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2026-11-03 18:58:04 +01:00 · 2022-07-23 22:42:06 +00:00
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@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@
 <ul>
 <li><a href="#reasonably-anonymous-option">Reasonably anonymous option:</a></li>
 <li><a href="#extra-paranoid-anonymous-option">Extra-Paranoid anonymous option:</a></li>
-<li><a href="#when-using-btc-bonus-step-for-improving-your-privacy-using-obfuscation">When using BTC: bonus step for improving your privacy using obfuscation:</a></li>
+<li><a href="#warning-about-special-tumbling-mixing-coinjoining-privacy-wallets-and-services">Warning about special tumbling, mixing, coinjoining privacy wallets and services:</a></li>
 <li><a href="#when-converting-from-btc-to-monero">When converting from BTC to Monero:</a></li>
 </ul></li>
 <li><a href="#appendix-a1-recommended-vps-hosting-providers">Appendix A1: Recommended VPS hosting providers</a></li>
@@ -867,6 +867,7 @@
 <li><p>2017, Social Networks and Positive and Negative Affect <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042811013747/pdf?md5=253d8f1bb615d5dee195d353dc077d46&amp;pid=1-s2.0-S1877042811013747-main.pdf" class="uri">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042811013747/pdf?md5=253d8f1bb615d5dee195d353dc077d46&amp;pid=1-s2.0-S1877042811013747-main.pdf</a> <sup><a href="https://archive.ph/iuowI">[Archive.today]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2015, Using Social Networks Data for Behavior and Sentiment Analysis <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300562034_Using_Social_Networks_Data_for_Behavior_and_Sentiment_Analysis" class="uri">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300562034_Using_Social_Networks_Data_for_Behavior_and_Sentiment_Analysis</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300562034_Using_Social_Networks_Data_for_Behavior_and_Sentiment_Analysis">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2016, A Survey on User Behavior Analysis in Social Networks <a href="https://www.academia.edu/30936118/A_Survey_on_User_Behaviour_Analysis_in_Social_Networks" class="uri">https://www.academia.edu/30936118/A_Survey_on_User_Behaviour_Analysis_in_Social_Networks</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.academia.edu/30936118/A_Survey_on_User_Behaviour_Analysis_in_Social_Networks">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p></li>
+<li><p>2017, DEF CON 25 presentation: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">DEF CON 25 - Svea Eckert, Andreas Dewes - Dark Data</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2019, Influence and Behavior Analysis in Social Networks and Social Media <a href="https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2" class="uri">https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://web.archive.org/web/https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p></li>
 </ul>
 <p>So, how can you mitigate these?</p>
@@ -1702,6 +1703,7 @@
 </ul></li>
 </ul>
 <p>We would recommend the “Safer” level for most cases. The Safest level should be enabled if you think you are accessing suspicious or dangerous websites or if you are extra paranoid. The Safest mode will also most likely break many websites that rely actively on JavaScript.</p>
+<p><strong>Temporary Important Warning: Please see <a href="#microarchitectural-side-channel-deanonymization-attacks">Microarchitectural Side-channel Deanonymization Attacks</a>.</strong></p>
 <p>If you are extra paranoid, use the “Safest” level by default and consider downgrading to Safer is the website is unusable because of Javascript blocking.</p>
 <p>Lastly, while using Tor Browser on Tails on the “Safer” level, please consider <a href="#appendix-a5-additional-browser-precautions-with-javascript-enabled">Appendix A5: Additional browser precautions with JavaScript enabled</a></p>
 <p>When you are done and have a working Tails on your laptop, go to the <a href="#creating-your-anonymous-online-identities">Creating your anonymous online identities</a> step much further in this guide or if you want persistence and plausible deniability, continue with the next section.</p>
@@ -3997,6 +3999,7 @@
 <li><p>They track your behavior before/during/after the tests to ensure you are “human”<a href="#fn391" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref391" role="doc-noteref"><sup>391</sup></a>.</p></li>
 </ul>
 <p>It is also highly likely that those platforms could already reliably identify you based on the unique way you interact with those puzzles. This could work despite obfuscation of your IP address / Browser and clearing all cookies.</p>
+<p>Watch for example this DEF CON 25 presentation: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">DEF CON 25 - Svea Eckert, Andreas Dewes - Dark Data</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">[Invidious]</a></sup></p>
 <p>You will often experience several in a row (sometimes endlessly) and sometimes exceedingly difficult ones involving reading undecipherable characters or identifying various objects on endless pictures sets. You will also have more captchas if you use an ad-blocking system (uBlock for example) or if your account was flagged for any reason for using VPNs or Tor previously.</p>
