible that they ask you to take a selfie video or picture-making certain gestures to prove your identity (within the app or through an e-mail request). If that is the case, we are afraid it is a dead-end for now.
It is no secret that Instagram is part of Facebook however it is more lenient than Facebook when it comes to user verification. It is quite unlikely you will get suspended or banned after signing up. But it could help.
-For instance, I noticed that you will face fewer issues creating a Facebook account if you already have a valid Instagram account. You should always create an Instagram account before trying Facebook.
-Unfortunately, there are some limitations when using the web version of Instagram. For instance, you will not be able to enable Authenticator 2FA from the web for a reason I do not understand.
+For instance, we noticed that you will face fewer issues creating a Facebook account if you already have a valid Instagram account. You should always create an Instagram account before trying Facebook.
+Unfortunately, there are some limitations when using the web version of Instagram. For instance, you will not be able to enable Authenticator 2FA from the web for a reason we do not know.
After sign-up, do the following:
Upload a picture of your generated identity if you want.
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? Nope it does not work for some technical reason
Is this against their ToS? No https://www.ivpn.net/tos/ [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes
Is this against their ToS? Yes https://www.kraken.com/legal [Archive.org]
LinkedIn is far less aggressive than twitter but will nonetheless require a valid e-mail (preferably again your Gmail) and a phone number in most cases (tho not always).
LinkedIn however is relying a lot on reports and user/customer moderation. You should not create a profile with an occupation inside a private corporation or a small startup company. The company employees are monitoring LinkedIn activity and receive notifications when new people join. They can then report your profile as fake, and your profile will then be suspended or banned pending appeal.
-LinkedIn will then require you to go through a verification process that will, unfortunately, require you to send an ID proof (identity card, passport, driver’s license). This ID verification is processed by a company called Jumio423 that specializes in ID proofing. This is most likely a dead end as this would force you to develop some strong Photoshop skills.
+LinkedIn will then require you to go through a verification process that will, unfortunately, require you to send an ID proof (identity card, passport, driver’s license). This ID verification is processed by a company called Jumio420 that specializes in ID proofing. This is most likely a dead end as this would force you to develop some strong Photoshop skills.
Instead, you are far less likely to be reported if you just stay vague (say you are a student/intern/freelance) or pretend you work for a large public institution that is too large for anyone to care or check.
As with Twitter and Google, you should do the following after signing up:
So yes, it is still possible to create an MS account without a phone number and using Tor or VPN, but you might have to cycle through a few exit nodes to achieve this.
After signing up you should set up 2FA authentication within the security options and using KeePassXC TOTP.
-Is this against their ToS? No https://mullvad.net/en/help/terms-service/ [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail.
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes.
Is this against their ToS? No https://njal.la/tos/ [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, but they do require an e-mail or an XMPP (Jabber) account somewhere.
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, they even have a “.onion” address at http://njallalafimoej5i4eg7vlnqjvmb6zhdh27qxcatdn647jtwwwui3nad.onion/
Is this against their ToS? No, they do not even have Terms of Services
Will they require a phone number? No, they do not even require an e-mail
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes (obviously)
Is this against their ToS? No, it looks fine https://onlyfans.com/terms [Archive.org]
You obviously need an e-mail for your online identity and disposable e-mails are pretty much banned everywhere.
Proton is a free e-mail provider based in Switzerland that advocates security and privacy.
-They are recommended by Privacyguides.org424. Their only apparent issue is that they do require (in most cases) a phone number or another e-mail address for registration (when you try to register from a VPN or Tor at least).
-They claim they do not store/link the phone/e-mail associated with the registration but only store a hash that is not linked to the account425. If their claim is true and the hash is not linked to your account, and that you followed my guide about the phone number, you should be reasonably safe from tracking.
+They are recommended by Privacyguides.org421. Their only apparent issue is that they do require (in most cases) a phone number or another e-mail address for registration (when you try to register from a VPN or Tor at least).
+They claim they do not store/link the phone/e-mail associated with the registration but only store a hash that is not linked to the account422. If their claim is true and the hash is not linked to your account, and that you followed my guide about the phone number, you should be reasonably safe from tracking.
This e-mail account can be used for creating a Google/Gmail account.
-Is this against their ToS? No https://protonvpn.com/terms-and-conditions [Archive.org]
Will they require a phone number? No, but they do require an e-mail.
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes
Is this against their ToS? No https://www.redditinc.com/policies [Archive.org]
Telegram is quite straightforward, and you can download their portable Windows app to sign-up and log in.
It will require a phone number (that can only be used once) and nothing else.
-In most cases, I had no issues whether it was over Tor or VPN, but I had a few cases where my telegram account was just banned for violating terms of services (not sure which one?). This again despite not using them for anything.
-They provide an appeal process through e-mail, but I had no success with getting any answer.
+In most cases, we had no issues whether it was over Tor or VPN, butWehad a few cases where my telegram account was just banned for violating terms of services (not sure which one?). This again despite not using them for anything.
+They provide an appeal process through e-mail, but we had no success with getting any answer.
Their appeal process is just sending an e-mail to recover@telegram.org [Archive.org] stating your phone number and issue and hope they answer.
After signing up you should do the following:
Is this against their ToS? No https://twitter.com/en/tos
Will they require a phone number? They might not at sign-up, but they will just after sign-up or later.
Will they require a phone number? Extremely likely, possibly now a requirement in all cases.
Can you create accounts through Tor? Yes, but expect some captchas and your phone number will be required after a while.
Twitter is extremely aggressive in preventing anonymity on its network. You should sign-up using e-mail and password (not phone) and not using “Sign-in with Google”. Use your Gmail as the e-mail address.
More than likely, your account will be suspended immediately during the sign-up process and will require you to complete a series of automated tests to unlock. This will include a series of captchas, confirmation of your e-mail and Twitter handle, or other information. In some cases, it will also require your phone number.
-In some cases, despite you selecting a text verification, the Twitter verification system will call the phone no matter what. In that case, you will have to pick up and hear the verification code. I suspect this is another method of preventing automated systems and malicious users from selling text receiving services over the internet.
+In some cases, despite you selecting a text verification, the Twitter verification system will call the phone no matter what. In that case, you will have to pick up and hear the verification code. We suspect this is another method of preventing automated systems and malicious users from selling text receiving services over the internet.
Twitter will store all this information and link it to your account including your IP, e-mail, and phone number. You will not be able that phone number to create a different account.
Once the account is restored, you should take some time to do the following:
Disable Phone lookup
Disable all personalized advertising settings
Disable geolocation of tweets
Remove the phone number from the account
Caution: Remove the phone number from the account (at your own risk, this often leads to suspension of the account)
Follow some people based
Log out and leave it be.