 <p>You will also have (in my experience) more Captchas (Google’s reCAPTCHA) if you do not use a Chromium-based browser. But this can be mitigated by using a Chromium-based browsers such as Brave. There is also a Browser extension called Buster that could help you those <a href="https://github.com/dessant/buster" class="uri">https://github.com/dessant/buster</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/dessant/buster">[Archive.org]</a></sup>.</p>
 <p>As for Cloudflare (hCaptcha), you could also use their Accessibility solution here (<a href="https://www.hcaptcha.com/accessibility" class="uri">https://www.hcaptcha.com/accessibility</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.hcaptcha.com/accessibility">[Archive.org]</a></sup>) which would allow you to sign-up (with your anonymous identity created later) and set a cookie within your Browser that would allow you to bypass their captchas. Another solution to mitigate hCaptcha would be to use their own solution called “Privacy Pass”<a href="#fn392" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref392" role="doc-noteref"><sup>392</sup></a> <a href="https://privacypass.github.io/" class="uri">https://privacypass.github.io/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://privacypass.github.io/">[Archive.org]</a></sup> in the form of a Browser extension you could install in your VM Browser.</p>
@@ -4083,8 +4086,9 @@
 <li><p>Browser Permissions: Is your browser allowing some things like geolocation or microphone/webcam access.</p></li>
 <li><p>…</p></li>
 </ul>
-<p>Here are two services you can use to check your browser Fingerprinting:</p>
+<p>Here are services you can use to check your browser fingerprints:</p>
 <ul>
+<li><p><a href="https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/" class="uri">https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/</a> (Probably the best overall)</p></li>
 <li><p><a href="https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/" class="uri">https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/</a></p></li>
 <li><p><a href="https://amiunique.org" class="uri">https://amiunique.org</a></p></li>
 <li><p><a href="https://browserleaks.com/" class="uri">https://browserleaks.com/</a></p></li>
@@ -8605,6 +8609,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <li><p>OSINT “yourself” and your identities from time to time by looking for them yourself online using various search engines to monitor your online identities. You can even automate the process somewhat using various tools such as Google Alerts <a href="https://www.google.com/alerts" class="uri">https://www.google.com/alerts</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.google.com/alerts">[Archive.org]</a></sup>.</p></li>
 <li><p>Do not ever use biometrics alone to safeguard your secrets. Biometrics can be used without your consent.</p></li>
 <li><p>Do check the signatures and hashes of software and documents you download before installing/viewing them.</p></li>
+<li><p>Do not have the same behavior such as visiting the same links on the clearnet then visit the same with the your anoynous online identity. Watch this DEF CON 25 presentation if you didn’t before: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">DEF CON 25 - Svea Eckert, Andreas Dewes - Dark Data</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">[Invidious]</a></sup>.</p></li>
 <li><p>Encrypt everything but do not take it for granted. Remember the 5$ wrench.</p></li>
 </ul>
 <h2 id="physical-and-irl-opsec">Physical and IRL OPSEC</h2>
@@ -8632,6 +8637,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <li><p>2020, RSA Conference 2020, When Cybercriminals with Good OpSec Attack <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXmZnU2GdVk" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXmZnU2GdVk</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=zXmZnU2GdVk">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2015, DEF CON 22, Adrian Crenshaw, Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ2OZKitRwc" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ2OZKitRwc</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=eQ2OZKitRwc">[Invidious]</a></sup> (<a href="https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Crenshaw/DEFCON-22-Adrian-Crenshaw-Dropping-Docs-on-Darknets-How-People-Got-Caught-UPDATED.pdf">Slides</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Crenshaw/DEFCON-22-Adrian-Crenshaw-Dropping-Docs-on-Darknets-How-People-Got-Caught-UPDATED.pdf">[Archive.org]</a></sup>)</p></li>
 <li><p>2017, Ochko123 - How the Feds Caught Russian Mega-Carder Roman Seleznev <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Chp12sEnWk" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Chp12sEnWk</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=6Chp12sEnWk">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
+<li><p>2017, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">DEF CON 25 - Svea Eckert, Andreas Dewes - Dark Data</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2015, DEF CON 22, Zoz, Don’t Fuck It Up! <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2020, Bad Opsec, How Tor Users Got Caught, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GR_U0G-QGA0" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GR_U0G-QGA0</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=GR_U0G-QGA0">[Invidious]</a></sup></p></li>
 <li><p>2022, Master of OpSec Masters: A View Through the Prism of Time, <a href="https://officercia.mirror.xyz/4x2-M4R2cSnID1wpsTO4CQNrMQ5JUFouR-rZ_N4xO-Q" class="uri">https://officercia.mirror.xyz/4x2-M4R2cSnID1wpsTO4CQNrMQ5JUFouR-rZ_N4xO-Q</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220714213939/https://officercia.mirror.xyz/4x2-M4R2cSnID1wpsTO4CQNrMQ5JUFouR-rZ_N4xO-Q">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p></li>
@@ -9315,7 +9321,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 </ul></li>
 <li><p><strong>Consider leaving your smart devices at home online and doing something (watching YouTube/Netflix or something similar) instead of taking them with you powered off. This will mitigate tracking efforts but also create digital traces that could indicate you were at home.</strong></p></li>
 </ul>
-<p>Addititionally, if using a smartphone as a burner, know that they send a lot of diagnostics by default. Enough to potentially identify you based on your device usage patterns (a technique known as biometric profiling). You should avoid using your burner unless absolutely necessary, to minimize the information that can be collected and used to identify you.</p>
+<p>Additionally, if using a smartphone as a burner, know that they send a lot of diagnostics by default. Enough to potentially identify you based on your device usage patterns (a technique known as biometric profiling). You should avoid using your burner unless absolutely necessary, to minimize the information that can be collected and used to identify you.</p>
 <p><strong>Lastly, you should also consider this useful sheet from the NSA about Smartphone security: <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210728204533/https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21018353/nsa-mobile-device-best-practices.pdf" class="uri">https://web.archive.org/web/20210728204533/https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21018353/nsa-mobile-device-best-practices.pdf</a>.</strong></p>
 <p><strong>Note: Please do not consider commercial gimmicky all-in devices for anonymity. The only way to achieve proper OPSEC is by doing it yourself. See those examples to see why it is not a clever idea:</strong></p>
 <ul>
@@ -9726,6 +9732,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p><strong>Do not use a live system on a Software supervised/monitored device on a known network.</strong></p>
 <p><strong>Refer to the Tails route to achieve this. See <a href="#the-tor-browser-route">The Tails route</a> and <a href="#appendix-p-accessing-the-internet-as-safely-as-possible-when-tor-and-vpns-are-not-an-option">Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option</a> sections.</strong></p>
 <h1 id="appendix-v-what-browser-to-use-in-your-guest-vmdisposable-vm">Appendix V: What browser to use in your Guest VM/Disposable VM</h1>
+<p><strong>Temporary Important Warning: Please see <a href="#microarchitectural-side-channel-deanonymization-attacks">Microarchitectural Side-channel Deanonymization Attacks:</a>.</strong></p>
 <p>There are 6 possibilities of browser to use on your guest/disposable VM:</p>
 <ul>
 <li><p>Brave (Chromium-based)</p></li>
@@ -10375,6 +10382,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p>Hopefully, these bridges should be enough to get you connected even in a hostile environment.</p>
 <p>If not, consider <a href="#appendix-p-accessing-the-internet-as-safely-as-possible-when-tor-and-vpns-are-not-an-option">Appendix P: Accessing the internet as safely as possible when Tor and VPNs are not an option</a></p>
 <h1 id="appendix-y-installing-and-using-desktop-tor-browser">Appendix Y: Installing and using desktop Tor Browser</h1>
+<p><strong>Temporary Important Warning: Please see <a href="#microarchitectural-side-channel-deanonymization-attacks">Microarchitectural Side-channel Deanonymization Attacks:</a>.</strong></p>
 <h2 id="installation-7">Installation:</h2>
 <p>This is valid for Windows, Linux, and macOS.</p>
 <ul>
@@ -10442,58 +10450,61 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p>Despite this, it is possible to safely anonymize Bitcoin through the use of cryptocurrencies with a focus on untraceability such as Monero (XMR) with a few more steps and at a relatively small cost. So, you might be wondering how? Well, it is actually pretty simple:</p>
 <ol type="1">
 <li><p>Purchase Monero at:</p>
-<ol type="a">
+<ul>
 <li><p>a KYC exchange (such as Kraken)</p></li>
 <li><p>a non-KYC exchange (such as <a href="https://bisq.network/" class="uri">https://bisq.network/</a>)</p></li>
 <li><p>from someone on LocalMonero using cash (at your own risk)</p></li>
-</ol></li>
+</ul></li>
 <li><p>Create a Monero wallet on one of your anonymized VMs (for example, on the Whonix Workstation which includes a Monero GUI wallet natively or using the Monero GUI wallet from <a href="https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/" class="uri">https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/</a> on other OSes)</p></li>
 <li><p>Transfer your Monero from the Exchange you bought it from to the wallet on your VM.</p></li>
 <li><p>On the same VM (for instance again the Whonix Workstation), create a Bitcoin Wallet (again this is provided natively within the Whonix Workstation)</p></li>