After about a week, you should check Twitter again and the chances are quite high that it will be suspended again for “suspicious activity” or “violating community guidelines” despite you not using it at all (not even a single tweet/follow/like/retweet or DM) but this time by another system. I call this the “Double-tap”.
-This time you will need to submit an appeal using a form426, provide a good reason and wait for the appeal to be processed by Twitter. During that process, you may receive an e-mail (on Proton) asking you to reply to a customer service ticket to prove that you do have access to your e-mail and that it is you. This will be directed toward your Gmail address but will arrive on your Proton.
+After about a week, you should check Twitter again and the chances are quite high that it will be suspended again for “suspicious activity” or “violating community guidelines” despite you not using it at all (not even a single tweet/follow/like/retweet or DM) but this time by another system. We call this the “Double-tap”.
+This time you will need to submit an appeal using a form423, provide a good reason and wait for the appeal to be processed by Twitter. During that process, you may receive an e-mail (on Proton) asking you to reply to a customer service ticket to prove that you do have access to your e-mail and that it is you. This will be directed toward your Gmail address but will arrive on your Proton.
Do not reply from Proton as this will raise suspicions, you must sign in to Gmail (unfortunately) and compose a new mail from there copy-pasting the E-Mail, Subject, and Content from Proton. As well as a reply confirming you have access to that e-mail.
After a few days, your account should get unsuspended “for good”. No issues after that but keep in mind they can still ban your account for any reason if you violate the community guidelines. The phone number and e-mail will then be flagged, and you will have no other option but to get a new identity with a new number to sign-up again. Do not use this account for trolling.
Can you post there with Tor or VPN? Not likely.
4chan is 4chan … This guide will not explain 4chan to you. They block Tor exit nodes and known VPN IP ranges.
-You are going to have to find a separate way to post there using at least seven proxies427 that are not known by 4chan blocking system (hint: Anonymous VPS using Monero is probably your best option).
+You are going to have to find a separate way to post there using at least seven proxies424 that are not known by 4chan blocking system (hint: Anonymous VPS using Monero is probably your best option).
Use any crypto wallet app within the Windows Virtual Machine. But be careful not to transfer anything toward an Exchange or a known Wallet. Crypto is in most cases NOT anonymous and can be traced back to you when you buy/sell any (remember the Your Cryptocurrencies transactions section).
If you really want to use Crypto, use Monero which is the only one with reasonable privacy/anonymity.
Ideally, you should find a way to buy/sell crypto with cash from an unknown person.
There are only three ways of securely using those anonymously (that I would recommend). Using a VPN on your phone is not one of those ways. All of those are, unfortunately, “tedious” to say the least.
+There are only three ways of securely using those anonymously (that we would recommend). Using a VPN on your phone is not one of those ways. All of those are, unfortunately, “tedious” to say the least.
Use an Android Emulator within the Windows VM and run the App through your multi-layer of Tor/VPN. The drawback is that such emulators are usually quite resource-hungry and will slow down your VM and use more battery. Here is also an (outdated) guide on this matter: https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/08/23/creating-android-open-source-research-device-pc/ [Archive.org]. As for myself, I will recommend the use of:
+Use an Android Emulator within the Windows VM and run the App through your multi-layer of Tor/VPN. The drawback is that such emulators are usually quite resource-hungry and will slow down your VM and use more battery. Here is also an (outdated) guide on this matter: https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/08/23/creating-android-open-source-research-device-pc/ [Archive.org]. As for myself, we will recommend the use of:
Android-x86 on Virtualbox (see https://www.android-x86.org/documentation/virtualbox.html [Archive.org]) that you can also set up easily.
AnBox (https://anbox.io [Archive.org]) that you can also set up rather easily including on the Whonix Workstation, see https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anbox [Archive.org]
Not recommended: Using a non-official app (such as Wassapp for WhatsApp) to connect from the Windows VM to the app. Use at your own risk as you could get banned for violating the terms of services by using a non-official App.
Not recommended and most complicated: Have a burner Smartphone that you will connect to the VM layered network through Tethering/Sharing of the connection through Wi-Fi. I will not detail this here, but it is an option.
Not recommended and most complicated: Have a burner Smartphone that you will connect to the VM layered network through Tethering/Sharing of the connection through Wi-Fi. We will not detail this here, but it is an option.
There is no way to reliably set a decent multi-layered connectivity approach easily on an Android phone (it is not even possible on IOS as far as I know). By reliable, I mean being sure that the smartphone will not leak anything such as geolocation or anything else from booting up to shutting down.
+There is no way to reliably set a decent multi-layered connectivity approach easily on an Android phone (it is not even possible on IOS as far as we know). By reliable, we mean being sure that the smartphone will not leak anything such as geolocation or anything else from booting up to shutting down.
You should use the same logic and security for any other platform.
It should work in most cases with most platforms. The hardest platform to use with full anonymity is Facebook.
@@ -5906,7 +5858,7 @@ HardThere are plenty of messaging apps everywhere. Some have excellent UI and UX and terrible Security/Privacy. Some have excellent Security/Privacy but terrible UI and UX. It is not easy to pick the ones that you should use for sensitive activities. So, this section will help you do that.
Before going further, there are also some key basic concepts you should understand:
End-to-end Encryption428 (aka e2ee) is a rather simple concept. It just means only you and your destination know each-others public encryption keys and no one in between that would be eavesdropping would be able to decrypt the communication.
+End-to-end Encryption425 (aka e2ee) is a rather simple concept. It just means only you and your destination know each-others public encryption keys and no one in between that would be eavesdropping would be able to decrypt the communication.
However, the term is often used differently depending on the provider:
Some providers will claim e2ee but forget to mention what is covered by their protocols. For instance, is metadata also protected within their e2ee protocol? Or is it just the content of the messages?
See the Bad Cryptography section at the start of this guide.
Always be cautious of apps rolling their own crypto until it has been reviewed by many in the crypto community (or even better published and peer-reviewed academically). Again, this is harder to verify with closed-source proprietary apps.
-It is not that rolling your own crypto is bad in essence, it is that good cryptography needs real peer-reviewing, auditing, testing… And since you are probably not a cryptanalyst (and I am not one either), chances are high we are not competent to assess the cryptography of some apps.
+It is not that rolling your own crypto is bad in essence, it is that good cryptography needs real peer-reviewing, auditing, testing… And since you are probably not a cryptanalyst (and we are not either), chances are high we are not competent to assess the cryptography of some apps.