 <li><p>From an anonymized browser (such as Tor Browser), use a non-KYC (Know Your Customer) service swapping service (see <a href="#appendix-a8-crypto-swapping-services-without-registration-and-kyc">Appendix A8: Crypto Swapping Services without Registration and KYC</a>) and convert your Monero to BTC and transfer those to the BTC Wallet you have on your anonymized VM</p></li>
+<li><p>You should now have an anonymized Bitcoin wallet that can be used for purchasing services that do not accept Monero.</p></li>
 </ol>
-<p>You should now have an anonymized Bitcoin wallet that can be used for purchasing services that do not accept Monero. <strong>You should never access this wallet from a non-anonymized environment and always use well-thought OPSEC with your BTC transactions. Remember those can be traced back to you.</strong></p>
+<p><strong>You should never access this wallet from a non-anonymized environment. Always use well-thought OPSEC with your BTC transactions. Remember those can be traced back to you.</strong></p>
 <p>The origin of those BTC cannot be traced back to your real identity due to the use of Monero <strong>unless Monero is broken</strong>. Please do read <a href="#appendix-b2-monero-disclaimer">Appendix B2: Monero Disclaimer</a>.</p>
 <h2 id="extra-paranoid-anonymous-option">Extra-Paranoid anonymous option:</h2>
 <p><strong>As explained in the disclaimer, If you feel extra paranoid,</strong> you could consider using an additional conversion step using a different privacy/anonymity-focused cryptocurrency such as Zcash (<a href="https://z.cash/" class="uri">https://z.cash/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://z.cash/">[Archive.org]</a></sup>).</p>
 <p>For example, here are two possibilities:</p>
+<p><strong>Buying Monero first option:</strong></p>
 <ol type="1">
-<li><p><strong>Buying Monero first option:</strong></p>
-<ol type="a">
-<li><p>Buy Monero (XMR) at either at:</p>
-<ol type="i">
+<li><p>Buy Monero (XMR) at:</p>
+<ul>
 <li><p>a KYC exchange (such as Kraken)</p></li>
 <li><p>a non-KYC exchange (such as <a href="https://bisq.network/" class="uri">https://bisq.network/</a>)</p></li>
-<li><p>from someone on LocalMonero using cash (at your own risk)</p></li>
-</ol></li>
-<li><p>Transfer your Monero to your Monero wallet in a secure environment (such as the Monero GUI wallet pre-installed on the Whonix workstation or using the Monero GUI wallet from <a href="https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/" class="uri">https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/</a> on other OSes).</p></li>
+<li><p>LocalMonero using cash (at your own risk)</p></li>
+</ul></li>
+<li><p>Transfer your Monero to your Monero wallet in a secure environment (such as the Monero GUI wallet pre-installed on the Whonix workstation OR using the Monero GUI wallet from <a href="https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/" class="uri">https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/</a> on other OSes).</p></li>
 <li><p>Use a swapping service (see <a href="#appendix-a8-crypto-swapping-services-without-registration-and-kyc">Appendix A8: Crypto Swapping Services without Registration and KYC</a>) to exchange your Monero to a Zcash wallet you control in your secure environment (see <a href="#appendix-a9-installing-a-zcash-wallet">Appendix A9: Installing a Zcash wallet</a>).</p></li>
-<li><p>Transfer your Zcash from one VM Zcash wallet to another VM Zcash wallet you control while making sure you are using shielded addresses (some exchanges allow this directly).</p>
-<ol type="i">
-<li><strong>Do make sure the wallets are different and change your Tor identity before opening the recipient wallet.</strong></li>
-</ol></li>
+<li><p>Transfer your Zcash from one VM Zcash wallet to another VM Zcash wallet you control while making sure you are using shielded addresses (some exchanges allow this directly).</p></li>
+</ol>
+<p><strong>Make sure the wallets are different and change your Tor identity before opening the recipient wallet.</strong></p>
+<ol start="5" type="1">
 <li><p>Use a swapping service again to exchange your Zcash to Monero/BTC/other (for BTC, use for example the Electrum Wallet on the Whonix Workstation).</p></li>
 <li><p>Use your Monero/BTC/other anonymously.</p></li>
-</ol></li>
-<li><p><strong>Buying Zcash first option:</strong></p>
-<ol type="a">
+</ol>
+<p><strong>Buying Zcash first option:</strong></p>
+<ol type="1">
 <li><p>Buy Zcash (see <a href="https://z.cash/exchanges/" class="uri">https://z.cash/exchanges/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://z.cash/exchanges/">[Archive.org]</a></sup>)</p></li>
 <li><p>Transfer your Zcash from the to a VM Zcash Wallet (see <a href="#appendix-a9-installing-a-zcash-wallet">Appendix A9: Installing a Zcash wallet</a>).</p></li>
-<li><p>Transfer your Zcash from your VM Zcash Wallet to another VM Zcash Wallet using shielded addresses.</p>
-<ol type="i">
-<li><strong>Do make sure the wallets are different and change your Tor identity before opening the recipient wallet.</strong></li>
-</ol></li>
+<li><p>Transfer your Zcash from your VM Zcash Wallet to another VM Zcash Wallet using shielded addresses.</p></li>
+</ol>
+<p><strong>Make sure the wallets are different and change your Tor identity before opening the recipient wallet.</strong></p>
+<ol start="4" type="1">