Forward Secrecy429 (FS aka PFS for Perfect Forward Secrecy) is a property of the key agreement protocol of some of those messaging apps and is a companion feature of e2ee. This happens before you establish communication with the destination. The “Forward” refers to the future in time and means that every time you establish a new e2ee communication, a new set of keys will be generated for that specific session. The goal of forward secrecy is to maintain the secrecy of past communications (sessions) even if the current one is compromised. If an adversary manages to get hold of your current e2ee keys, that adversary will then be limited to the content of the single session and will not be able to easily decrypt past ones.
+Forward Secrecy426 (FS aka PFS for Perfect Forward Secrecy) is a property of the key agreement protocol of some of those messaging apps and is a companion feature of e2ee. This happens before you establish communication with the destination. The “Forward” refers to the future in time and means that every time you establish a new e2ee communication, a new set of keys will be generated for that specific session. The goal of forward secrecy is to maintain the secrecy of past communications (sessions) even if the current one is compromised. If an adversary manages to get hold of your current e2ee keys, that adversary will then be limited to the content of the single session and will not be able to easily decrypt past ones.
This has some user experience drawbacks like for instance, a new device could not be able to conveniently access the remotely stored chat history without additional steps.
So, in short, Forward Secrecy protects past sessions against future compromises of keys or passwords.
More on this topic on this YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSQtyW_ywZc [Invidious]
Some providers and apps claiming to offer e2ee do not offer FS/PFS sometimes for usability reasons (group messaging for instance is more complex with PFS). It is therefore important to prefer open-source apps providing forward secrecy to those that do not.
Zero-Access Encryption430 at rest is used when you store data at some provider (let us say your chat history or chat backups) but this history or backup is encrypted on your side and cannot be read or decrypted by the provider hosting it.
+Zero-Access Encryption427 at rest is used when you store data at some provider (let us say your chat history or chat backups) but this history or backup is encrypted on your side and cannot be read or decrypted by the provider hosting it.
Zero-Access encryption is an added feature/companion to e2ee but is applied mainly to data at rest and not communications.
Examples of this issue would be iMessage and WhatsApp, see the Your Cloud backups/sync services at the start of this guide.
So again, it is best to prefer Apps/Providers that do offer Zero-Access Encryption at rest and cannot read/access any of your data/metadata even at rest and not only limited to communications.
-Such a feature would have prevented important hacks such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal431 if it were implemented.
+Such a feature would have prevented important hacks such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal428 if it were implemented.
Remember the Your Metadata including your Geo-Location section. End-to-end Encryption is one thing, but it does not necessarily protect your metadata.
For Instance, WhatsApp might not know what you are saying but they might know who you are talking to, how long and when you have been talking to someone, who else is in groups with you, and if you transferred data with them (such as large files).
End-to-end Encryption does not in itself protect an eavesdropper from harvesting your metadata.
This data can also be protected/obfuscated by some protocols to make metadata harvesting substantially harder for eavesdroppers. This is the case for instance with the Signal Protocol which does offer some added protection with features like:
The Sealed Sender option432.
The Private Contact Discovery433.
The Private Group System434.
The Sealed Sender option429.
The Private Contact Discovery430.
The Private Group System431.
Other Apps like Briar or OnionShare will protect metadata by using the Tor Network as a shield and storing everything locally on-device. Nothing is stored remotely, and all communications are either direct using proximity wi-fi/Bluetooth or remotely through the Tor network.
Most apps however and especially closed-source proprietary commercial apps will collect and retain your metadata for various purposes. And such metadata alone is enough to figure out a lot of things about your communications.
@@ -5947,16 +5899,6 @@ HardFinally, Open-Source apps should always be preferred because they allow third parties to check actual capabilities and weaknesses vs claims of marketing departments. Open-Source does not mean the app should be free or non-commercial. It just means transparency.
Below you will find a small table showing the state of messaging apps as of the writing of this guide based on my tests and data from the various sources below:
-Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_instant_messaging_protocols [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_cross-platform_instant_messaging_clients [Wikiless] [Archive.org]
Secure Messaging Apps https://www.securemessagingapps.com/ [Archive.org]
Proton Blog, https://proton.me/blog/whatsapp-alternatives/ [Archive.org]
Whonix Documentation, Instant Messenger Chat https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat [Archive.org]
Have a look at https://securechatguide.org/featuresmatrix.html [Archive.org] which is also a good comparison table for messaging apps.
Messenger-Matrix.de at https://www.messenger-matrix.de/messenger-matrix-en.html [Archive.org]
Legend: * Not recommended but mentioned. N/A = Not Included or absence of recommendation for that software type. (L)= Linux Only but can maybe be used on Windows/macOS through other means (HomeBrew, Virtualization, Cygwin). (?)= Not tested but open-source and could be considered.
-In all cases, I strongly recommend only using such applications from within a VM or Tails to prevent as much leaking as possible. If you do not, you will have to sanitize those documents carefully before publishing (See Removing Metadata from Files/Documents/Pictures).
+In all cases, we strongly recommend only using such applications from within a VM or Tails to prevent as much leaking as possible. If you do not, you will have to sanitize those documents carefully before publishing (See Removing Metadata from Files/Documents/Pictures).
You might be interested in communicating information to some organization such as the press anonymously.
-If you must do so, you should take some steps because you cannot trust any organization to protect your anonymity441. See Appendix B1: Checklist of things to verify before sharing information.
-For this, I strongly recommend the use of SecureDrop442 (https://securedrop.org/ [Archive.org]) which is an open-source project from the Freedom of the Press Foundation.
+If you must do so, you should take some steps because you cannot trust any organization to protect your anonymity438. See Appendix B1: Checklist of things to verify before sharing information.
+For this, we strongly recommend the use of SecureDrop439 (https://securedrop.org/ [Archive.org]) which is an open-source project from the Freedom of the Press Foundation.
Do take a moment to their read their “source guide” here: https://docs.securedrop.org/en/stable/source.html [Archive.org]
Ideally, you should use SecureDrop over Tor and you will find a curated list of those here https://github.com/alecmuffett/real-world-onion-sites#securedrop [Archive.org]
For these back-ups, you will need a USB key or an external hard drive with enough storage capacity to store the files you want to back up.
For this purpose, I will recommend the use of Veracrypt on all platforms (Linux/Windows/macOS) for convenience, security, and portability.
+For this purpose, we will recommend the use of Veracrypt on all platforms (Linux/Windows/macOS) for convenience, security, and portability.
The process is fairly simple and all you will need is to follow Veracrypt tutorial here: https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Beginner%27s%20Tutorial.html [Archive.org]
In this container, you can then store sensitive data manually and or use any backup utility you want to backup files from the OS to that container.
@@ -7697,10 +7648,10 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)Be extremely cautious with these file containers:
Do not store multiple versions of them or store them anywhere where some versioning is being done (by the file system or the storage system). These file containers should be identical everywhere you store them. If you have a backup of such containers somewhere, it needs to be absolutely identical to the one you are using. If you do not take this precaution, an adversary could compare two different versions of this container and prove the existence of hidden data. Follow carefully the recommendations here https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html [Archive.org]. Remember the Local Data Leaks and Forensics: section.
I strongly recommend storing such containers on external USB keys that you will only mount from your guest VMs and never from your Host OS. After each modification to the files, you should clean the free space on the USB disk and make sure that any backup of such containers is absolutely identical on each key and your computer. See the How to securely delete specific files/folders/data on your HDD/SSD and Thumb drives section of this guide for help on doing this.
If you have time, I will even recommend that you delete wipe the keys completely before making any modification on such containers on your computer (if you do not work from the USB key directly). This is to prevent an adversary that would seize your assets before you could update the keys from having multiple versions of the containers that could lead to proving the existence of hidden data using forensics techniques.
We strongly recommend storing such containers on external USB keys that you will only mount from your guest VMs and never from your Host OS. After each modification to the files, you should clean the free space on the USB disk and make sure that any backup of such containers is absolutely identical on each key and your computer. See the How to securely delete specific files/folders/data on your HDD/SSD and Thumb drives section of this guide for help on doing this.
If you have time, We will even recommend that you delete wipe the keys completely before making any modification on such containers on your computer (if you do not work from the USB key directly). This is to prevent an adversary that would seize your assets before you could update the keys from having multiple versions of the containers that could lead to proving the existence of hidden data using forensics techniques.
Do not ever store such containers on cloud storage platforms that have backups and where you have no direct control over permanent deletion. They might keep “old versions” of your files which can then also be used by forensics to prove the existence of hidden data.
If you are mounting the hidden volume from your Host OS (not recommended), you should erase all traces of this hidden volume everywhere after use. There could be traces in various places (system logs, file systems journaling, recent documents in your applications, indexing, registry entries…). Refer to the Some additional measures against forensics section of this guide to remove such artifacts. Especially on Windows. Instead, you should mount them on your Guest VMs. With Virtualbox for instance, you could take a snapshot of the VM before opening/working the hidden volume and then restore the snapshot before opening/working on it after use. This should erase the traces of its presence and mitigate the issue. Your Host OS might keep logs of the USB key being inserted but not of the hidden volume usage. Therefore, I do not recommend using these from your host OS.
If you are mounting the hidden volume from your Host OS (not recommended), you should erase all traces of this hidden volume everywhere after use. There could be traces in various places (system logs, file systems journaling, recent documents in your applications, indexing, registry entries…). Refer to the Some additional measures against forensics section of this guide to remove such artifacts. Especially on Windows. Instead, you should mount them on your Guest VMs. With Virtualbox for instance, you could take a snapshot of the VM before opening/working the hidden volume and then restore the snapshot before opening/working on it after use. This should erase the traces of its presence and mitigate the issue. Your Host OS might keep logs of the USB key being inserted but not of the hidden volume usage. Therefore, we do not recommend using these from your host OS.
Do not store these on external SSD drives if you are not sure you can use Trim on them (see the Understanding HDD vs SSD section).
(Not recommended) Doing your backup from the live operating system using a backup utility (commercial utilities such as EaseUS Todo Free, Macrium Reflect…) or native utilities like macOS Time Machine, QubesOS Backup, Ubuntu Déjà Dup, or Windows Backup…).
This backup can be done while the Operating System is running.
This backup will not be encrypted using the disk encryption but using the Backup utility encryption algorithm (which you will have to trust and cannot really control for most). Alternatively, you could encrypt the backup media yourself separately (for instance with Veracrypt). I am not aware of any free or non-free utility that natively supports Veracrypt.
This backup will not be encrypted using the disk encryption but using the Backup utility encryption algorithm (which you will have to trust and cannot really control for most). Alternatively, you could encrypt the backup media yourself separately (for instance with Veracrypt). We are not aware of any free or non-free utility that natively supports Veracrypt.
Some utilities will allow for differential/incremental backups instead of full backups.
These backup utilities will not be able to restore your encrypted drive as-is as they do not support those encrypted file systems natively. And so, these will require more work to restore your system in an encrypted state (re-encryption after restoring).
This method is the easiest to manage.
I made extensive testing using live backups utilities (Macrium Reflect, EaseUS Todo Reflect, Déjà Dup…) and personally I do not think it is worth it. Instead, I would recommend that you periodically back up your system with a simple Clonezilla image. It is much easier to perform, much easier to restore, and usually works reliably without issues in all cases. And contrary to many beliefs, it is not that slow with most backups taking about an hour depending on the speed of your destination media.
-For backing up single files while you work, I recommend using file containers or encrypted media directly and manually as explained in the earlier section.
+We made extensive testing using live backups utilities (Macrium Reflect, EaseUS Todo Reflect, Déjà Dup…) and personally we do not think it is worth it. Instead, we would recommend that you periodically back up your system with a simple Clonezilla image. It is much easier to perform, much easier to restore, and usually works reliably without issues in all cases. And contrary to many beliefs, it is not that slow with most backups taking about an hour depending on the speed of your destination media.
+For backing up single files while you work, we recommend using file containers or encrypted media directly and manually as explained in the earlier section.
You will need a separate external drive with at least the same or more free space available than your source disk. If your laptop has a 250GB disk. You will need at least 250GB of free disk space for the full image backup. Sometimes this will be reduced significantly with compression by the backup utility but as a safety rule, you should have at least the same or more space on your backup drive.
I will recommend the use of the open-source Clonezilla utility for convenience and reliability but there are many other native Linux utilities and methods you could use for this purpose.
+We will recommend the use of the open-source Clonezilla utility for convenience and reliability but there are many other native Linux utilities and methods you could use for this purpose.
So, you should follow the steps in Appendix E: Clonezilla
Qubes OS recommends using their own utility for backups as documented here https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/backup-restore/ [Archive.org]. But it is just a hassle and provides limited added value unless you just want to back up a single Qube. So instead, I am also recommending just making a full image with Clonezilla which will remove all the hassle and bring you back a working system in a few simple steps.
+Qubes OS recommends using their own utility for backups as documented here https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/backup-restore/ [Archive.org]. But it is just a hassle and provides limited added value unless you just want to back up a single Qube. So instead, we are also recommending just making a full image with Clonezilla which will remove all the hassle and bring you back a working system in a few simple steps.
So, you should follow the steps in Appendix E: Clonezilla
I will only recommend the use of the open-source and free Clonezilla utility for this purpose. There are commercial utilities that offer the same functionality, but I do not see any advantage in using any of them vs Clonezilla.