 <li><p>Use a swapping service (see <a href="#appendix-a8-crypto-swapping-services-without-registration-and-kyc">Appendix A8: Crypto Swapping Services without Registration and KYC</a>) to exchange your Zcash to Monero at your VM Monero Wallet (such as the Monero GUI wallet pre-installed on the Whonix workstation or using the Monero GUI wallet from <a href="https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/" class="uri">https://www.getmonero.org/downloads/</a> on other OSes).</p></li>
 <li><p>Now either use your Monero directly to buy from merchants OR use a swapping service to swap your Monero to another cryptocurrency such as BTC/ETH/Other (for BTC, use for example the Electrum Wallet on the Whonix Workstation).</p></li>
 <li><p>Use your cryptocurrency anonymously.</p></li>
-</ol></li>
 </ol>
 <p>These steps should upgrade from “reasonably anonymous” to “extra-paranoid anonymous”. Even if Monero is broken in the future. Zcash will have to be broken as well. Quite unlikely.</p>
-<h2 id="when-using-btc-bonus-step-for-improving-your-privacy-using-obfuscation">When using BTC: bonus step for improving your privacy using obfuscation:</h2>
-<p>You might want to consider the use of Samourai for Android (<a href="https://samouraiwallet.com" class="uri">https://samouraiwallet.com</a>). This wallet uses an implementation of CoinJoin<a href="#fn547" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref547" role="doc-noteref"><sup>547</sup></a> called Whirlpool<a href="#fn548" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref548" role="doc-noteref"><sup>548</sup></a>.</p>
-<pre><code>&lt;!-- Unverified recommendation: Sparrow for desktop (https://sparrowwallet.com). WARNING: Sparrow has not been thoroughly reviewed by this guide&#39;s maintainers and cannot at this point be considered a serious recommendation --&gt;</code></pre>
+<h2 id="warning-about-special-tumbling-mixing-coinjoining-privacy-wallets-and-services-wikiless-archive.org">Warning about special tumbling, mixing, coinjoining privacy wallets and services: <sup><a href="https://wikiless.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency_tumbler">Wikiless</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://wikiless.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency_tumbler">Archive.org</a></sup></h2>
+<p>We are not recommending any as none of those are truly providing anonymity but obfuscation. As of this writing, and as we are aware of, anonymity can be only achieved with Zcash “Shielded Addresses” and Monero. BTC, ETH and many others do not provide anonymity and those wallets and mixing services can be traced. Here are some references about this issue:</p>
 <p>Mixing BTC in this way should prevent any chain analysis on future transactions. This will not hide any past transactions or the fact you purchased BTC from a KYC exchange. Both wallets support Tor and running your own Bitcoin full node.</p>
-<p>Wasabi wallet is not recommended due to censorship of transactions<a href="#fn549" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref549" role="doc-noteref"><sup>549</sup></a> and vulnerabilities in its CoinJoin implementation<a href="#fn550" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref550" role="doc-noteref"><sup>550</sup></a>.</p>
+<ul>
+<li><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.02019.pdf">Mixing detection on Bitcoin transactions using statistical patterns.</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2204.02019.pdf">Archive.org</a></sup></li>
+<li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Julio-Hernandez-Castro/publication/319944399_An_Analysis_of_Bitcoin_Laundry_Services/links/5a045d410f7e9beb177883af/An-Analysis-of-Bitcoin-Laundry-Services.pdf?origin=publication_detail">An Analysis Of Bitcoin Laundry Services</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Julio-Hernandez-Castro/publication/319944399_An_Analysis_of_Bitcoin_Laundry_Services/links/5a045d410f7e9beb177883af/An-Analysis-of-Bitcoin-Laundry-Services.pdf?origin=publication_detail">Archive.org</a></sup></li>
+<li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344485520_Mixing_Strategies_in_Cryptocurrencies_and_An_Alternative_Implementation">Mixing Strategies in Cryptocurrencies and An Alternative Implementation</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344485520_Mixing_Strategies_in_Cryptocurrencies_and_An_Alternative_Implementation">Archive.org</a></sup></li>
+</ul>
+<p>Instead we recommend to use Monero (preferred) and additionaly Zcash to achieve anonymity.</p>
 <h2 id="when-converting-from-btc-to-monero">When converting from BTC to Monero:</h2>
 <p><strong>Now, as part of any process above, if you want to convert BTC back to Monero</strong>, we recommend not using a swapping service but instead recommend using the new Monero Atomic Swap Tool: <a href="https://unstoppableswap.net/" class="uri">https://unstoppableswap.net/</a>. This will prevent unnecessary fees and intermediates when using a commercial swapping service. The website is self-explanatory with detailed instructions for all OSes.</p>
 <h1 id="appendix-a1-recommended-vps-hosting-providers">Appendix A1: Recommended VPS hosting providers</h1>
@@ -10517,11 +10528,11 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p><strong>Please do read <a href="#appendix-b2-monero-disclaimer">Appendix B2: Monero Disclaimer</a>.</strong></p>
 <p>If the service does not accept Monero but does accept BTC, consider the following appendix: <a href="#appendix-y-installing-and-using-desktop-tor-browser">Appendix Z: Paying anonymously online with BTC</a>.</p>
 <h1 id="appendix-a2-guidelines-for-passwords-and-passphrases">Appendix A2: Guidelines for passwords and passphrases</h1>
-<p>My opinion (and the one of many<a href="#fn551" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref551" role="doc-noteref"><sup>551</sup></a>‘<a href="#fn552" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref552" role="doc-noteref"><sup>552</sup></a>’<a href="#fn553" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref553" role="doc-noteref"><sup>553</sup></a>‘<a href="#fn554" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref554" role="doc-noteref"><sup>554</sup></a>’<a href="#fn555" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref555" role="doc-noteref"><sup>555</sup></a>’<a href="#fn556" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref556" role="doc-noteref"><sup>556</sup></a>) is that passphrases are generally better than passwords. So instead of thinking of better passwords, forget them altogether and use passphrases instead (when possible). Or just use a password manager with very long passwords (such as KeePassXC, the preferred password manager in this guide).</p>
+<p>My opinion (and the one of many<a href="#fn547" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref547" role="doc-noteref"><sup>547</sup></a>‘<a href="#fn548" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref548" role="doc-noteref"><sup>548</sup></a>’<a href="#fn549" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref549" role="doc-noteref"><sup>549</sup></a>‘<a href="#fn550" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref550" role="doc-noteref"><sup>550</sup></a>’<a href="#fn551" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref551" role="doc-noteref"><sup>551</sup></a>’<a href="#fn552" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref552" role="doc-noteref"><sup>552</sup></a>) is that passphrases are generally better than passwords. So instead of thinking of better passwords, forget them altogether and use passphrases instead (when possible). Or just use a password manager with very long passwords (such as KeePassXC, the preferred password manager in this guide).</p>
 <p>The well-known shown-below XKCD <a href="https://xkcd.com/936/" class="uri">https://xkcd.com/936/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://xkcd.com/936/">[Archive.org]</a></sup> is still valid despite some people disputing it (See <a href="https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php/936:_Password_Strength" class="uri">https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php/936:_Password_Strength</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php/936:_Password_Strength">[Archive.org]</a></sup>). Yes, it is quite old now and is a little bit outdated and might be misinterpreted. But generally, it is still valid and a good argument for using passphrases instead of passwords.</p>
 <p><img 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truncated
 <p>(Illustration by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com, licensed under CC BY-NC 2.5)</p>
-<p>Here are some recommendations (based on Wikipedia<a href="#fn557" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref557" role="doc-noteref"><sup>557</sup></a>):</p>
+<p>Here are some recommendations (based on Wikipedia<a href="#fn553" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref553" role="doc-noteref"><sup>553</sup></a>):</p>
 <ul>
 <li><p>Long enough to be hard to guess (typically four words is a minimum, five or more is better).</p></li>
 <li><p>Not a famous quotation from literature, holy books, et cetera.</p></li>
@@ -10768,7 +10779,7 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <p><strong>After curating the files for anything you want to leave out. Double-check and even Triple check them. Then you could consider sending them to an organization such as a press organization or others.</strong></p>
 <h1 id="appendix-b2-monero-disclaimer">Appendix B2: Monero Disclaimer</h1>
 <p>First, please read this small introduction video to Monero: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H33ggs7bh8M" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H33ggs7bh8M</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=H33ggs7bh8M">[Invidious]</a></sup></p>
-<p>The anonymity of Monero depends on its crypto algorithms. If you do use Monero from a KYC Exchange. You can be almost certain that you are safe today. But you might not be in the long-term future if Monero algorithms are ever broken<a href="#fn558" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref558" role="doc-noteref"><sup>558</sup></a> (think Quantum Computing). Do keep in mind that KYC regulations might force operators (such as Crypto Exchanges) to keep your financial records for up to 10 years and that you, therefore, need Monero algorithms to not be broken for the next 10 years as well.</p>
+<p>The anonymity of Monero depends on its crypto algorithms. If you do use Monero from a KYC Exchange. You can be almost certain that you are safe today. But you might not be in the long-term future if Monero algorithms are ever broken<a href="#fn554" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref554" role="doc-noteref"><sup>554</sup></a> (think Quantum Computing). Do keep in mind that KYC regulations might force operators (such as Crypto Exchanges) to keep your financial records for up to 10 years and that you, therefore, need Monero algorithms to not be broken for the next 10 years as well.</p>