+We will only recommend the use of the open-source and free Clonezilla utility for this purpose. There are commercial utilities that offer the same functionality, but we do not see any advantage in using any of them vs Clonezilla.
Some warnings:
If you use Bitlocker for encryption with TPM443 enabled, you might need to save your Bitlocker Key (safely) somewhere as well as this might be needed to restore your drive if your HDD/SSD or other hardware parts changed. Another option would be to use Bitlocker without the use of TPM which would not require this option. But again, I do not recommend using Bitlocker at all.
If you use Bitlocker for encryption with TPM440 enabled, you might need to save your Bitlocker Key (safely) somewhere as well as this might be needed to restore your drive if your HDD/SSD or other hardware parts changed. Another option would be to use Bitlocker without the use of TPM which would not require this option. But again, we do not recommend using Bitlocker at all.
You should always have a backup of your Veracrypt rescue disk at hand somewhere to be able to resolve some issues that might still appear after a restore. Remember this rescue disk does not contain your passphrase or any sensitive information. You can store it as is.
If you changed the HDD/SSD after a failure, Windows 10 may refuse to boot if your hard drive ID is changed. You should also save this ID before backing up as you might need to change the ID of the new drive as Windows 10 might require a matching ID before booting. See Appendix F: Diskpart
If you changed the HDD/SSD after a failure, Windows 10/11 may refuse to boot if your hard drive ID is changed. You should also save this ID before backing up as you might need to change the ID of the new drive as Windows 10/11 might require a matching ID before booting. See Appendix F: Diskpart
In case you are using Plausible Deniability on Windows. DO NOT back up the hidden OS partition as this image could be used by Forensics to prove the existence of the hidden volume as explained earlier. It is okay to back up the Decoy OS partition without issues, but you should never back up the partition containing the Hidden OS.
Follow the steps in Appendix E: Clonezilla
I would recommend just using the native Time Machine backup with encryption (and a strong passphrase that could be the same as your OS) as per the guides provided at Apple: https://support.apple.com/en-ie/guide/mac-help/mh21241/mac [Archive.org] and https://support.apple.com/en-ie/guide/mac-help/mh11421/11.0/mac/11.0 [Archive.org].
+we would recommend just using the native Time Machine backup with encryption (and a strong passphrase that could be the same as your OS) as per the guides provided at Apple: https://support.apple.com/en-ie/guide/mac-help/mh21241/mac [Archive.org] and https://support.apple.com/en-ie/guide/mac-help/mh11421/11.0/mac/11.0 [Archive.org].
So, plug in an external drive and it should prompt you to use it as a Time Machine backup.
You should however consider formatting this drive as exFAT so that it is also usable by other OSes conveniently (Windows/Linux) without added software using this guide: https://support.apple.com/en-ie/guide/disk-utility/dskutl1010/mac [Archive.org]
It is just simpler and will work online while you work. You will be able to recover your data on any other Mac from the recovery options and you will be also able to use this disk for backing up other devices.
-It is possible to also use Clonezilla to clone your Mac Hard Drive, but it could bring hardware compatibility issues and probably will not add much in terms of security. So, for macOS, I am not specifically recommending Clonezilla.
+It is possible to also use Clonezilla to clone your Mac Hard Drive, but it could bring hardware compatibility issues and probably will not add much in terms of security. So, for macOS, We are not specifically recommending Clonezilla.
This is a tricky one. The problem is that it depends on your threat model.
@@ -7773,10 +7724,10 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)AnonArchive (https://anonarchive.org/): free tier limited to 1GB total
Filen (https://filen.io/): free tier limited to 10GB total
I am currently not aware of any online storage/hosting platform accepting cash payments unlike providers mentioned before.
+We are currently not aware of any online storage/hosting platform accepting cash payments unlike providers mentioned before.
If you do intend to store sensitive data on “mainstream platforms” (Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive…), remember not to ever store plausible deniability containers on those and remember to encrypt and check (for metadata…) anything locally before uploading there. Either with software like Veracrypt or with a software like Cryptomator (https://cryptomator.org/). Do not ever upload non-encrypted files on those platforms and repeating myself, only access them from a secure shielded VM.
If you just want to save information (text), I will recommend the use of secure and private pastebins444. Mostly I will stick to the ones recommended by PrivacyGuides.org (https://www.privacyguides.org/productivity/#paste-services [Archive.org] ) :
+If you just want to save information (text), we will recommend the use of secure and private pastebins441. Mostly we will stick to the ones recommended by PrivacyGuides.org (https://www.privacyguides.org/productivity/#paste-services [Archive.org] ) :
The methods and utilities to manage/wipe them will vary depending on the type of drive you are using. So, it is important you know which one you have inside your laptop.
On most recent laptops, chances are high that it will be one of the middle options (M.2 SATA or M.2 NVMe).
These drives use a technique called wear leveling445. At a high level, wear leveling works as follows. The space on every disk is divided into blocks that are themselves divided into pages, like the chapters in a book are made of pages. When a file is written to disk, it is assigned to a certain set of pages and blocks. If you wanted to overwrite the file in an HDD, then all you would have to do is tell the disk to overwrite those blocks. But in SSDs and USB drives, erasing and re-writing the same block can wear it out. Each block can only be erased and rewritten a limited number of times before that block just will not work anymore (the same way if you keep writing and erasing with a pencil and paper, eventually the paper might rip and be useless). To counteract this, SSDs and USB drives will try to make sure that the number of times each block has been erased and rewritten is about the same so that the drive will last as long as possible (thus the term wear leveling). As a side effect, sometimes instead of erasing and writing the block, a file was originally stored on, the drive will instead leave that block alone, mark it as invalid, and just write the modified file to a different block. This is like leaving the chapter in the book unchanged, writing the modified file on a different page, and then just updating the book’s table of contents to point to the new location. All of this occurs at a very low level in the electronics of the disk, so the operating system does not even realize it has happened. This means, however, that even if you try to overwrite a file, there is no guarantee the drive will actually overwrite it, and that’s why secure deletion with SSDs is so much harder.