 <p>You may want to watch this insightful video for more details: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j02QoI4ZlnU"><strong>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j02QoI4ZlnU</strong></a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=j02QoI4ZlnU">[Invidious]</a></sup></p>
 <p>Also please consider reading: <strong><a href="https://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/master/docs/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md#privacy-limitations" class="uri">https://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/master/docs/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md#privacy-limitations</a></strong> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/master/docs/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md#privacy-limitations">[Archive.org]</a></sup></p>
 <p><strong>If you feel extra paranoid and want the highest safety level possible,</strong> see the <a href="#extra-paranoid-anonymous-option">Extra-Paranoid anonymous option</a>.</p>
@@ -11347,18 +11358,14 @@ PDF-Redact Tools (L)
 <li id="fn544" role="doc-endnote"><p>Wikipedia, Domain Fronting <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_fronting" class="uri">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_fronting</a> <sup><a href="https://wikiless.org/wiki/Domain_fronting">[Wikiless]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_fronting">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref544" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn545" role="doc-endnote"><p>GitLab, Tor Browser Issues, Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/17569" class="uri">https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/17569</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/17569">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref545" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 <li id="fn546" role="doc-endnote"><p>Vice, The NSA and CIA Use Ad Blockers Because Online Advertising Is So Dangerous <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/93ypke/the-nsa-and-cia-use-ad-blockers-because-online-advertising-is-so-dangerous" class="uri">https://www.vice.com/en/article/93ypke/the-nsa-and-cia-use-ad-blockers-because-online-advertising-is-so-dangerous</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.vice.com/en/article/93ypke/the-nsa-and-cia-use-ad-blockers-because-online-advertising-is-so-dangerous">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref546" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn547" role="doc-endnote"><p>A Comprehensive Bitcoin CoinJoin Guide <a href="https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/a-comprehensive-bitcoin-coinjoin-guide" class="uri">https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/a-comprehensive-bitcoin-coinjoin-guide</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220508125004/https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/a-comprehensive-bitcoin-coinjoin-guide">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref547" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn548" role="doc-endnote"><p>Samourai Whirlpool <a href="https://docs.samourai.io/whirlpool/start" class="uri">https://docs.samourai.io/whirlpool/start</a><sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220510172742/https://docs.samourai.io/whirlpool/start">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref548" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn549" role="doc-endnote"><p>Wasabi Wallet zkSNACKs Blacklisting <a href="https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update" class="uri">https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220424143857/https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/zksnacks-blacklisting-update/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref549" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn550" role="doc-endnote"><p>An Analysis and Disclosure Regarding the Deterministic Nature of the Wasabi Wallet CoinJoin Algorithm <a href="https://research.oxt.me/alerts/2020/08/21/Wasabi-Wallet" class="uri">https://research.oxt.me/alerts/2020/08/21/Wasabi-Wallet</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220327075818/https://research.oxt.me/alerts/2020/08/21/Wasabi-Wallet">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref550" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn551" role="doc-endnote"><p>NIST, NIST Has Spoken - Death to Complexity, Long Live the Passphrase! <a href="https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/" class="uri">https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref551" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn552" role="doc-endnote"><p>ZDnet, FBI recommends passphrases over password complexity <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/" class="uri">https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref552" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn553" role="doc-endnote"><p>The Intercept, Passphrases That You Can Memorize — But That Even the NSA Can’t Guess <a href="https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/" class="uri">https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/</a> <sup><a href="https://27m3p2uv7igmj6kvd4ql3cct5h3sdwrsajovkkndeufumzyfhlfev4qd.onion/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/">[Tor Mirror]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref553" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn554" role="doc-endnote"><p>Proton Blog, Let’s settle the password vs. passphrase debate once and for all <a href="https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase/" class="uri">https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref554" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn555" role="doc-endnote"><p>YouTube, Edward Snowden on Passwords: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc">[Invidious]</a></sup><a href="#fnref555" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn556" role="doc-endnote"><p>YouTube, How to Choose a Password – Computerphile <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg">[Invidious]</a></sup><a href="#fnref556" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn557" role="doc-endnote"><p>Wikipedia, Passphrase <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection" class="uri">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection</a> <sup><a href="https://wikiless.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection">[Wikiless]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref557" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
-<li id="fn558" role="doc-endnote"><p>Monero Research Lab, Evaluating cryptocurrency security and privacy in a post-quantum world <a href="https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf" class="uri">https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref558" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn547" role="doc-endnote"><p>NIST, NIST Has Spoken - Death to Complexity, Long Live the Passphrase! <a href="https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/" class="uri">https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.sans.org/blog/nist-has-spoken-death-to-complexity-long-live-the-passphrase/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref547" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn548" role="doc-endnote"><p>ZDnet, FBI recommends passphrases over password complexity <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/" class="uri">https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.zdnet.com/article/fbi-recommends-passphrases-over-password-complexity/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref548" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn549" role="doc-endnote"><p>The Intercept, Passphrases That You Can Memorize — But That Even the NSA Can’t Guess <a href="https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/" class="uri">https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/</a> <sup><a href="https://27m3p2uv7igmj6kvd4ql3cct5h3sdwrsajovkkndeufumzyfhlfev4qd.onion/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/">[Tor Mirror]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/passphrases-can-memorize-attackers-cant-guess/">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref549" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn550" role="doc-endnote"><p>Proton Blog, Let’s settle the password vs. passphrase debate once and for all <a href="https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase/" class="uri">https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase/</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-com-blog-password-vs-passphrase">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref550" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn551" role="doc-endnote"><p>YouTube, Edward Snowden on Passwords: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=yzGzB-yYKcc">[Invidious]</a></sup><a href="#fnref551" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn552" role="doc-endnote"><p>YouTube, How to Choose a Password – Computerphile <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg" class="uri">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg</a> <sup><a href="https://yewtu.be/watch?v=3NjQ9b3pgIg">[Invidious]</a></sup><a href="#fnref552" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn553" role="doc-endnote"><p>Wikipedia, Passphrase <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection" class="uri">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection</a> <sup><a href="https://wikiless.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection">[Wikiless]</a></sup> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passphrase#Passphrase_selection">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref553" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
+<li id="fn554" role="doc-endnote"><p>Monero Research Lab, Evaluating cryptocurrency security and privacy in a post-quantum world <a href="https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf" class="uri">https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf</a> <sup><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/insight-decentralized-consensus-lab/post-quantum-monero/blob/master/writeups/technical_note.pdf">[Archive.org]</a></sup><a href="#fnref554" class="footnote-back" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li>
 </ol>
 </section>
 </body>