+These drives use a technique called wear leveling442. At a high level, wear leveling works as follows. The space on every disk is divided into blocks that are themselves divided into pages, like the chapters in a book are made of pages. When a file is written to disk, it is assigned to a certain set of pages and blocks. If you wanted to overwrite the file in an HDD, then all you would have to do is tell the disk to overwrite those blocks. But in SSDs and USB drives, erasing and re-writing the same block can wear it out. Each block can only be erased and rewritten a limited number of times before that block just will not work anymore (the same way if you keep writing and erasing with a pencil and paper, eventually the paper might rip and be useless). To counteract this, SSDs and USB drives will try to make sure that the number of times each block has been erased and rewritten is about the same so that the drive will last as long as possible (thus the term wear leveling). As a side effect, sometimes instead of erasing and writing the block, a file was originally stored on, the drive will instead leave that block alone, mark it as invalid, and just write the modified file to a different block. This is like leaving the chapter in the book unchanged, writing the modified file on a different page, and then just updating the book’s table of contents to point to the new location. All of this occurs at a very low level in the electronics of the disk, so the operating system does not even realize it has happened. This means, however, that even if you try to overwrite a file, there is no guarantee the drive will actually overwrite it, and that’s why secure deletion with SSDs is so much harder.
Wear-leveling alone can therefore be a disadvantage for security and an advantage for adversaries such as forensics examiners. This feature makes classic “secure deletion” counter-productive and useless and is why this feature was removed on some Operating Systems like macOS (as from version 10.11 El Capitan) where you could enable it before on the Recycle Bin.
Most of those old secure deletion utilities were written with HDD in mind and have no control over wear-leveling and are completely pointless when using an SSD. Avoid them on an SSD drive.
So, what now? Well here comes the Trim446 operation. When you delete data on your SSD, your OS should support what is called a Trim operation command and could (should) issue this Trim command to the SSD drive periodically (daily, weekly, monthly…). This Trim command will then let know the SSD drive controller that there are pages within blocks containing data that are now free to be really deleted without deleting anything itself.
-Trim should be enabled by default on all modern Operating Systems detecting an SSD drive covered in this guide (macOS, Windows 10, Ubuntu, Qubes OS…).
-If Trim operations are not done regularly (or at all), then the data is never deleted pro-actively and at some point, all the blocks and pages will be occupied by data. Your OS will not see this and will just see free space as you delete files, but your SSD controller will not (this is called Write Amplification447). This will then force the SSD controller to erase those pages and blocks on the fly which will reduce the write performance. This is because while your OS/SSD can write data to any free page in any bock, erasure is only possible on entire blocks, therefore, forcing your SSD to perform many operations to write new data. Overwriting is just not possible. This will defeat the wear-leveling system and cause performance degradation of your SSD over time. Every time you delete a file on an SSD, your OS should issue a Trim command along with the deletion to let the SSD controller know the pages containing the file data are now free for deletion.
+So, what now? Well here comes the Trim443 operation. When you delete data on your SSD, your OS should support what is called a Trim operation command and could (should) issue this Trim command to the SSD drive periodically (daily, weekly, monthly…). This Trim command will then let know the SSD drive controller that there are pages within blocks containing data that are now free to be really deleted without deleting anything itself.
+Trim should be enabled by default on all modern Operating Systems detecting an SSD drive covered in this guide (macOS, Windows 10/11, Ubuntu, Qubes OS 4.1.x …).
+If Trim operations are not done regularly (or at all), then the data is never deleted pro-actively and at some point, all the blocks and pages will be occupied by data. Your OS will not see this and will just see free space as you delete files, but your SSD controller will not (this is called Write Amplification444). This will then force the SSD controller to erase those pages and blocks on the fly which will reduce the write performance. This is because while your OS/SSD can write data to any free page in any bock, erasure is only possible on entire blocks, therefore, forcing your SSD to perform many operations to write new data. Overwriting is just not possible. This will defeat the wear-leveling system and cause performance degradation of your SSD over time. Every time you delete a file on an SSD, your OS should issue a Trim command along with the deletion to let the SSD controller know the pages containing the file data are now free for deletion.
So, Trim itself does not delete any data but just marks it for deletion. Data deleted without using Trim (if Trim has been disabled/blocked/delayed for instance) will still be deleted at some point by the SSD garbage collection or if you want to overwrite what the OS sees at free space. But it might stick around for a bit longer than if you use Trim.
Here is an illustration from Wikipedia showing how it works on an SSD drive:
As you can see in the above illustration, data (from a file) will be written to the four first pages of Block X. Later new data will be written to the remaining pages and the data from the first files will be marked as invalid (for instance by a Trim operation when deleting a file). As explained on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trim_(computing) [Wikiless] [Archive.org]; the erase operation can only be done on entire blocks (and not on single pages).
In addition to marking files for deletion (on reputable SSD drives), Trim usually makes those unreadable using a method called “Deterministic Read After Trim” or “Deterministic Zeroes After Trim”. This means that if an adversary tries to read data from a trimmed page/block and somehow manages to disable garbage collection, the controller will not return any meaningful data.
-Trim is your ally and should always be enabled when using an SSD drive and should offer sufficient reasonable protection. And this is also the reason you should not use Veracrypt Plausible deniability on a Trim enabled SSD as this feature is incompatible with Trim448.
+Trim is your ally and should always be enabled when using an SSD drive and should offer sufficient reasonable protection. And this is also the reason you should not use Veracrypt Plausible deniability on a Trim enabled SSD as this feature is incompatible with Trim445.
Garbage collection449 is an internal process running within your SSD drive that looks for data marked for erasure. This process is done by the SSD controller, and you have no control over it. If you go back to the illustration above, you will see that Garbage collection is the last step and will notice that some pages are marked for deletion in a specific block, then copy the valid pages (not marked for deletion) to a different free destination block and then will be able to erase the source block entirely.
+Garbage collection446 is an internal process running within your SSD drive that looks for data marked for erasure. This process is done by the SSD controller, and you have no control over it. If you go back to the illustration above, you will see that Garbage collection is the last step and will notice that some pages are marked for deletion in a specific block, then copy the valid pages (not marked for deletion) to a different free destination block and then will be able to erase the source block entirely.
Garbage collection in itself does NOT require Trim to function, but it will be much faster and more efficient if Trim is performed. Garbage collection is one of the processes that will actually erase data from your SSD drive permanently.
So, the fact is that it is very unlikely450‘451 and difficult for a forensic examiner to be able to recover data from a Trimmed SSD but it is not completely impossible either452’453’454 if they are fast enough and have access to extensive equipment, skills, and motivation455.
+So, the fact is that it is very unlikely447‘448 and difficult for a forensic examiner to be able to recover data from a Trimmed SSD but it is not completely impossible either449’450’451 if they are fast enough and have access to extensive equipment, skills, and motivation452.
Within the context of this guide which also uses full disk encryption. Deletion and Trim should be reasonably secure enough on any SSD drive and will be recommended as the standard method of deletion.
So, you want to be sure. To achieve 100% secure deletion on an SSD drive, we will need to use specific SSD techniques (If you are using an HDD drive, skip this part and go to your OS of choice):
+So, you want to be sure. To achieve 100% secure deletion on an SSD drive, you will need to use specific SSD techniques (If you are using an HDD drive, skip this part and go to your OS of choice):
Easy options for less experienced users:
Just re-install a fresh operating system (delete/quick format the drive) and re-encrypt it. The full disk encryption process should erase all previous data from the disk.
Buy PartedMagic456 for 11$ and use it to erase any disk.
Buy PartedMagic453 for 11$ and use it to erase any disk.
Technical options for more advanced users:
wipe or srm.
+wipe or srm.
wipe, just use its default options (wipe /dev/sdX), as the defaults are tuned to most effectively wipe data on HDDs.srm, make sure to manually specify that it should perform a Gutmann wipe (srm -G /dev/sdX).Bonus: See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bpX8YvNg6Y [Invidious]
For maximum overkill paranoia security, Sanitize Block Erase option should be preferred but Secure Erase is probably more than enough when considering your drive is already encrypted. Unfortunately, are no free easy (bootable with a graphical menu) all-in-one tools available and you will be left with either going with drive manufacturers provided tools, the free manual hdparm457 , and nvme-cli458 utilities or going with a commercial tool such as PartedMagic.
+For maximum overkill paranoia security, Sanitize Block Erase option should be preferred but Secure Erase is probably more than enough when considering your drive is already encrypted. Unfortunately, are no free easy (bootable with a graphical menu) all-in-one tools available and you will be left with either going with drive manufacturers provided tools, the free manual hdparm454 , and nvme-cli455 utilities or going with a commercial tool such as PartedMagic.
This guide will therefore recommend the use of the free utilities hdparm and nvme-cli using a Live System Rescue system.
-If you can afford it, just buy Parted Magic for 11$ which provides an easy-to-use graphical tool for wiping SSD drives using the option of your choice459’460.
+If you can afford it, just buy Parted Magic for 11$ which provides an easy-to-use graphical tool for wiping SSD drives using the option of your choice456’457.
Note: Again, before proceeding, you should check your BIOS as some will offer a built-in tool to securely erase your drive (ATA/NVMe Secure Erase or ATA/NVMe Sanitize). If this is available, you should use that, and the following steps will not be necessary. Check this before going ahead to avoid the hassle, see Appendix M: BIOS/UEFI options to wipe disks in various Brands).
The same principles from the earlier chapters apply to this one. The same issues arise too.
With an HDD drive, you can securely delete files by just deleting them and then apply one or more “passes” to overwrite the data in question. This can be done with many utilities on all OSes.
-With an SSD drive, however, again everything becomes a bit complicated because you are never sure anything is really deleted due to wear leveling, reliance on the Trim operation, and garbage collection of the drive. An adversary that has the decryption key of your SSD (whether it is LUKS, Filevault 2, Veracrypt, or Bitlocker) could unlock your drive and then attempt a recovery using classic recovery utilities461 and could succeed if the data were not trimmed properly. But this is again highly unlikely.
+With an SSD drive, however, again everything becomes a bit complicated because you are never sure anything is really deleted due to wear leveling, reliance on the Trim operation, and garbage collection of the drive. An adversary that has the decryption key of your SSD (whether it is LUKS, Filevault 2, Veracrypt, or Bitlocker) could unlock your drive and then attempt a recovery using classic recovery utilities458 and could succeed if the data were not trimmed properly. But this is again highly unlikely.
Since the Trim operation is not continuous on most recent hard drives but scheduled, simply forcing a Trim operation should be enough. But again, the only way to be 100% sure a file is securely deleted from your unlocked encrypted SSD is to again overwrite all the free space after deletion of the files in question or to decrypt/re-encrypt the drive. But this is overkill and not necessary. A simple disk-wide Trim should be sufficient.
Remember tho that no matter the deletion method you use for any file on any medium (HDD drive, SSD, USB Thumb drive). It will probably leave other traces (logs, indexing, shellbags …) within your system and those traces will also need to be cleaned. Also, remember that your drives should be fully encrypted and so this is most likely an extra measure. More on that later in the Some additional measures against forensics section.
Remember you cannot use Trim at all if you are using Plausible Deniability on an SSD drive against all recommendations.
At this stage, and just delete the file permanently (empty the recycle bin) and trim/garbage collection will do the rest. This should be sufficient.
-If you do not want to wait for the periodic Trim (set to Weekly by default in Windows 10), you could also force a disk-wide Trim using the Windows native Optimize tool (see Appendix H: Windows Cleaning Tools).
+If you do not want to wait for the periodic Trim (set to Weekly by default in Windows 10/11), you could also force a disk-wide Trim using the Windows native Optimize tool (see Appendix H: Windows Cleaning Tools).
If data were deleted by some utility (for instance by Virtualbox when reverting a snapshot), you could also issue a disk-wide Trim to clean anything remaining using the same Optimize tool.
Just open Windows Explorer, Right Click on your System Drive and click Properties. Select Tools. Click Optimize and then Optimize again to force a Trim. You are done. That is probably enough in my opinion.
You can do this the graphical way with BleachBit following this tutorial from the EFF: https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-delete-your-data-securely-linux [Archive.org]
Or you can do this from the command line following this tutorial: https://linuxhint.com/completely_wipe_hard_drive_ubuntu/ [Archive.org] (For this purpose I recommend wipe and shred).
Or you can do this from the command line following this tutorial: https://linuxhint.com/completely_wipe_hard_drive_ubuntu/ [Archive.org] (For this purpose we recommend wipe and shred).
First please see Appendix K: Considerations for using external SSD drives
@@ -8081,7 +8032,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)Please follow this documentation to Trim within Qubes OS: https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/disk-trim.md [Archive.org]
As with other Linux Systems, if you want more security and do not trust the Trim operation then you will have no option but to either:
Decrypt and re-encrypt the whole drive to overwrite all free space after data deletion. This will ensure overwriting of all the free space. I didn’t find a reliable tutorial on how to do this safely on Qubes OS but it is possible this tutorial could work: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Re-encrypting_devices [Archive.org] (at your own risk, this has not been tested yet).
Decrypt and re-encrypt the whole drive to overwrite all free space after data deletion. This will ensure overwriting of all the free space. We didn’t find a reliable tutorial on how to do this safely on Qubes OS but it is possible this tutorial could work: https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Re-encrypting_devices [Archive.org] (at your own risk, this has not been tested yet).
Refer to this Documentation (https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/disk-trim.md [Archive.org]) and then trim using “fstrim –all” and then fill up the entire free space of the disk using a utility such as:
BleachBit https://www.bleachbit.org/download/linux [Archive.org]
Use the same method as Linux from a Qube connected to that specific USB device
You can do this the graphical way with BleachBit following this tutorial from the EFF: https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-delete-your-data-securely-linux [Archive.org]
Or you can do this from the command line following this tutorial: https://linuxhint.com/completely_wipe_hard_drive_ubuntu/ [Archive.org] (For this purpose I recommend wipe and shred).
Or you can do this from the command line following this tutorial: https://linuxhint.com/completely_wipe_hard_drive_ubuntu/ [Archive.org] (For this purpose we recommend wipe and shred).
First please see Appendix K: Considerations for using external SSD drives
@@ -8138,7 +8089,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)Just permanently delete the file (and empty recycle bin) and it should be unrecoverable due to trim operations and garbage collection.
"Does Apple File System support TRIM operations?
Yes. TRIM operations are issued asynchronously from when files are deleted or free space is reclaimed, which ensures that these operations are performed only after metadata changes are persisted to stable storage".
@@ -8147,7 +8098,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)Unfortunately, Apple has removed the secure erase options from the trash bin even for HDD drives463. So, you are left with using other tools:
+Unfortunately, Apple has removed the secure erase options from the trash bin even for HDD drives460. So, you are left with using other tools:
Permanent Eraser http://www.edenwaith.com/products/permanent%20eraser/ [Archive.org]
From the terminal, you can use the “rm –P filename” command which should erase the file and overwrite it as explained in this EFF tutorial https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-delete-your-data-securely-macos [Archive.org].
Note that the same SSD issue discussed in the earlier section will arise here. You can never really be 100% sure your SSD data is deleted when you ask it to do so unless you wipe the whole drive using specific methods above.
-I am not aware of any 100% reliable method to delete single files selectively and securely on SSD drives unless overwriting ALL the free space (which might reduce the lifespan of your SSD) after Deletion + Trim of these files. Without doing that, you will have to trust the SSD Trim operation which in my opinion is enough. It is reasonable and again very unlikely that forensics will be able to restore your files after a Deletion with Trim.
+We are not aware of any 100% reliable method to delete single files selectively and securely on SSD drives unless overwriting ALL the free space (which might reduce the lifespan of your SSD) after Deletion + Trim of these files. Without doing that, you will have to trust the SSD Trim operation which in my opinion is enough. It is reasonable and again very unlikely that forensics will be able to restore your files after a Deletion with Trim.
In addition, most of these measures here should not be needed since your whole drive should be encrypted and therefore your data should not be accessible for forensic analysis through SSD/HDD examination anyway. So, these are just “bonus measures” for weak/unskilled adversaries.
Consider also reading this documentation if you’re going with Whonix https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Anti-Forensics_Precautions [Archive.org] as well as their general hardening tutorial for all platforms here https://www.whonix.org/wiki/System_Hardening_Checklist [Archive.org]
On Windows, macOS, and Linux I would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing those properties.
+On Windows, macOS, and Linux we would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing those properties.
ExifTool is natively available on Tails and Whonix Workstation.
Just install it from https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org], run and drag and drop the files into the GUI.
@@ -8201,7 +8152,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)First, here is a tutorial to remove metadata from Office documents: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/remove-hidden-data-and-personal-information-by-inspecting-documents-presentations-or-workbooks-356b7b5d-77af-44fe-a07f-9aa4d085966f [Archive.org]. Make sure however that you do use the latest version of Office with the latest security updates.
-Alternatively, on Windows, macOS, Qubes OS, and Linux I would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing those properties
+Alternatively, on Windows, macOS, Qubes OS, and Linux we would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing those properties
Just install it from https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org], run and drag and drop the files into the GUI.
In addition, on Windows, macOS, Qubes OS, and Linux I would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing additional properties
+In addition, on Windows, macOS, Qubes OS, and Linux we would recommend ExifTool (https://exiftool.org/ [Archive.org]) and/or ExifCleaner (https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org]) that allows viewing and/or removing additional properties
Just install it from https://exifcleaner.com/ [Archive.org], run and drag and drop the files into the GUI.
To remove all metadata: exiftool -All= filename.odt
Another option good tool IMHO to remove metadata from various documents is the open-source mat2 recommended by privacyguides.org464 (https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2 [Archive.org]) which you can use on Linux quite easily. I never managed to make it work properly within Windows due to various dependencies issues despite the provided instructions. It is however very straightforward to install and use on Linux.
-So, I would suggest creating a small Debian VM within Virtualbox (behind your Whonix Gateway) which you can then use from your other VMs to analyze various files from a convenient web interface. For this see Appendix L: Creating a mat2-web guest VM for removing metadata from files
+Another option good tool IMHO to remove metadata from various documents is the open-source mat2 recommended by privacyguides.org461 (https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2 [Archive.org]) which you can use on Linux quite easily. We never managed to make it work properly within Windows due to various dependencies issues despite the provided instructions. It is however very straightforward to install and use on Linux.
+So, we would suggest creating a small Debian VM within Virtualbox (behind your Whonix Gateway) which you can then use from your other VMs to analyze various files from a convenient web interface. For this see Appendix L: Creating a mat2-web guest VM for removing metadata from files
Mat2 is also pre-installed on the Whonix Workstation VM465 and available on Tails by default466.
+Mat2 is also pre-installed on the Whonix Workstation VM462 and available on Tails by default463.
Tails is great for this; you have nothing to worry about even if you use an SSD drive. Shut it down and it is all gone as soon as the memory decays.
Run the following command to clear the database completely: :>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2
Run the following command to lock the file and prevent further download history from being written there: sudo chflags schg ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2
Lastly, you can also disable Gatekeeper altogether by issuing the following command in the terminal467:
+Lastly, you can also disable Gatekeeper altogether by issuing the following command in the terminal464:
sudo spctl --master-disableVerify by running xattr --l filename and there should be no output
(Note that Apple has removed the convenient xattr –c option that would just remove all attributes at once so you will have to do this for each attribute on each file)
-These attributes and entries will stick even if you clear your browser history, and this is obviously bad for privacy (right?), and I am not aware of any convenient tool that will deal with those at the moment.
-Fortunately, there are some mitigations for avoiding this issue in the first place as these attributes and entries are set by the browsers. So, I tested various browsers (On macOS Catalina, Big Sur, and Monterey), and here are the results as of the date of this guide:
+These attributes and entries will stick even if you clear your browser history, and this is obviously bad for privacy (right?), and we are not aware of any convenient tool that will deal with those at the moment.
+Fortunately, there are some mitigations for avoiding this issue in the first place as these attributes and entries are set by the browsers. So, we tested various browsers (On macOS Catalina, Big Sur, and Monterey), and here are the results as of the date of this guide: